

No. 12344

Supreme Court of Illinois

People, ex. rel.

vs.

Evans

71641  7

The last General Assembly established a Court for the Cities of Peru and Savalle.

The question submitted is the constitutionality of this law establishing one and the same Court for two Cities. In all other respects it is admitted that the law conforms to the constitutional requirements.

This is also admitted that the Cities of Savalle and Peru adjoin, and are situated in the same County.

The 1st Sec of Art 5th of the constitution vests the judicial power of this State in one supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, in County Courts and in Justices of the Peace.

This is a distribution of the entire judicial power of the State among the Courts named, and standing alone and unqualified is a prohibition upon the Legislature forbidding it to place any portion of that power elsewhere. The section however concludes with the following proviso. Provided that inferior Courts may be established by the General Assembly in the Cities of this State, but such Courts shall have a uniform organization and jurisdiction.

This proviso limits the prohibition, and as to establishing inferior Courts in the Cities of the State restores the Legislature to plenary authority, only requiring it to give to the Courts it may establish uniform organization and jurisdiction. The power to which it is thus restored by the proviso is, as to the Cities in the State and subject in its exercise to the

requirements mentioned, the same power and of the same extent it would have possessed over every other portion of the State, had Art 5th not been placed in the Constitution. For though some sections of this Article refer to the judicial Office generally, and some sections to matters appertaining to the exercise of judicial power in broad and equally general terms, yet these sections do not apply to the judicial offices to be created by the Legislature, or to the exercise of judicial power in the inferior Courts it may establish in the Cities - They refer to the Constitutional Courts and not to those created by Legislative act unless the latter be particularly embraced. *The People v Wilson* 15th Ill: 393.

What then would have been the extent of Legislative authority without the Article in question over the judicial system of the State?

The constitution of a State is a limitation of Legislative power, and not a grant of power.

The Legislative body in a government has all the powers incident to government not deposited elsewhere by the organic law, or the exercise of which that law does not forbid. The 5th art is the only limitation of Legislative power in the particular to which it refers necessary to mention; in its absence, therefore, supposing it to be the only restraining article or provision, the Legislature would have been unrestricted. The Legislature could have deposited the judicial power where it pleased, and have distributed it as it deemed expedient. - it could have established

as many Courts as it considered convenience required - have regulated their jurisdiction as it thought proper and given one Court, to two, three or five Counties, or given two, three or five Courts to one County.

If this view of Legislative power, and the action of Constitutional provisions upon it, be correct, as it unquestionably is, then the effect of the proviso is, as before stated, to limit the limitation, which immediately precedes it.

Had this proviso only said, - "that inferior Courts may be established by the General Assembly in the Cities of this State," - and there stopped, - its effect would have been to restore the Legislative power without any restriction whatever, as to establishing inferior Courts in the Cities. The peculiar phraseology used cannot alter the fact, and the proviso though in some of its terms apparently a grant, is really not so, but restrains the generality of the language which immediately precedes it. If, as to establishing inferior Courts in the Cities, the Legislative power is fully restored or, in other words, if as to inferior Courts in the Cities of the State, there is no limitation upon the inherent authority of the Legislature, that authority would authorize it to establish as many in one City - or one for as many Cities as it should judge to be proper and advisable.

Had the proviso contained nothing more than supposed above, I presume there could be no question as to the constitutionality ~~un-~~ of the law submitted

It could not be contended that the proviso anywhere required the use of the word respectively as relating to the word Cities, and the whole proviso taken together being a limitation of power must be construed strictly. The People v Wilson 15th Ill: 392.

The limitation is a limitation upon the exercise of the judgment of the body organized as part of the government and required to judge and act, according to the emergencies and conditions existing at the time its action is invoked. Such a limitation must be confined strictly to the letter. This principle applies not only to the proviso supposed, - but to the proviso as it is.

It seems clear that no difficulty would exist as to this law, if the proviso was as above written.

The difficulty then is, in the concluding words of the section - viz. - "but such Courts shall have a uniform organization and jurisdiction."

1. Can a Court which sits for two Cities be of uniform organization with a Court that sits for one City only?

The organization of a Court is not necessarily affected by the fact that it sits for a County or a City or for one City or two Cities. The organization of a Court means its structure and form - that is to say, the manner in which the powers that belong to a Court are distributed, divided and appointed for the purpose of being exercised. A Court with one judge, for

instance is differently organized from a Court with two judges - The powers that belong to each Court respectively, are not, in each, distributed in a uniform manner.

