

14487

No. \_\_\_\_\_

# Supreme Court of Illinois

Fenden et al

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vs.

Stiles et al

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STATE OF ILLINOIS,  
SUPREME COURT,  
Third Grand Division

No. 249

Funder  
vs  
Stiles

1863

14487

1863

# Supreme Court of Illinois.

THIRD GRAND DIVISION.

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APRIL TERM, A. D. 1863.

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HIRAM FENDEN ET AL.,

vs.

ELIAS B. STILES.

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## POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

FOR APPELLEE.

The first point of Appellant seems to be that in a suit against three, with service of process on two, and a return of "not found" as to the other, the judgment should be pro forma against all. We do not understand how it can be against all and pro forma as to the one not served, and substantial as to the two served. The intention seems very clearly to have been that there might be a judgment against a part of several joint defendants where some were not found by the officer, and such has always been the construction of the act and the practice under it.

In answer to the second point made, it is only necessary to refer the Court to page 28 of the Record, where it is stated that the sum of \$411.67 was agreed upon in open Court by the parties to the suit, as the damages sustained. This seems to have been accidentally overlooked. It is not in the abstract.

The third, fourth, fifth and sixth points are in relation to the defects of the declaration. If the declaration contains facts showing a cause of action, though not stated as clearly and fully as they might have been, the Court will not reverse the judgment. We think the declaration contains enough to sustain the judgment. Where a plaintiff relies upon a recovery against him as the sole evidence of his right to recover over against a defendant, the latter ought to have notice of the suit in which the recovery is had against the plaintiff.

The judgment in such cases is competent to show the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover over, but it is not competent for the purpose of showing the right to have recovered the amount of the plaintiff which he seeks to recover over.



But it is said that Stiles shall not recover on the bond, because running horses and betting on the race is a violation of the statute. We concede that a person shall not recover a wager which he has won on a horse race, because he relies upon a contract made in violation of a law which forbids it under a penalty; but a suit may be maintained by one of the bettors, against the stakeholder, to recover the amount by him deposited before it is paid over, because he does not rely upon a contract made in violation of law, but by his action disaffirms it. Stiles being thus under a legal obligation to pay back the money to Atkins, one who contracts to indemnify him for doing that which he is legally obliged to do, should be held to perform his contract of indemnity. The case of *Peck vs. Briggs and Carfield*, 3 Denio 107, is in point. It would be grossly immoral for Fender not to pay back to Stiles the amount which Atkins thus recovered of him, and which Fender agreed to pay back to Stiles if the latter had to pay it to Atkins, in accordance with and not in violation of laws.

We are not aware of any statute which the payment by Fender to Stiles of the amount which the latter had paid Atkins, would violate; nor do we see any breach of good morals in a compliance by Fender and his securities with their obligations. The compliance with the bond neither violates the legal nor moral code, and the recovery was proper.

*Wood* We are aware that a contract collateral to a gaming or other illegal contract may be considered when it is necessary in an action on the collateral contracts to rely upon and affirm the gaming or other illegal contracts, but it is because of the disaffirmance of the illegal contract that Atkins recovered of Stiles, and for the same reason the latter should recover on the bond though it grew out of the betting on the race.

*Barn* Stiles was no party to the bet, and if merely acting as a stakeholder was an illegal transaction and in violation of the statute, it would follow that Atkins could not recover of him the amount of his deposited. The bettors are the only violators of the law; therefore, a person who agrees to be paid for an article sold by the loser of a bet between other parties, the article being the thing bet, can recover the price, and money loaned to be used in gaming could be recovered at common law, though the gaming itself was illegal. (1 Scam. 577.) And generally a contract collateral to the illegal one is valid unless it is necessary to rely upon and affirm the illegal one in a suit on the collateral one. (See 4 ~~Barn~~ 2069; 2 N. H., McOrt., 827; 11 Wheaton, 258) It is hardly necessary to say in relation to the 6th point, that if Atkins demanded his deposit from the stakeholder before it was paid over, and recovered and collected the amount of him, that he could not recover the amount again from Fender, though Stiles had paid it to him and taken his bond to repay it in case Atkins collected it of him.

LELAND & BLANCHARD  
And GEORGE P. GOODWIN,  
FOR APPELLEE.



COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS AND MINES, CHICAGO, ILL.

F. FULTON & Co., PRINTERS, 148 LAKE ST., CHICAGO,

# SUPREME COURT STATE OF ILLINOIS,

THIRD GRAND DIVISION.

APRIL TERM, 1863.

HIRAM FENDER, ET AL.,  
IMPLEADED, &C.,  
Appellants,  
vs.  
ELIAS B. STILES,  
Appellee.

} Appeal from Lec Circuit.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF.

FIRST POINT.

The suit is brought upon a joint and several Bond against *all* the obligors. The plaintiff below, by his declaration, chose to attempt the maintenance of an action against all the defendants and obligors jointly. He could sue one, or all three, but not two out of three; for in this way he would neither treat the obligation as joint or several, but between the two. Having attempted a joint proceeding, his judgment must correspond with his declaration, or it is erroneous and should be reversed. This is elementary in law where there is no countervailing statute.

It is submitted that there is no statute in this State which changes this rule. The statute, page 413, Sec. 6, 1845, authorizes judgment in *form* against all *joint* debtors where a part *only* have been served with process, the same as if all the defendants were in court. This statute being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly complied with, or the judgment is ill for error. In this case judgment was rendered against *only* two of the defendants, and no judgment as to Deeds, who was not served and did not appear. It is obvious that if all

the defendants had been in court by the service of process, that judgment should have been against *all*, or that it would be bad.

*Stratfield vs. Holliday*, 3 T. R. 782.  
Cook's Rep. 257—494.  
Breese Rep. 128.  
2 Scam. 36—319.

#### SECOND POINT.

The amount of recovery in this case did not depend upon computation, nor did the judgment go by default, nor was an assessment by jury waived, nor is there any award of a writ of enquiry in the judgment. This should have been done. The court can only pursue the forms of law in pronouncing judgment. We are not aware of any authority by statute for the entry of such a judgment as that disclosed by this record. Upon consulting the forms of judgments on demurrer in favor of the plaintiff, it is thought that no prototype for the judgment at bar can be found. It may be said that the defect is a matter of form. This conceded does not do away with the fact that it is through form that substance is maintained and recognized in law.

