

No. 14347

# Supreme Court of Illinois

Innes et al.

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vs.

Hadden.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS,

SUPREME COURT.

Third Grand Division.

14347

No. 79.

*Jones*

*vs*

*Hadden*

362

State of Illinois  
In Supreme Court

Third Grand Division  
April Term A.D. 1862

Peter James &  
Abiram Spaulding  
appellants

Appellee

vs  
George M. Hadden  
appellee

Application for  
re-hearing

George M. Hadden,

Sir: You are hereby notified that the appellants at the said April Term of said Court, will move the said Court to hear and determine an application for re-hearing of the appeal in the above cause, made at the April Term A.D. 1861, by the said appellants, which application at said April Term A.D. 1861, was continued to the April Term A.D. 1862, in order that you should be notified of the said application for re-hearing of said appeal in said Cause - when and where you may attend.

Anna April 8<sup>th</sup> 1862

Montgomery & Crocker  
attorneys for appellants

Several by making and having a copy  
of which this is a copy April 11 1862  
A. S. Curtis

Supreme Court  
of Grand Jurors

the "Gross"  
in an Spanding  
Appellants  
vs

George M. Stadden  
Appellee

Notice

State of Illinois  
In Supreme Court } Third Grand Division  
April Term A.D. 1862.

Peter Innes &  
Abiram Spaulding } Appellants  
vs }  
George M. Hadden } Appellee  
Application for  
re-hearing.

State of Illinois }  
County of Kane } ss. As a Justice of the  
City of Aurora }  
I do hereby certify  
that he personally served by reading  
and delivering to George M. Hadden  
April 11<sup>th</sup> A. D. 1862, at the City of  
Aurora aforesaid in said County and  
State a written notice of which  
the within is a true copy. Which notice  
was served at the request of R. S.  
Montgomery of the firm of Montgomery & Sparks  
attorneys for appellants. And  
further this deponent says not.

A. A. Curtis

State of Illinois }  
County of Kane } I Charles F. Huston Clerk  
City of Aurora } of the Court of Common  
Pleas of the City of

Aurora aforesaid, do certify that  
Asa A. Dexter personally  
known to me as the same  
person whose name is subscrib-  
-ed to the foregoing affidavit,  
appeared before me this day in  
person, at my office in said  
City, and made oath in due form  
of law that he had read the  
said affidavit by him subscrib-  
-ed and that the same is true  
in substance and in fact.

Given under my hand and seal  
of said Court of Common Pleas of  
the City of Aurora County and State  
of Iowa this 16<sup>th</sup> day of April A.D.  
1862

Charles P. Johnston  
Clerk

79  
In Supreme Court  
April Term 22 1862

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Peter Ernest  
vs  
Abner Spaulding  
Appellants  
vs  
George M. Wadden  
Appellee

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Notice & aff. for  
rehearing

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Filed April 22-1862

L. Ireland  
Clark

State of Illinois vs

In Supreme Court at Ottawa  
Of the April Term A.D. 1861

Prtes James  
Abraham Spaulding } Appeal from the Court  
vs } of Criminals of the  
George W. Hadden } City of Havana.

Argued April Term A.D. 1860

To the Honorable

The Justice of said Supreme Court

The appellants in the above  
entitled cause respectfully  
represent that the opinion  
of the majority of the court  
filed ~~by~~ states: But  
it is insisted by the defendant  
that the reserves <sup>interest</sup> which he has  
~~been~~ paid might at any time be re-  
covered back, as for money paid  
and advanced, or for money had  
and received; and that having such  
demand against the plaintiff, he  
had a right to set it off in this  
action. If the premise is correct,  
the conclusion follows. Whether

that be right; depends on the  
statute of usury (and then cites  
the statute) It then further says:  
"It is manifest that the legisla-  
-ture had no intention of giving  
a cause of action to the person  
who has paid usury and fails  
to make the defence, when sued  
for the debt upon which the usury  
has been paid, or agreed to be  
paid."

2<sup>d</sup> It is respectfully submitted  
that the same objection is equally  
as true to the New York and the  
English statute of usury as to that  
of this state. It is based upon  
the well known and universal  
principle of law that when a  
party has had his day in court  
and fails to make his claim  
or defence that the judgment  
is conclusive against him.

For there must be an end to litigation.  
See 9 Paige Ch R. 165 and the cases  
there cited.

2<sup>d</sup> The Court also say in same opinion: "If he voluntarily pays the principal sum due and the usury agreed to be paid upon it, that is an end of the matter so far as this Statute is concerned."

This is freely admitted so far as ~~any~~ remedy being pointed out by the Statute. But it is respectfully insisted that the mere fact that the legislature did not give the party paying the usurious interest any right of action in terms, to recover back the excess of usury, manifests an intention on their part to leave him to his common law remedy or right of action. And had they given him a Statutory remedy it would not have taken away his common law right of action. See Phelan vs Hubbard 20 plus 290

3<sup>d</sup> The Statute of this State prohibits the taking of more than ten per cent per annum. It is the

prohibition and not the penalty  
that makes the contract illegal  
See State Bank v. Emswiler  
& Blackford R. 107. Where the court  
say that: "Indeed it is the prohibition  
" to make a contract which renders  
" it illegal, and not the penalty  
" inflicted for a violation of the  
" prohibition -

4 The appellee is no more  
entitled to the use of money under  
our statute which forfeits the  
whole interest for violating it  
than he would be if the legis-  
lature had seen fit <sup>to forfeit</sup> both  
principal and interest. or if these  
words had declared it void.  
" For the use beyond legal inter-  
" est was money to which the  
" appellee had no right; it ~~belonged~~  
" belonged to the appellants."  
So says the court in the case of  
Whelan v. Hubbard 20 plus 290.