The only plausible position that can be taken against this law on the ground that the organization of the Court it creates is not uniform with the organization of other Courts established by the Legislature is that the Judge of this Court is appointed by the Governor and hereafter to be elected by the qualified voters of two Cities.

But it has been already determined by the Supreme Court of this State, that such a difference in the mode of appointment, as intimated above will not affect the organization of a Court.

The Recorder of Chicago is elected by the qualified voters of Chicago.

The Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of the City of Cairo is "nominated and appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

In the matter of James Welsh 117 Ill: 165 the Supreme Court say: "The existence of the Court of Common Pleas of Cairo is by no means inconsistent with the continuance of the Recorders Court of Chicago." The particular question in relation to which the Supreme Court adverted to these Courts in comparison with each other, was one of jurisdiction, but it would be wanting in respect to that Tribunal not to presume,

that it would not have been made such an emphatic declaration unless satisfied, that as to all questions that appeared before it in the laws creating them respectively there was no ground to maintain that either was unconstitutional.

If the mode of appointment cannot affect the organization of the Court, a fortiori the boundaries of the Territory over which its jurisdiction extends can not.

The mode of appointment is the source of power to be exercised - the boundaries of the territory over which the jurisdiction extends is the territorial limit to which the exercise of that power extends - Neither the manner of receiving the power, nor the extent of Territory over which it is to be exercised can regulate the organization of the body which is made its depository.

The only limitation here, is that of the Constitution which requires that these Courts should be confined to the Cities.

The Supreme Court in *Perry et al v The People* 111th Ill: 500, uses the following language, in speaking of the 1st Sec of the 5th article: "The uniformity of organization & jurisdiction", has respect to the Courts, and not to Cities as its antecedent."

Q. Can a Court which sits for two Cities be of uniform jurisdiction with a Court that sits for one City only?

The meaning of the word jurisdiction is - legal

authority - extent of power. But this extent is not measured by the superficial area of territory. A Court may have a jurisdiction much larger than another and yet be confined in its exercise to a much smaller territory. Courts in technical language are said to be Courts of general jurisdiction and Courts of limited or special jurisdiction, but the extent of territory over which the jurisdiction, in either the one case or other, is exercised, forms no element in determining the character of the Court. That is determined by the extent of the legal power of which it is the depository, and this legal power is in no way lessened or increased, by lessening or increasing the extent of territory over which it may be exercised. However that may be changed by being made greater or smaller, the jurisdiction - that is the legal power with which the Court is invested remains the same.

If this were not so, then it would follow that the jurisdiction of the various Circuit Courts would be different or not uniform. Because there are no two Circuits in the State, probably, of precisely the same size, and some Courts embrace more and some less counties than others. But it is known that these Courts are of uniform jurisdiction.

The word uniform means - having the same form with others - consonant - agreeing with each other - conforming to one rule or mode - If a Court can

not be uniform with another in jurisdiction, because the limits within which the jurisdiction is exercised are not of the same dimensions, then in order that it should become of uniform jurisdiction, it is necessary to make these limits perfectly equal. Such a rule will not be answered by an approximate equality.

This is the logical necessity of the position and makes its absurdity apparent.

But does the fact of one or more municipal organizations within the limits of its jurisdiction affect or modify that jurisdiction? There seems to be less reason for any affect from this source than from that discussed above.

The Municipal organization is entirely independent of the Court. If there are several municipal organizations within the jurisdiction of a Court, that Court has cognisance of complaints by and against more Mayors, Aldermen and Scavengers, than a Court within whose jurisdiction there is but one, ~~but~~ in the latter Court, to exercise its legal power over the one Mayor or Alderman, requires as large an extent of jurisdiction as is needed by the other to exercise its legal power over its half-dozen Mayors. The Court of Common Pleas in Chicago has jurisdiction over more judges than the Court of Common Pleas of Cairo; are their respective jurisdictions not therefore uniform?

How otherwise is the jurisdiction of a Court

affected by being extended over several municipal organizations? If these Cities were remote and in different Counties, making it necessary that two different Sheriffs and probably a Clerk in each County should form part of the Court, it might then, not be uniform in its organization with a Court having only one: but even such a condition of things would not affect its jurisdiction.

But in the case under consideration - the two Cities are not remote - but join each other and are in the same County.

The law in question is in our judgment not only Constitutional, but a judicious exercise of legislative power, with a view to convenience and economy.