#### THIRD POINT.

Although there is some difference in the various counts in the declaration, yet it is submitted that they are all defective in substance.

1. The plaintiff claims to recover in consequence of a judgment rendered *against* and paid by him in favor of one "*Atkins*," whom he avers is the person *intended* in the bond, counted on by the name of "*Alkinson*." This being so, he should have set forth the record, or so much as would have disclosed the *specific* ground of action; so that the court could determine whether that recovery was within the condition of the bond sued upon so as to constitute a breach; or at least the pleader should have *averred* that the cause of action in the prior suit was such that a recovery against the plaintiff below would create a breach of the bond in question. This was not done, even if it be conceded that averments may take the place of a "*record*"

*set forth.*" The appellants were strangers to that record, and it should have been distinctly set forth. There is nothing to show that the appellants ever heard of that prior suit until the exhibition of the narr in this case.

2. There could be no breach of the bond in question other than that "*By reason of said Stiles refusing to pay said money, or any portion thereof, to said Atkinson.*" Now, it is nowhere averred that the judgment mentioned was recovered on the ground or for the reason that Stiles had "*refused to pay said money, or any portion thereof, to said Atkinson*"; yet without this there could be no breach of the bond. Instead of this averment, it is alleged that the recovery was had by occasion of a *certain claim* which the plaintiff had against the defendant in that suit, concerning the money placed in the hands of Stiles. This might well be, and a recovery had without any averment that Stiles *had refused* to pay to Atkins that money or any part thereof. Averment that Atkins forbade Stiles to pay over the money to Fender, and that notwithstanding, he did afterwards pay it over, would have been entirely sufficient to maintain the action if sustained by proof. Paying the money to *Fender* against this *forbidding* is very *different* from *refusing* to pay it to *Atkins*. This money being in the hands of Stiles for an illegal purpose, was subject to be retained by him for the party who placed it there, to the extent of his deposit, in case he forbade its being paid over to the other party while still in his hands. Paying to the other party after being forbidden, would make Stiles liable to the forbidding party. This would be a claim, in fact, a *certain claim*, against him in relation to said money, and clearly actionable upon general principles. But would this be actionable by reason of refusing to pay to another person? Obviously not; no question of refusal would arise in such a case.

Had the record been set forth, the court could see whether the grounds of recovery were such as to constitute a breach of the bond in question. By the recitals in the bond it appears that there was a *dispute* as to which party was entitled to it. That is, the *whole* \$872; not *merely* the half, or sum which each had put up.

Again, the bond appears to be based upon an *executed consideration*, without any statement as to whether there had been

any request by any one as to that transaction—(namely, the paying of the money to Fender)—or as to the making of the bond in question. It is submitted that where a contract has its basis in an executed consideration, that no recovery can be had unless the request comes from the party promising. These views are based mainly, or in part, at least, upon the ground that the whole transaction was legal.

#### FOURTH POINT.

The whole consideration was in relation to that which was illegal, and made void by the statute. It was a gaming transaction. In such case the condition of the defendant is best; and the courts will *not* listen to the complaint of a man who has been violating a statute. This bond is within the teeth of the statute against gaming. It has no other consideration.

Chap. 46 Rev. Statutes 1845, Sec. 1, page 263.

#### FIFTH POINT.

The bond in question, if sustainable in law, was given for the purpose of indemnifying Stiles as to the specified matter.

The declaration should, therefore, have contained an averment that notice of the pendency of the former suit—and which was the predicate of this action—had been given to Fender, so that he might have taken upon himself the defense thereof—*non constat* that a recovery would not have been defeated, had this been done.

*Bond vs. Ward*, 1 Nott & McCord, 201.

New Edition, 120.

2 New H. Rep. 190.

#### SIXTH POINT.

By section 2 of chapter 46, above noted, Atkins could have maintained an action against Fender in case he lost the money at gaming, it having passed into his hands; and the law would not allow him to maintain an action therefor against any other person. If he did not lose it gaming he can yet maintain an action against Fender, as money had and received to his use; and Fender could not plead the recovery against Stiles in bar

of the action, because Stiles and Fender are *not* privies in this judgment. To allow this action to be maintained by Stiles, is to subject Fender to the payment of the same debt twice and to different persons. If illegal, because lost at gaming, no action can be maintained except under the statute.

J. H. KNOWLTON,  
*of Counsel.*

L. E. DEWOLF,  
*Attorney for Appellants.*

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Winnans Gordon et al

vs

Elias B Stiles

Appl. B. C. & P. -

Filed May 4, 1863

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F. FULTON & Co., PRINTERS, 148 LAKE ST., CHICAGO,

# SUPREME COURT STATE OF ILLINOIS,

THIRD GRAND DIVISION.

APRIL TERM, 1863.

HIRAM FENDER, ET AL.,  
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Appellants,  
vs.  
ELIAS B. STILES,  
Appellee.

} *Appeal from Lee Circuit.*

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It is submitted that there is no statute in this State which changes this rule. The statute, page 413, Sec. 6, 1845, authorizes judgment in *form* against all *joint* debtors where a part *only* have been served with process, the same as if all the defendants were in court. This statute being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly complied with, or the judgment is ill for error. In this case judgment was rendered against *only* two of the defendants, and no judgment as to Deeds, who was not served and did not appear. It is obvious that if all

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1. The plaintiff claims to recover in consequence of a judgment rendered *against* and paid by him in favor of one "*Atkins*," whom he avers is the person *intended* in the bond, counted on by the name of "*Atkinson*." This being so, he should have set forth the record, or so much as would have disclosed the *specific* ground of action; so that the court could determine whether that recovery was within the condition of the bond sued upon so as to constitute a breach; or at least the pleader should have *averred* that the cause of action in the prior suit was such that a recovery against the plaintiff below would create a breach of the bond in question. This was not done, even if it be conceded that averments may take the place of a "*record*"

*set forth.*" The appellants were strangers to that record, and it should have been distinctly set forth. There is nothing to show that the appellants ever heard of that prior suit until the exhibition of the narr in this case.