5 It may be that if the appel-  
-lants had sought to insist  
upon a forfeiture of the whole  
interest - which would be

insisting upon the penal portion  
of the Statute - that the Court  
might with propriety require  
him to plead his defence  
specially - But here the  
appellants ask that the Court  
will allow them to have the  
benefit of the excess either by  
way of set off or payment for  
cents of the principal and such  
a defence is meritorious and  
not to be disregarded by the  
Court - it being money in his  
hands belonging to them and  
they have the meritorious right  
to have the same applied to the  
principal see Bald & Cronan  
24 Ill. 146

- 6<sup>th</sup> Under the general issue the  
appellants had the right to  
have the illegal excess upon  
the discharge of the principal  
interest applied on the  
principal - The Court say in  
the case of Smiles & Marshall  
R. 640, "For although it be  
true that by law partial pay-  
ments must be first applied

insisting upon the penal portion  
of the Statute - that the Court  
might with propriety require  
him to plead his defence  
specially - But here the  
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will allow them to have the  
benefit of the excess either by  
way of set off or payment for  
cents of the principal and such  
a defence is meritorious and  
not to be disregarded by the  
Court - it being money in his  
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the case of Smiles & Marshall  
R. 640, "For although it be  
true that by law partial pay-  
ments must be first applied

to the interest and the party  
receiving them would have  
a right so to apply them,  
yet this would not be the  
case with illegal interest.  
The law does not apply  
payments to illegal purposes.  
See *Whitson v Hibbard* 20 Pick  
290; *Batholomew v Gave* 9 Page  
Ch. R. 165; *Sanders v Lambert*  
17 Gray R. 484; *Smad v Green* 5 Porter  
308.

3 The Court say: Suppose the party  
said upon an usurious note  
fails to make the defense  
authorized by the statute, but  
suffers judgment to go against  
him for the principal and the  
usurious interest, and pays it,  
the statute gives him no  
right to recover back the  
interest thus paid. This is  
certainly correct and it would  
be equally correct if our statute  
should have made the usurious  
contract void like the English  
statute. And when the defendant  
is sued on his usurious note  
made in New York or England and

He does not show that fact  
but fails to make the defence  
the judgment is conclusive  
against him both at law and  
equity. See 9 Paige. R. lch 165  
& cases there cited. Neither the  
New York nor the English Statute  
give the party paying usurious  
interest any right of action  
where he was sued for the  
principal and usurious interest  
and failed to make his defence.  
See those Statute as cited in  
Wharton vs Hubbard 20 Johns  
290. But under a common  
law defence - that is to say  
plea of payment, or general  
issue or plea of set off, he might  
show the usury and have all  
that he has paid as usurious  
interest applied first to the pay-  
-ment of the principal and legal  
interest. And if he has paid more  
than the principal and legal  
interest, then he would have  
a right to have judgment under  
plea of set off for the balance  
as money had and received &c  
And this is not because the Statute

has given any remedy of this sort but because the statute has prohibited the contracting for and receiving of any rate of interest beyond the amount prescribed by it. And that, therefore, the usurer has no legal or equitable title whatever to the excess of usury for he got it when the law prohibited him from receiving it. And shall have no advantage by his possession for the other party is not in pari delicto with the usurer. See the cases already cited.

8<sup>th</sup> When a statute is substantially or literally copied from one in another state which has there received a construction which is consistent with the spirit and policy of our laws such a construction may with propriety be adopted by our courts and there are many decisions of this court adopting this principle which are not necessary to cite. Our legislature has adopted

in regard to using the Southern  
Statutes in substance rather  
than the New York or English  
Statute - See Kentucky Statute  
approved Feb. 6<sup>th</sup> 1819; Georgia  
Statute passed 23<sup>d</sup> Dec. 1822;  
South Carolina Statute passed  
18<sup>th</sup> Dec. 183 : Tennessee of 1819;  
of 1835; Mississippi Statute passed  
June 25 1822; Alabama Statute  
passed Jan. 17. 1834; Texas Statute in  
17 Texas R. 803 & post-print made by Thompson  
Census for Appellee Bernette;

The following decisions were made under  
those Statutes allowing the money paid  
~~either~~ as the excess of usury to be  
recovered back as for money had  
& received or set off - as the partic-  
ular case might require - See  
12 B. Monro 87; Smida & Marshall R.  
631; 1 Georgia R. 241; 10 Georgia R.  
389; 7 Mercer 545; 17 Texas R. 794;  
Clark & Hunter 2 Spear R. 83. 85-  
5 Dana 80;

See also

Fleming & al. v. Jenks & al. 22 Ill. 437

Wherefore and for that there  
were errors in the record and  
proceedings aforesaid and also  
in the rendition of the judgment  
aforesaid, the said appellants  
pray a re-hearing of this  
Cause and that the judgment  
aforesaid in favor aforesaid  
given may be reversed  
and in all things held for  
naught

Montgomery & Seales  
attys for appellants

Charles C. Bonney  
of counsel -

~~307-79~~

Jones & al.

v.

Hadden

Petition  
for Rehearing

Filed Apr 20. 1861-

A. Deland  
Clerk

Rehearing Denied