In the above argument the fact is not noticed that the ~~actual~~ jurisdiction of the Court is not confined to the Cities of Sasalee & Fern, but is extended to the towns of Sasalee & Salsberry - Did the Constitution intend to allow the Legislature to confer upon the City Courts extrajurisdiction territorially? & if not did they not intend that the territorial jurisdiction should be limited to the Cities in which the courts are established? If they

Can go beyond the city limits
& embrace one or more towns may
they not embrace the whole County
if one county then why not several
Counties or the whole State?

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People's and Peasants

n

Wars

Agreement

(5-11-1917)

People of the State

vs

Exors.

The power conferred upon the General Assembly by the Provision contained in Art 5. Sec 1. of the Constitution "to Establish Inferior ~~Courts~~ Local Courts of Civil & Criminal Jurisdiction", "in the Cities of this State" of uniform organization and jurisdiction if viewed in a spirit of liberal construction would, without working injury to any vested right, greatly aid in meeting the wants of crowded localities; and tend materially to disengage the subject from those difficulties, in which a strict construction involves the question.

The exercise of this power, is given by the Constitution to the General Assembly to meet the wants and necessities of Cities. As these Cities differ in extent of territory; in the number of their population — and are in no respect similar, excepting only in the fact of their being Municipal Corporations "The uniformity of organization and jurisdiction" provided for in the Constitution cannot it would seem be limited to a uniformity of either territory, or population, or any other mere physical circumstance characterizing the various Cities — in which (as before remarked) they are each dissimilar.

This view if strictly carried out, could result only in the establishment of one Inferior ^{Local} Court — and its benefits could be enjoyed ~~by~~ not by "the Cities of the State", but only by one City — whereas the language of the Constitution is broad

and embraces all of the Cities in the State; giving the General Assembly power to establish these Inferior local Courts in them all if deemed Expedient.

If this position is correct it would seem, that in the Exercise of the power "to establish Inferior Local Courts, for the Cities of the State; the General Assembly were not restricted to the establishment of Inferior Courts, all of them to be made after precisely the same pattern - without regard to their adaptation and fitness for the locality where they were to exist.

Can the Constitution be fairly construed to mean that each Inferior Court should be precisely similar to every other Inferior Court established by the General Assembly? Does it not rather mean, that the Inferior Courts established in different Cities need not necessarily be similar the one to another; but that the uniformity, required in organization & jurisdiction, should be limited to the Municipalities in which such Inferior Courts are established?

In other words that the terms "Uniform organization and Jurisdiction in such Cities" contained in the proviso of the first section of the 5th Article, mean, what they purport to mean - that no "inferior Court" can be established in a particular City in this State - differing in organization and jurisdiction, from any other Inferior Court existing in the same City.

People of ed Baha
at
Cross

Argument -

[Faint, illegible handwriting covering the majority of the page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.]

State of Illinois - Supreme Court
April Term A.D. 1887

The People & rel

Henry S. Rabe

vs

David Evans

(Clerk of the Recorders Court
for the cities of LaSalle & Peru)

Points on the fact of the Relator

That the act of the General Assembly
Establishing the Recorders Court for
the cities of Peru and LaSalle is void
in violation of the 7 & 8 of the 11. Article
of the Constitution of this State

It. The act not being within any
prohibition upon the power of the
Legislature, contained in the Constitution
it is not in violation of the Constitution
And the mandamus prayed for should
be awarded

Chambers & Etalidge
Per Relator

Sup. Court

The People &c
vs Wm Henry S. Rabe
17

Warrant Executed

Attest

J

Points on Submission
of the case above the
point of the Relator

In the Supreme Court of } To the April Term
the State of Illinois } thereof A.D. 1857

The People of the
State of Illinois & of
Henry S. Peck
vs
David Evans, Clerk
of the Records Court of
the Cities of LaSalle and