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#### FIFTH POINT.

The bond in question, if sustainable in law, was given for the purpose of indemnifying Stiles as to the specified matter.

The declaration should, therefore, have contained an averment that notice of the pendency of the former suit—and which was the predicate of this action—had been given to Fender, so that he might have taken upon himself the defense thereof—*non constat* that a recovery would not have been defeated, had this been done.

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of the action, because Stiles and Fender are *not* privies in this judgment. To allow this action to be maintained by Stiles, is to subject Fender to the payment of the same debt twice and to different persons. If illegal, because lost at gaming, no action can be maintained except under the statute.

J. H. KNOWLTON,  
*of Counsel.*

L. E. DEWOLF,  
*Attorney for Appellants.*

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William Leland et al

vs

Elias B. Stetson

App'ts. Briefs & Points

Filed May 4, 1863

J. Leland  
M

Fender  
vs  
Stiles

court

Mr. Chief Justice Cocton delivered the opinion of the

The only question in this <sup>of the last importance</sup> case is as to the sufficiency of the declaration. That must show either that the obligor had notice of the action against the obligee, and an opportunity to defend it, or else that ~~the obligor~~ really had a good cause of action on which he recovered, <sup>or might have recovered,</sup> against the obligee such we regard the rights of the obligor in a bond of indemnity. There is no averment that the obligor had any opportunity of pending any action or proceeding against the obligee, but the bond shows upon its face, that Atkins had a cause of action against the plaintiff, upon which he had a right to recover, and that bond is set out in, <sup>and</sup> constitutes a part of the declaration. It shows that At-kins had deposited money with Stiles as stakes upon a horse race. And we know, as a matter of law, that Atkins had a right to recover from <sup>Stiles</sup> the money thus deposited, no matter what the event of the race was. The case is the same as if the bond had recited that Stiles had so much money in his hands which Fender wanted him

to pay over ~~some~~ <sup>to him</sup> ~~to him~~, to indemnify  
him for doing which, the bond was  
given. Could any other averment or  
statement be required, in order to  
show that attorneys had rightfully recover-  
ed against Stiles? The declaration  
is ~~the~~ sufficient.

Three parties were sued, <sup>and</sup> ~~two~~ only  
were served <sup>and</sup> ~~judgment~~ <sup>only</sup> was  
rendered against ~~the~~ and this  
is complained of as error. This was  
in pursuance of the express <sup>and</sup> ~~literal~~  
provisions of the statute <sup>\* and</sup> ~~was~~,  
of course, right.

There is some complaint about  
the amount of claims. This amount  
was expressly agreed upon by the parties,  
as appears from the record.

The judgment is affirmed.  
Judgment affirmed.

\* Rev. Stat. 1845, 413, sec. 6.

2017-11-17  
Fender  
in  
Stiles

Opinion  
Lecton

OK  
Recorded  
Page 701

Comptroller

United States of America }  
State of Illinois } Set  
Lee County }

Plas in the Lee  
County Circuit Court in the Twenty second  
Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois in a  
certain matter wherein Elias B. Stiles was  
Plaintiff and Hiram Fuller, Harvey Wilson  
and John Geeds, in our Action of Debt <sup>and</sup>  
in said Court then pending to wit: of the  
Money Term in the Year of our Lord  
One Thousand Eight Hundred and sixty two

Do it remembered that on the 26<sup>th</sup> day of  
February A D 1862, the said Plaintiff filed his  
process for Summons in said cause, and  
thereupon a Summons was issued in the  
words and figures as follows to wit:

Summons "State of Illinois }  
Lee County }

The People of the State of Illinois  
to the Sheriff of Carroll County, Greeting;

We  
command you that you summon Hiram Fuller,  
Harvey Wilson, and John Geeds if they shall  
be found in your County, personally to be and  
appear before the Circuit Court of said Lee County  
on the first day of the next Term thereof, to be  
held at the Court House in Dixon in said

Summons  
continued

Lee County, on the first day of May A.D.  
1862, to answer unto Elias B. Stiles in a  
plea of Debt in the sum of One Thousand Dollars  
to the Damage of the said plaintiff, as he says  
in the sum of Five Hundred Dollars -

And have you then and there this writ with  
an endorsement thereon, in what manner you  
shall have executed the same -

Witness Benjamin F. Shaw Clerk of  
said Court, and the Seal thereof at Dixon  
this 26<sup>th</sup> day of February A.D. 1862.  
Benjamin F. Shaw Clerk  
Joseph Ball De'c<sup>t</sup>

which said Summons so directed to the  
Sheriff of said Carroll County, was afterwards  
returned with the following endorsement to wit:

Return on  
Summons

"State of Illinois }  
"Carroll County } I have served the within  
"Summons on the within named Defendants  
"Amos Wilson and Arison Fowler by making the  
"same to each of them, on the 15<sup>th</sup> day of March  
"A.D. 1862. Miles J. Landon Sheriff  
"Fees: Invoice 1.00; Mday 1.90; Return 10 = 73<sup>cs</sup> John Deeds not  
"found in my County; Rec<sup>d</sup> three dollars sheriff's fees  
"by the hand of plaintiff April 15<sup>th</sup> A.D. 1862  
"Miles J. Landon Sheriff  
"also "Filed in the Circuit Court this 24<sup>th</sup> April 1862  
"Benjamin F. Shaw Clerk"

And afterwards, to wit, on the 25<sup>th</sup> day of April A.D. 1862, the said Plaintiff filed his declaration in the words & figures following, that is to say:-

Declaration }

State of Illinois }  
County of Lee }

S.S. In the Lee County Circuit Court  
of the May Term A.D. 1862

Elias B. Stiles by George P. Goodwin his attorney complains of Hiram Trender, Harvey Wilson and John Woods who were summoned &c of a plea that they rendered to said Elias B. Stiles the sum of one thousand dollars which they owe to and unjustly detain from him &c. For that