Peru
State of Illinois & of
LaSalle County & of

The Petition of the
above named Henry S. Peck
respectfully shows to the Court that
the General Assembly of the State of Illi-
nois by an act approved February
18th 1857, Established in the Cities of
LaSalle and Peru in said County
of LaSalle and State of Illinois an inferior
Court of criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion called the Records Court for
the Cities of LaSalle and Peru and
thence gave to said Court Concurrent
Jurisdiction with the Circuit of said
LaSalle County within the towns of
LaSalle and Salisbury Excepting in
Cases of murder and treason
And your Petitioner further shows
that the Governor of this State in

pursuance of said act of the General
assembly afterwards to wit on the
10th day of March 1857, appointed
Churchill Coffin Esq. of the City
of New Orleans to the office of
Judge of said County, and who on
the 15th day of ^{March} 1857, accepted
such appointment and was duly
qualified as such Judge and
thereupon entered upon the
duties of said office - that after
wards and on the 20th day of March
1857, the said Churchill Coffin,
as Judge of said County by virtue
of the authority vested in him
under the provisions of said act
of the General assembly appointed
Daniel Edouard Esq. of the City
of La Salle in said County to be the
Clerk of said County and the said
Edouard was on the same day of
~~1857~~ 1857, duly qualified as such Clerk
& accepted said office - And your
Petitioner further shows that by
the provisions of said act of the
General assembly the Clerk of
said County is required to perform
the same duties in respect to said
County and the business thereof

As is required by law to be performed
by the Clerks of the several Circuit
Courts of this State in respect to such
complaints and the business thereof
and your Petitioner further shows
that on the 15th day of May 1887
your Petitioner tendered to said Clerk
of said ^{County} Court at his office in the
City of Lasalle aforesaid, a Precept
of which the annexed marked A,
is a copy and requested said Clerk
to file said Precept and issue a
Summons at the heels of your
Petitioner against ~~the said~~
Wilson Maxson, the defendant
Whom named as is and by said
Precept he was commanded, and
at the same time tendered him
his fees allowed by law for issuing
such precept to wit Two Dollars
and Fifty Cents yet the said David
Evans then and then so being
Clerk of said Court as aforesaid
refused to and would not issue
file said Precept and issue said
Precept, ^{as requested by your Petitioner &} as is by said Precept he
was required to and required to do
Wherefore and inasmuch as said
David Evans so being Clerk of
said Court, hath refused to issue

Said process as aforesaid as by
law, as your Petitioner is advised
he was required to do. Your Petitioner
prays that an alternative writ
of Mandamus may issue by
and under the direction of this
Court directed to said Daniel
Evans Clerk of said Recorder
Court requiring him to file
said process and issue said
process or show cause ^{before this court} at a time
and place to be therein mentioned
why he so refused - and that in
case of his omission to appear and
show cause why he so refused
or in case of his appearance and
failure to show any sufficient
cause for such refusal that a
peremptory writ of Mandamus
may issue by and under the order
of this Court commanding
said ~~him~~ ^{him} to file said process
and show such summons
as requested and required as
aforesaid. Or for such other or
different relief in the premises as
Your Honors may deem proper
to grant - Dated May 1857

Henry S. Beebe

Chambers P. Dauder
for Petitioner

State of Illinois }
 LaSalle County } of Henry S. Beebe being
 duly sworn says that he is the
 petitioner in the foregoing
 petition named - and that ~~the~~
 said petition is substantiated and
 correct facts. } Henry S. Beebe
 Sworn before me
 this 15th day of May 1854 }
 Notary public

(A)

State of Illinois
 Henry S. Beebe } in the Recorder's Court
 vs } for the City of LaSalle
 Nelson Masson } and Term

Assumpsit Damages \$100.
 5th July Term 1854.

Clk please file preps and
 issue summons as above ^{to Sheriff of Whitesides Co.} returnable
 as above - return May 14, 1857
 Chasmasse & Glady,
 Pepp, Atty

It is hereby stipulated & admitted by
the undersigned the Respondent in the
foregoing Petition ~~that~~ that the facts
stated in said Petition are true, and
the issuing of an alternative Mandamus,
or the granting of a Rule Remedy is
hereby expressly waived, and it is further
stipulated on the part of this Respondent
that the Order made, if one shall be made
by the Court for the issuing of a Mandamus
as prayed for in said petition, may be
for a peremptory Mandamus, and the
determination of the Court upon the question
of issuing such Mandamus is hereby
submitted upon the following which
it is stipulated and agreed shall
be taken and considered by the Court
with the like effect in all respects as if
made as a formal return to an alternative
Mandamus duly issued as prayed for
in said Petition, viz: That the cause
and only reason assigned by this Respondent
for refusing to issue such summons as
required by said Petitioner as set forth in
said Petition, is that the act of the
Annual Assembly of this State ^{establishing} ~~constituting~~
said Recorders Court for the Cities
of ~~Rosario~~ Sabado and Peru as stated
in said Petition is in violation of the

first (1) Section of the Fifth (5) Article of
 the Constitution of this State and
 therefore void. ~~And that~~ Wherefore
 this Respondent submits that to the
 Court, and claims that said Court
 so established is ~~not~~ ^{Constitutional} ~~and~~ ^{is}
 Judicial Tribunal under the Constitution
 of this State, and that the appointments
 of this Respondent by the Judge thereof,
 to the Office of Clerk of such Court
 confers no powers upon this Respon-
 dent to act in the premises, - wherefore
 he refuses to issue said process as stated
 in said Petition -

James Evans, (Respondent)

Superior Court April Term A.D. 1837
 The People vs. J. R. B. }
 Henry S. Baber }
 by }
 Daniel Evans }
 Clerk } and now comes
 the said People vs. J. R. B. and the said
 Henry S. Baber and says that said
 Act establishing said Recorder's Court
 for the Cities of LaSalle & Peru is not
 in violation of the first Section of
 the Fifth Article of the Constitution
 of this State and that the said Relation
 says may be Criminal of the
 Chamber of Deputies for Relations

State of Illinois
Superior Court

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The People & vs

Henry S. Pube

vs

Daniel Evans

Petition for
Mandamus

Filed May 16, 1857
S. Seland
Clerk

Chambers & Eldridge
for Petitioner

An Act to establish a Recorder's Court for the cities of
Lasalle and Peru.

Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, repre-
sented in the General Assembly,

That there shall be established in the cities of Lasalle and
Peru in Lasalle County an Inferior Court of civil and
criminal jurisdiction, which court shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Circuit Court of Lasalle County, in
all civil and criminal cases, excepting cases of murder
and treason; which Court shall be called the Recorder's Court
for the cities of Lasalle and Peru, and shall have concu-
rent jurisdiction with the Circuit court of Lasalle County,
in the towns of Lasalle and Salisbury in said County, except
in the cases above excepted.

Section 2 The judge of said court shall be nominated and ap-
pointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and shall hold his office until
the next general election for judges of the Circuit Court
in this State, and until his successor shall be elected and
qualified at said election, and at every general election
for judges of the Circuit Court of this State there shall be
elected by the qualified electors of said cities and of
said towns of Lasalle and Salisbury, a recorder of the cities
of Lasalle and Peru. The judge of said court shall have
power to appoint a clerk of said court, and the said
clerk shall give bond to perform the same duties, and
be subject to the same liabilities, and be entitled to the
same fees as are or may be provided by law in relation

to clerks of the Circuit Court. The judge of said court shall be called the Recorder of the cities of LaSalle and Peru, and shall receive an annual salary of five hundred dollars, to be paid quarterly out of the State Treasury, and such additional compensation as the City Councils of said cities may allow, and in addition thereto shall receive the like fees as are received by the judges of the Cook County Court of Common Pleas to be collected in the same manner as is provided by law for the collection of the fees of the last mentioned judge.

Section 4. The City Attornies of the cities of LaSalle and Peru, shall be Prosecuting Attornies for said court, and may act separately in the terms of said court, held in their said cities, or jointly, if the judge of said court shall so order, and they shall receive the same fees as are now allowed by law to State Attornies, and such additional compensation, to be paid out of their respective City Treasuries, as the Councils thereof respectively may order and direct.

Section 5. The grand and petit jurors of said court shall be selected from the qualified voters in the territory embraced within said cities and towns of LaSalle and Salisbury, in such manner as the City Councils of said cities may direct; for which purpose, each City Council of the City in which the Court is to be held, is required to certify to the clerk a list respectively of the grand and petit jurors at least ten days before each term of said court. Provided that the said Court may cause talesman to be called and to serve as jurors, subject to the same restrictions

and in the same manner as is now provided by law in relation to jurors in the Circuit Court. Provided, further, that said jurors shall be entitled to the same fees as now provided by law in relation to jurors in the Circuit Court. Provided further, that grand jurors need not be summoned unless the judge shall certify to the city Council the need thereof.

Section 6.

The regular terms of said Court shall be held on the first Mondays of January, April, July and October of each year, at such places as the City Councils of said cities shall designate. The first term of said Court shall be held on the first Monday in April next in the City of LaSalle, and alternately thereafter in the said cities. The judge of said Court shall determine the duration of the terms, and may call special terms when the business of the Court, in his opinion, may require. Provided, that the City Councils of said Cities may change the times of holding the regular terms of said Court.

Section 7.