1<sup>st</sup> Count }

whereas the said defendants heretofore to wit:- on the the third day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand Eight-hundred fifty nine to wit- at said county of Lee by their certain Writing obligatory sealed with their seals, and now shown to the court here, the date whereof is a certain day and year above named to wit- the day and year aforesaid, acknowledged themselves to be held and firmly bound unto the said Plaintiff in the sum of one thousand dollars alone demanded to be paid to the said Plaintiff- which said writing obligatory was conditioned in the words and figures following to wit: The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas the said Hiram Trender,

Indemnity  
Continued

& one Edward Atkinson have on day of the date hereof placed in the hands of said States the sum of \$430 each the whole amount of which was to be delivered by said States to the said Hender in case his saddle Horse should out-run the Brown Mare of said Atkinson in a certain race run between them (the said Horse & Mare) this day, or to be delivered to said Atkinson in case his Mare should out-run in such race. And whereas there is a dispute between said Hender & said Atkinson as to which of them is entitled to said Money; and whereas said States hath delivered the whole amount thereof to said Hender Now therefore if said Hender shall at all times indemnify & save & keep the said States free and clear & harmless against all suits, actions damages, judgments, costs & expenses which may be brought or recovered or in any manner incurred by reason of any manner of claim or demand which said Atkinson may have or pretend to have against said States refusing to pay said Money or any portion thereof to said Atkinson; then this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain of full force & virtue. And although at the November Term of the said Lee County Circuit Court for the year eighteen hundred and Sixty one Edward Atkins who is the one and same person described in the and named in <sup>the</sup> condition

of the above writing obligatory as Edward  
 Atkinson by reason of a certain claim or de-  
 mand which the said Atkins then and  
 therefore had against the said Plaintiff, by  
 reason of the said Plaintiff's refusing to pay  
 to said Atkins a portion of the said money  
~~paid~~ referred to in the condition of the said writing  
 obligatory to wit, the sum of money so  
 placed in the hands of said Plaintiff by said  
 Atkins, recovered against the said Plaintiff  
 in a certain suit - therefore brought and  
 then pending in the said Court wherein the said  
 Atkins was Plaintiff and the said Plaintiff  
 States was defendant - a judgment for the  
 sum of Four hundred and twenty nine dol-  
 lars, six (said Atkins) damages in that be-  
 half sustained, together with six costs and  
 charges by him (said Atkins) in and about  
 said suit - expended whereof the said Plaintiff  
 States was convicted as appears of records -  
 Yet the said Hiram Greider although after  
 requested so to do hath not from the time of  
 making said writing obligatory indemnified  
 and saved and kept the said Plaintiff free  
 clear, and harmless against said suit, judg-  
 ment, damages, costs and expenses by the  
 said Plaintiff incurred in and about said suit  
 according to the conditions of the said writing  
 obligatory but has hitherto wholly neglected

Declaration continued

and refused, and still neglects and refuses so to do. And by means thereof the said Plaintiff Stiles, after the making of the said writing obligatory to wit <sup>on</sup> the twenty fourth day of June A.D. 1858, and on divers other days and times afterwards was forced and obliged to and did necessarily lay out and expend divers sums of money in the whole amounting to a large sum of money to wit the sum of one thousand Dollars in and about the defenses of said suit - so brought, and in and about the payment and causing the said judgment and costs recovered as aforesaid to be satisfied in full to wit: at said County of See by means of which said premises the said Plaintiff has sustained damages to a large amount, to wit: to the amount of one thousand Dollars, whereby an action hath accrued to the said Plaintiff to demand and have of and from the said Defendants in this suit the said sum of one thousand Dollars.

It is to be noted that the said Defendants have not, nor has either of them, although often requested, so to do as yet paid the said sum of one thousand Dollars above the sum of any part thereof to the said Plaintiff, but have hitherto wholly neglected and refused, and still neglect and refuse so to do.

2<sup>d</sup> Count

And whereas, also afterwards to wit on the third day of September A.D. 1859 to wit: at said County of See the said Defendants executed and delivered to the said Plaintiff their certain other writing obligatory sealed with their respective seals and now shown to the Court here

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in words and figures following. To wit:  
Know all Men by these presents that we  
Hiram Tunder, Harry Wilson & John  
Reeds - are held and firmly bound  
unto Elias B Stiles in the sum of one  
thousand dollars (\$1000) for the payment  
of which said sum well and truly to be  
made me & each of us do hereby, bind our-  
selves, our heirs, executors, & administrators  
jointly & severally firmly by these presents:  
Witness our hands & seals this 3<sup>d</sup> day of  
September 22 1859. (The condition of  
the above obligation is such that whereas  
the said Hiram Tunder & one Edward  
Atkinson, have on the day of the date  
hereof placed in the hands of the said Stiles  
the sum of \$435 each the whole amount  
of which was to be delivered by said Stiles  
to the said Tunder in case his Sorrel Horse  
should out-run the Brown Mare of said  
Atkinson in a certain race run between  
them (the said horse and Mare) this day or  
to be delivered to said Atkinson in case  
his Mare should outrun in such race  
and whereas there is a dispute between said  
Tunder & said Atkinson as to which of them  
is entitled to said money, and whereas  
said Stiles hath delivered the whole amount  
thereof to said Tunder, now therefore

Declarations  
continued

if said Heuder shall at all times indemp-  
nify & save & keep the said Stiles free  
and clear & harmless against all suits, ac-  
tions, damages, judgments costs and ex-  
penses which may be brought or recovered  
or in any manner incurred by reason  
of any Promise of Claim or demand which  
said Atkinson may have or pretend to  
have against said Stiles, <sup>by reason of said Stiles,</sup> refusing to pay  
said Money or any portion thereof to said  
Atkinson; then this obligation to be void;  
otherwise to remain of full force & virtue.

Hiram Heuder (Seal)

Harry Wilson (Seal)

John Reed (Seal)

And the said Plaintiff avers that the real  
and proper name of the said person <sup>named</sup> re-  
ferred to in the condition of the said writing  
obligatory as Edward Atkinson, is Edward  
Atkins and that by mistake the name  
of the said Edward Atkins is in said  
condition & felt Edward Atkinson instead  
of Edward Atkins, and although <sup>with</sup> Edward  
Atkins after the making of the said writing  
obligatory, and before the commencement  
of this suit <sup>to wit</sup> on the fifteenth day of  
November A.D. 1859, by reason of certain  
claim or demand which the said Atkins  
then had against the said plaintiff by

reason of the said Plaintiff's having refused to pay to said Atkins a portion of the said Money referred to <sup>in</sup> the condition of the said writing obligatory to wit; the sum of Money so placed in the hands of said Plaintiff by said Atkins, commenced in said Lee County Circuit Court a certain suit wherein the said Edward Atkins was Plaintiff and the said Plaintiff Stiles was defendant, and afterward so prosecuted said suit to effect, that <sup>he</sup> the said Atkins at the November <sup>Term</sup> of said Court for the year eighteen hundred and sixty recovered therein against the said Plaintiff Stiles a judgment for the sum of Four hundred and twenty nine Dollars (said Atkins) damages in that behalf sustained together with his costs and charges by him said Atkins in said and about said suit expended whereof the said Plaintiff was convicted as appears of record.

Yet the said Hiram Fender has not from the time of the making of said writing obligatory, indemnified, saved and kept the said Plaintiff free, clear, and harmless against said suit, damages, judgments, costs and expenses incurred in and about said suit according to the condition of said writing obligatory but has hitherto wholly neglected and refused and still neglects

and refuses to do. And by means thereof  
continued, the said Plaintiff Stiles after the making of the  
said writing obligatory to wit, on the day and  
year aforesaid and on divers other days and  
times afterwards and before the commencement of  
this suit - was forced and obliged to and did,  
necessarily pay out and expend divers sums of money  
in the whole amounting to a large sum of money  
to wit: the sum of one Thousand Dollars in and  
about the defence of said suit so brought and  
also in and about the payment of said judg-  
ment and costs so recorded as aforesaid and  
concerning the said judgment and costs and  
execution issued out of the office of the  
Clerk of said Sec County Circuit Court and  
under the seal and of said Court on said  
judgment and to the Sheriff of said Sec County  
directed and delivered on the thirteenth day of  
February A.D. 1851, to be satisfied in full, to wit:  
at said County of Sec (Whereby an action  
hath accrued to the said Plaintiff to demand  
and have of and from the said defendants in  
this suit the said sum of one Thousand Dollars

3<sup>d</sup> Count

Yet the said defendants in this suit  
have not, one has either of them (although often  
requested so to do) as yet paid the said sum  
of one thousand Dollars above demanded  
or any part thereof to the said Plaintiff,  
but have hitherto wholly neglected and refused

and still neglect and refuse so to do.

And whereas, also afterwards, to wit; on the third day of September A D 1859. to wit the said county of See the said Defendants executed and delivered to the said Plaintiff their certain other writing obligatory sealed with their respective seals and now shown to the court here in words and figures following, to wit:

Know all Men by these presents that the Heir and Executor, Harry Milson ~~that and~~ John Dads - are held & fairly bound unto Elias B Stiles in the sum of one thousand dollars (\$1000) for the payment of which said sum well and truly to be made we 2, each of us do hereby bind ourselves our heirs, executors & administrators, jointly & severally by these presents. Witness our hands & seals this 3<sup>d</sup> day of September A D 1859

The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas the said Heir and Executor ~~and~~ one Edward Atkinson have on the day of the date hereof placed in the hands of said Stiles the sum of \$4.36 each the <sup>whole</sup> amount of which was to be delivered by said Stiles to the said Heir in case his several horse should outrun the Brown Mare of said Atkinson in a certain race run between them (the said horse & mare) this day as to be delivered to said Atkinson in case his mare should outrun

Declarations  
Continued

in such case. And whereas there is a dispute between said Hender & said Atkinson as to which of them is entitled to said Money: And whereas said Stiles hath delivered the whole amount thereof to said Hender: Now therefore if said Hender shall at all times indemnify & save & keep the said Stiles free, clear & harmless against all suits, actions, damages, judgments, costs or expenses which may be brought or recovered <sup>or in any manner incurred</sup> by reason of any business of claim or demand which said Atkinson may have or pretend to have against said Stiles by reason of said Stiles refusing to pay said Money or any portion thereof to said Atkinson; then this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain of full force & virtue

Hiram Hender (Seal)

Harvey Wilson (Seal)

John Deeds (Seal)

And the said Plaintiff avers that the seal and proper name of the said person named and referred to in the condition of said writings obligatory as Edward Atkinson is Edward Atkins, and that by mistake the name of the said Edward Atkins is in said condition spelt Edward Atkinson instead of Edward Atkins. And the said Plaintiff <sup>further</sup> avers that that the said Hiram Hender was not from the time of the making of said writing

obligatory indemnified and saved and kept  
the said Plaintiff, free, clear & harmless against  
all suits, actions, damages, judgments, costs,  
& expenses, which might be brought or re-  
covered or in any manner incurred by rea-  
son of any manner of claim or demand  
which said Atkins might have or pretend  
to have against the said Plaintiff by reason  
of said Plaintiff's refusing to pay said money  
or any portion thereof to said Atkins: accor-  
ding to the conditions of said writing de-  
legatory, but both heretofore wholly neglected  
and refused so to do. And by means thereof  
the said Plaintiff after the making of the said  
writing obligatory to wit: on the twenty fourth  
day of June A.D. 1856 and on divers other days  
and times afterwards, was forced and obliged  
to and did necessarily lay out and expend  
divers sums of money in the whole amounting  
to a large sum of money to wit: the sum  
of one thousand dollars in and about the  
defense of a certain suit before the time of  
brought by said Atkins as plaintiff and against  
the said Plaintiff Stiles as defendant therein  
in the said Sec County Circuit Court of  
the November Term thereof for the year  
eighteen hundred and fifty nine, and also  
in and about the payment and satisfaction  
of a certain judgment recovered in said

*Declaration* court at the November Term thereof for the  
*continued* year 1860, by said Atkins against said Plain-  
tiff Stiles in said suit for the sum of Four  
Hundred and twenty three Dollars his (said  
Atkins) damages in that behalf sustained,  
together with his costs and damages by ~~him~~  
<sup>said Atkins</sup> in that  
behalf sustained, together with his costs and  
charges by him (said Atkins) in and about  
said suit - expended whereof the said Plaintiff  
Stiles was convicted as appears of record.  
By reason of the said Plaintiff Stiles hav-  
ing refused to pay to said Atkins a  
portion of the Money referred to in the con-  
dition of said writing obligatory, to wit:-  
the sum of Money so placed in the hands  
of said Plaintiff by said Atkins, to wit:  
at said County of Lee; by means of which  
said summes the said Plaintiff in the con-  
dition named has sustained damages to  
a large amount to wit: to the amount  
of one thousand Dollars; whereby an ac-  
tion hath accrued to the said Plaintiff  
to demand and have of and from the  
said defendants in this suit the said sum  
of one thousand Dollars.