Changes of venue in all cases may be taken from said Court to the Circuit Court of LaSalle County, for the same causes and in the same manner as changes of venue are now by law allowed from the Circuit Court; and when the petition shall allege that the inhabitants of LaSalle County are prejudiced against the petitioner, the change of venue shall be to the Circuit Court of some adjoining County, where the causes of Complaint do not exist. Provided, that if the judge of said Court shall not be satisfied that said petition is true, the Court may re-

quire the petition to be verified by the oath of some credible person, other than the party applying for such change of venue, and may require the reasons for the belief of the petitioner to be stated in the petition.

Section 8 All fines and forfeitures recovered in said Courts for the violation of any State Law shall be paid into the City Treasuries of said Cities in equal proportions, and the fees of the grand and petit jurors, and all fees attending the summoning of the same, shall be paid out of the City Treasuries of said Cities in equal proportion, and the Clerk of said Court at the end of each term thereof shall certify to the City Councils of said Cities respecting all fees that may be due the jurors at each term.

Section 9 The City Councils of said Cities shall provide a seal for said Court, and all process issued from said Court shall be attested in the name of the Clerk, and be impregned with the seal of the Court, and shall run throughout the territory within the jurisdiction of said Court, and shall also run throughout the County of Dallas, and also the State, in all cases where the process issued by the Circuit Court or the Clerk thereof may by law run into any other County than the one in which the same may be issued, and shall be returnable in the same manner as like process is made returnable in the Circuit Court. Provided, that all criminal process shall run throughout the State, as criminal process issued by the Circuit Court.

Section 10 The Marshals of said Cities, or either of them, and

the Sheriff of Lasalle County are hereby authorized to execute all process issued by or out of said Court, or which may otherwise come into their or either of their hands, and make due returns of the manner of executing the same, as now provided by law in relation to Sheriffs in like cases; and when they or either of them shall have executed any criminal process, they shall take recognizances and make return thereof as is now provided by law in like cases, in relation to Sheriffs, and the said Marshals or Sheriff shall be entitled to receive the same fees ~~xx~~ allowed by law for like services.

Section 11. All appeals, proceedings in the nature of appeals, and writs of certiorari taken from judgments of justices of the peace and other inferior tribunals within the towns of Lasalle and Salisbury may be taken to the said court in like manner as now provided by law in relation to appeals and writs of certiorari from justices of the peace to the Circuit Court, and shall be there heard and determined as in like cases in the Circuit Court, and appeals may be taken, and writs of error prosecuted to the Supreme Court as now provided by law in relation to appeals and writs of error from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court.

Section 12 The Judge of said Court shall appoint a master in chancery for said Court, who shall be qualified in the same manner, be subject to the

same liabilities, possess the same powers, perform the same duties, and be entitled to the same fees, as other masters in Chancery.

Section 13. All sales of property made by virtue of any process of said Court, in which in a like case the Sheriff would be required to make such sale at the Court House, shall be, by one of the Marshals of said City, or the Sheriff of said County, made at the place of holding the Court from which such process is issued.

Section 14. All judgments rendered in said Court, shall become liens in like manner and to like extent as judgments rendered in the Circuit Court, and shall be enforced and collected in like manner. Parties by agreement in civil cases, may dispense with a jury, and submit their cases to the judgment of the Court.

Section 15. The City Councils of LaSalle and Perushall provide a jail or jails in which to keep prisoners, and the expense of keeping and sending the same to the penitentiary shall be paid in the same manner as is now provided by law for the keeping and sending prisoners from the County jails to the penitentiary.

Section 16. The practice in said Court shall conform to the practice

practicing the Circuit Court so far as applicable.

Section 17 This act shall be deemed a public act, and be in force from and after its passage, and all laws conflicting therewith are hereby repealed.

Saml Holmes
Speaker of the House of Reps
John Wood
Speaker of the Senate

Approved Feb 18, 1857.

Wm A. Russell



Certified Copy of
the act of the General
Assembly, Establishing
a Recorder Court,
in the Cities of
Lasalle and Peris

approved Feby 18, 1857

File # 400



United States of America, } ss.
STATE OF ILLINOIS.



I, Ozias M. Hatch, Secretary of State
of the State of Illinois, do hereby certify
the foregoing to be a true and correct copy of
an enrolled law now on file in my office.
In witness whereof, I have herunto set
my hand, and caused the great seal of State
to be affixed. Done at Springfield, this
7th day of March 1857.

O. M. Hatch Secretary.

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People or relations
Henry S. Beebe

v
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