Yet the said defendants have not  
yet paid either of them (although often re-  
quested so to do) as yet paid the said sum  
of one thousand Dollars above demanded

or any part thereof to the said Plaintiff but have hitherto wholly neglected & refused, and still neglect and refuse so to do.

4<sup>th</sup> Count-

And whereas also afterwards to-wit: on the third day of September AD 1859, to-wit: at said County of See the said Defendant executed & delivered to the said Plaintiff three certain other writings obligatory, sealed with their respective seals and now shown to the court here in words and figures following to-wit:

Know all Men by these Presents that we Isaac Souder, Harvey Wilson & John Woods are held and firmly bound unto Elias B. Stiles in the sum of one thousand Dollars (\$1000) for the payment of which said sum, well & truly to be made we & each of us do hereby bind ourselves our heirs, executors, & administrators jointly & severally jointly by these presents.

Witness our hands & seals the 3<sup>d</sup> day of September AD 1859

The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas the

Declaration

continued

Said Hiram Steuder & one Edward Atkinson have on the day of the date hereof paid in the hands of the said Stiles the sum of \$436 each the whole amount of which was to be delivered by said said Stiles to the said Steuder in case his sorrel horse should out-run the Brown Mare of said Atkinson in a certain race run between them (the said horse & Mare) this day or to be delivered to said Atkinson in case his Mare should out-run in such race, and whereas there is a dispute between said Steuder & said Atkinson as to which of them is entitled to said Money: and whereas said Stiles hath delivered the whole amount thereof to said Steuder: Now therefore if said Steuder shall at all times indemnify & save & keep the said Stiles free, clear & harmless against all suits, actions, damages, judgments, costs & expenses which may be brought or recovered or in any manner incurred by reason of any manner of claim or demand which said Atkinson may have or pretend to have against said Stiles by reason

of said Stiles refusing to pay  
said Money, or any portion thereof  
to said Atkinson; then this obligation  
to be void: otherwise to remain  
of full force and virtue.

Thomas Towner (Seal)  
Harvey Nelson (Seal)  
John Deeds (Seal)

And the said Plaintiff avers that  
the seal and proper name of the  
said person named and referred to  
in the condition of said writing ob-  
ligatory as Edward Atkinson, is  
Edward Atkins, & that by mistake the  
name of said Edward Atkins is in  
said condition spelt Edward Atkinson  
instead of Edward Atkins.

And <sup>although</sup> after the making of  
said writing obligatory, and before  
the commencement of the suit to-  
suit: on the fifteenth day of Novem-  
ber AD 1859, the said Atkins by  
reason of a certain claim or de-  
mand which the said Atkins then  
had against the said Plaintiff by  
reason of the said Plaintiff having  
refused to pay to said Atkins a  
portion of the said Money referred  
to in the condition of said writing

Declaration

continued

obligatory to wit: The sum of Money  
So placed in the hands of said  
plaintiff by said Atkins commenced  
in said Lee County Circuit Court  
a certain suit wherein the said  
Edward Atkins was Plaintiff, and  
the said Plaintiff still was Defen-  
dant, and afterwards so prosecuted  
or caused to be so prosecuted said  
suit to effect that the said Atkins  
at the November Term of said Court  
for the year Eighteen Hundred  
and Sixty recovered therein against  
the said Plaintiff the a Judgment  
for the sum of Four Hundred and  
twenty five Dollars his (said Atkins)  
damages in that behalf sustained,  
together with his costs and charges  
by him (said Atkins) in and  
about said suit expended, whereof  
the said Plaintiff was convicted as  
appears of record. Yet the said  
William Tucker has not from the  
time of the Making of the said  
writing obligatory indemnified, saved  
and kept the said Plaintiff free  
clear and harmless against said  
suit so brought, damages, judgments

Costs recovered and expenses incurred thereby and by means thereof the said Plaintiff Stiles after the making of the said writing obligatory to wit: on the day and year aforesaid and on divers other days and times afterwards and before the commencement of this suit was forced and obliged to and did necessarily lay out and expend divers sums of money in the whole amounting to a large sum of money to wit: the sum of one thousand Dollars in and about the payment of one James R Edsall and Messrs Keaton & Goodwin their reasonable fees for appearing and defending said suit as the attorneys of the said Plaintiff as defendant therein in that behalf and also in about the payment of said judgment and costs and also the costs of the Plaintiff Stiles in and about said suit expended as defendant therein, and causing the same to be satisfied in full, to wit: at said County of Sec.

And so the said Plaintiff in fact says that the said

Declaration  
Continued

Swam Seuder has not at all times indemnified & saved & kept the said Plaintiff free clear and harmless against all suits, actions, damages, judgments, costs & expenses which might be brought or pursued or in any manner of claim or demand which said Atkins might have or pretend to have against said Plaintiff by reason of said Plaintiffs refusing to pay said money or any portion thereof to said Atkins; whereby an action hath accrued to the said Plaintiff to demand and have of and from the said Defendants in this suit the said sum of one thousand Dollars.

Yet the said Defendant have not nor has either of them (although often requested so to do) as yet paid the said sum of one thousand Dollars alone demanded, or any part thereof to the said Plaintiff but have hitherto wholly neglected and refused and still refuse neglected and re-

p 21

faces to do. Wherefore  
 the said Plaintiff says that  
 he is injured and has sustained  
 damage to the amount of Five  
 Hundred Dollars; and therefore  
 he brings this suit - Be  
 Geo P. Goodwin  
 Plffs Ally

Copy of the  
 instrument  
 and on

Copy of Instrument on which  
 action is brought

Know all Men by these  
 presents that we Wiam Feuders,  
 Harvey Wilson, & John Rudo -  
 are held & firmly bound unto  
 Elias B. Stiles in the sum of  
 one thousand dollars (\$1000) for  
 the payment of which said sum  
 well and truly to be made we  
 & each of us do hereby bind  
 ourselves, our heirs executors &

Copy of Instrument  
said and continued

Administrators, jointly & severally <sup>jointly</sup> &  
by these presents. Witness our  
hands & seals this 3<sup>d</sup> day of Sept-  
ember ad. 1859

The condition of the above  
obligation is such that whereas the  
said Heron Gauder & one Edward  
Atkinson have on the day of  
the date hereof placed in the hands  
of said Stiles the sum of \$430.  
each, the whole amount of which  
was to be delivered by said Stiles  
to the said Gauder in case his  
Sorrel horse should out run the  
Brown Mare of said Atkinson,  
in a certain race run between  
them, (the said horse & Mare) this  
day - or to be delivered to said  
Atkinson in case his Mare should  
out run in such race - and  
whereas there is a dispute between  
said Gauder & said Atkinson as  
to which of them is entitled to the  
money; and whereas said Stiles  
hath delivered the whole amount  
thereof to said Gauder, now  
therefore if said Gauder shall  
at all times indemnify & save

to Keep the said Stiles free clear and harmless against all suits actions, damages, Judgments, costs & expenses which may be brought or recovered or in any manner incurred by reason of any promise of claim or demand which said Atkinson may have, or pretend to have against said Stiles by reason of said Stiles refusing to pay said Money or any portion thereof to said Atkinson; then this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain of full force & virtue

Hiram Hender (Seal)  
 Harvey Wilson (Seal)  
 John Woods (Seal)

And which said Declaration is endorsed as follows - to wit:

"Filed April 25<sup>th</sup> 1862  
 By J. F. Shaw Clerk  
 per Joseph Ball D.C."

And afterwards to wit: at a regular term of the said 22<sup>d</sup> County Circuit Court begun and held at the Court House in the City of Dejeu in said 22<sup>d</sup> County on the first Monday to wit: on the fifth day of May 1862, then being Present: Honorable William W. Hartow Judge of the said 22<sup>d</sup> Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri

David M. Courtney States Attorney for said 22<sup>d</sup> Judicial Circuit -

Benjamin F. Shaw Clerk of the said 22<sup>d</sup> County Circuit Court

and Amos L. Porter Sheriff of said 22<sup>d</sup> County -

And on the said fifth day of May 1862 the following proceedings were had in said cause that is to say:

Recall of Proceedings

"Elias B. Stiles

"  
Abram Pender, Nancy Wilson  
and John Geels

} Debt -

On this day and the Plaintiff in this suit by Courtown his attorney, and enters his motion for a rule on the Defendants to plead by Thursday morning next; which said motion is by the Court

sustained, and the said rule is hereby entered accordingly -"

And afterwards on the eighth day of May A.D. 1862 the said day being before the time wherein the said Defendants were called to plead, the said Defendants filed their Demurrer in the words and figures as follows to wit:

Demurrer }

" In the said County Circuit Court of the May Term U.S. 1862.

Amos Under,  
Samuel Wilson, and  
John Dicks  
vs  
Elias B Stiles

} Demurrer to Declaration

And the said Defendants Amos Under and Samuel Wilson by Edouard Lacey their attorney, came and defend the wrong and injury shown and say that the said Declaration, and each and every Count thereof, and the matters therein contained in manner and form as the same are stated and set forth, are not sufficient in Law for the said Plaintiff to have and maintain his aforesaid action thereof against the said Defendants, and that the said Defendants are not bound by Law to answer the same, and that they are ready to verify, whereas by reason of the insufficiency

of the said Declaration, and each and every Court thereof in this behalf, the said defendants pray judgment, and that the said plaintiff may be barred from having or maintaining his aforesaid action thereof against them &c

And the said defendants Norman Fender and Henry Wilson shew to the Court, that the said Writing Obligatory, in the said plaintiffs declaration declared upon, appears to be conditioned to indemnify said plaintiff against liability incurred in favor of our Edward Atkins, and the plaintiff has no right in law to seek to hold said defendants for liability to Edward Atkins in the manner stated in said declaration

And the said defendants Norman Fender and Henry Wilson, further shew to the Court that the said plaintiffs declaration, and each Court thereof is in other respects informal, insufficient &c

Edsall & Lacey  
Atty for Eds Fender & Wilson,

And afterwards to wit on the tenth day of May 1862, (the same being no yet one of the regular days of the said May Term) the following proceedings were had in said Court as appears to us of Record that is to say:

Record of proceedings

" Elias B Stiles }  
" " " } Debt  
Norman Fender, Henry Wilson - for Eds }  
On this day

Record of  
proceedings  
continued

comes the Plaintiff, by Goodwin his attorney; also come the said Defendants by Edsall & Soney their attorneys; and the Demurrer to the Declaration herein coming on to be heard, is by the Court overruled; and thereupon the said Defendants say that they will stand by their said Demurrer, whereupon it is considered by the Court that the said Plaintiff, ought to have judgment in the premises. It is therefore considered, and adjudged by the Court, that the plaintiff have and recover of the said Defendants his Debt in the sum of One Thousand Dollars that being the penalty of the Bond upon which this suit was brought, but that the said sum of One Thousand Dollars be liquidated on the payment of (\$411 <sup>64</sup>/<sub>100</sub>) Four Hundred, and Eleven <sup>64</sup>/<sub>100</sub> Dollars Damages by the Plaintiff herein in this behalf sustained, as agreed upon by the respective parties to this suit in open Court and it is further considered, that the said plaintiff recover & have of the said Defendants his costs and charges by him in and about this suit expended, and that Execution issue for the said Debt & Costs herein to be taxed."

And afterwards to wit on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of May A.D. 1862 (the same being one of the regular days of the said May Term) the following proceedings were had in said case as follows

to us, of Record that is to say:-  
" Elias B Stiles

Debt

Record of proceedings Continued

"  
Nathan Sander, Harvey Wilson  
and John Deeds

On this day again come the Defendants herein by their Counsel aforesaid, and pray and appeal from the judgment of this Court to the Supreme Court which said appeal is allowed, on condition that within thirty days from this date the said Defendants file a Bond properly conditioned, and in the sum of Nine Hundred Dollars with Ransom Wilson and Zachariah Marks as securities therein.

And afterwards to wit on the third day of June AD 1862 the said Defendants filed their appeal Bond in the words and figures as follows

appeal Bond

" Know all Men by these Presents that we Nathan Sander and Harvey Wilson as principal, and Ransom Wilson and Zachariah Marks as security, are held and firmly bound unto Elias B Stiles in the full sum of Nine Hundred Dollars, good and lawful money of the United States for the payment of which well and truly to be made the said Nathan Sander, Harvey Wilson, Ransom Wilson and Zachariah Marks bind themselves their heirs, executors, administrators, jointly

Appeal Bond  
Continued

generally and jointly by these presents -  
Witness our hands this 21<sup>st</sup> day of  
May A.D. 1862 -

The condition of the above  
obligation is such that whereas the above  
named Elias D. Stiles did at the May Term  
of the Circuit Court held in and for the County  
of Lee in the State of Missouri in 1862 recover  
a judgment against the above named Herman  
Funder, and Harvey Wilson, included with  
one John Deeds for the sum of One Thousand  
Dollars Debt, to be liquidated and discharged  
upon the payment of Four Hundred & Eleven & 1/10  
Dollars Damages together with costs of suit  
from which said judgment the said Herman  
Funder and Harvey Wilson, at the time of the  
 rendition of said judgment to wit on the  
12<sup>th</sup> day of May A.D. 1862 pround an appeal  
to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri  
in pursuance of the Statute in such case  
made and provided, which said appeal was  
allowed by the Circuit Court, on condition  
that the said Herman Funder, and Harvey  
Wilson within thirty days thereafter file with  
the Clerk of said Circuit Court an Appeal  
Bond in the penalty of Five Hundred  
Dollars with Herman Wilson and Zachariah  
Markes as securities

Now if the said

Arrian Funder and Harvey Wilson shall  
duly prosecute said appeal to effect, and without  
delay & pay the amount of said judgment  
costs and interest, and all Damages, which  
the said Elias B Stiles may sustain by reason  
of this appeal having been taken, then this  
obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in  
full force and effect-

Arrian Funder } Seal  
Harvey Wilson } Seal  
J. G. Marks } Seal  
R. Wilson } Seal

And said appeal Bond is endorsed as follows to wit:  
"Filed June 3<sup>d</sup> - W D 1862 B. F. Shaw Clerk  
Wm Joseph Bull D.C."

State of Illinois } ss  
DeWitt County }

I, Benjamin F Shaw Clerk  
of the Circuit Court in and for said County, in  
the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the  
 foregoing is a full true and complete exam-  
plication of all the Record in said cause  
no appears from the books file in my office

In Witness whereof I hereunto set  
my hand and the Seal of said  
Court at Quincy this 15<sup>th</sup> day of  
April A D 1863

Benj: F. Shaw Clerk  
Wm Joseph Bull D.C.



50 Cts to \$ 8.05  
Exp'ts Cost 10.30  
of which Cost paid \$ 8.00

## State of Illinois

In the Supreme Court, Third Grand Division April 1863

Hiram Funder and Harry  
Wilson impleaded with John  
Dreds Plaintiffs in Error

vs  
Elias B. Stiles Defendant in error

Debt on Bond

Appeal from Lee County

And afterwards to wit on the  
21<sup>st</sup> day of April A D 1863 comes the said Plaintiffs  
Hiram Funder and Harry Wilson impleaded with John  
Dreds by Lyman E. DeWolf their attorney and say that  
in the record and proceedings aforesaid, and also in  
giving the judgment aforesaid there is manifest error in  
this to wit; that the declaration aforesaid and the  
matters therein contained are not sufficient in law  
for the said Elias B. Stiles the said Plaintiffs to have  
or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against the  
said Defendants the said Hiram Funder and Har-  
vey Wilson impleaded with the said John Dreds as  
aforesaid There is also error in this to wit. It is  
shown by the record aforesaid that the damages were  
awarded by the Court on a penal bond without the in-  
tervention of a jury.

There is also error in this It appears by the record  
aforesaid that Judgment was given on a joint  
and several bond against two out of three Defen-  
dants

And that no judgment was rendered against John Deeds  
the third Defendant

4<sup>th</sup> There is also error in this to wit - It appears by  
the record aforesaid that John Deeds one of said Defen-  
dants was not served with ~~the~~ Summons issued in  
said Cause and that no other Summons  
was ever issued therein

5 There is also error in this to wit, that by the record  
aforesaid, in form aforesaid, was given for  
the said Elias B Stites against the said Harmon  
Kendall and Henry Wilson. Whereas by the law of  
the land, the said Judgment ought to have  
been given for the <sup>said</sup> Harmon Kendall and Henry Wilson  
impleaded with John Deeds against the said Elias  
B Stites

And the said Harmon Kendall and Henry Wilson pray  
that the Judgment aforesaid, for the errors aforesaid, and  
other errors in the record and proceedings aforesaid  
may be reversed and altogether held for nothing  
and that they may be restored to all things  
which they have lost by occasion of said Judg-  
ment

Of Council  
J. H. Knutton

Spencer E. Wolf  
attorney for  
Kendall & Wilson

And now comes the said defendant  
in Court by Seland & Blanchard his  
Attorneys and says that in said  
record of proceedings there is no such  
error as is claimed by Plaintiffs in  
error and says in affirmance of said  
Judgment -

Seland & Blanchard

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Recd from Lee

William Fowler et al  
Df't in error

Elias P. Stiles  
Df't in error

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Filed April 20<sup>th</sup> 1863.  
L. Seland  
Clerk.