

No. 12048

Supreme Court of Illinois

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Walker

vs.

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Kimball

71641  7

Fifth April, 1860

S. Island Oh.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS, SUPREME COURT,

APRIL TERM, 1860.

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MARTIN O. WALKER and  
JAMES MOORE }  
ads.  
GRANVILLE KIMBALL. } Error to Cook Circuit Court.

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FOR DEFENDANTS.

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BY W. B. SCATES,

Of Counsel for Defendants.

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12948

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD GRAND DIVISION.

APRIL TERM, 1860.

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MARTIN O. WALKER and  
JAMES MOORE  
*ads.*  
GRANVILLE KIMBALL. }      *Error to Cook Circuit Court.*

THE defendants make the following points, but in order that they may be understood, a statement showing the real issues and questions in the case becomes necessary.

I.

On the dissolution of the company of John Frink & Co., and the sale of their Staging Stock in Missouri, the plaintiff became the sole purchaser to the amount of \$53,000, payable in instalments, for which he gave his notes, and Walker endorsed them. At that time there was an understanding between him and Walker that they would enter into the same business as partners in Missouri and Kansas. But afterwards Kimball agreed to take Moore into the same partnership. Walker purchased of Kimball one third of the stock, stages, &c., which he had purchased of Frink & Co., and afterwards paid up his purchase money to Kimball, and overpaid him the sum of \$972.19.

The third was sold Walker July 1, 1854, being \$17,666.66. Walker paid in all to Kimball \$18,628.85, leaving a balance due him of \$972.19.

After the sale to Walker, Kimball sold one third of the same staging stock to James Moore, and executed to him a bill of sale under seal bearing date the 5th Dec., 1854, for which Moore paid him in full as expressed on the face of the bill of sale.

See Abstract, page 8.

The above is the manner in which the old staging stock of Frink & Co. was first sold to Kimball, and by Kimball sold in undivided thirds to Walker and to Moore

individually on forming a new staging company. After this company had carried on business nearly two years, they agreed to dissolve, and Kimball sold out his interest in the capital stock and profits of the company to Walker and Moore, who entered into a new copartnership and continued the business. This last purchase was a joint one by Walker & Moore, made on the 1st April, 1856. This purchase and transaction—though all the facts respecting it are set forth in this record—has all been paid and settled up, and it only serves to embarrass and befog the case at bar by mixing up the two transactions both in the allegations of the bill and in the proofs.

I deem it important first to ascertain what the bill seeks to have done—what particular complaint is set forth—and whether equity has jurisdiction. There has been some difficulty in finding out what is the true nature of the injury or right to be redressed, for plaintiff sometimes sets up one and sometimes another. The bill (page 2 of abstract) charges that the company of Kimball, Moore & Co. was formed after Kimball purchased the stock &c., of Fink & Co., but it does not charge that Kimball, Moore & Co. purchased this same stock of him, Kimball, but the bill charges that the same stock "was put into, and became the property of the firm of Kimball, Moore & Co., and said Kimball, Moore & Co. were to account to the complainant for the purchase money, being \$53,000."

Now if this is to be understood as an allegation of a sale to, and purchase by, the company, it is wholly unsupported by a particle of evidence. On the contrary, the whole evidence shows that Walker made his purchase of an undivided third individually, and paid for it. And plaintiff's own bill of sale under seal (on page 8 of abstract) proves that he sold to Moore individually, one undivided third and received his pay for it from Moore long after Walker had purchased, and without Walker's knowledge or consent at the time.

As a bill, then, to account by the partnership to one of the firm for property sold to the firm by him—it is unsustainable—being wholly untrue in fact, and disproved.

All the members of the firm, it is true, are parties in some form on the notes given by Kimball for the purchase money to Fink & Co., but they are not there as a firm, but individually.

At the time those notes were made and Walker's guaranty endorsed, the firm did not exist.

Kimball & Walker contemplated at that time entering into a copartnership, each to take one-half of that property. This arrangement Kimball afterwards, some five months, set aside, by selling one undivided third to Moore, and then, and for the first time, the firm of Kimball, Moore & Co. was formed, and he then signed the notes with Kimball.

If the facts raise any pretence of any sale by the company, it is of a sale by Kimball & Walker to Moore, and not by the company to Walker & Moore. And yet the plaintiff by the bill, seeks to charge Walker as debtor for two-thirds instead of one, and jointly with Moore.

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If the facts raise any pretence of any sale by the company, it is of a sale by Kimball & Walker to Moore, and not by the company to Walker & Moore. And yet the plaintiff by the bill, seeks to charge Walker as debtor for two-thirds instead of one, and jointly with Moore.

## II.

The second point raised, (page 3 of abstract) if I understand it, is the repetition of the same idea and indebtedness, but in connection with the joint execution and liability on the notes given to Frink & Co., for the stock, stages, &c. The assumption of the bill is that each was jointly liable both as principal and purchaser, and when one joint principal pays, he is entitled to contribution.

The principle invoked is true, but the facts do not call for its application. It is true, that all three became liable, but not jointly, nor as principals. The facts show conclusively that Kimball alone was the principal debtor in the purchase of Frink & Co. He so recites and asserts the fact in his bill of sale to Moore, (Page 8 of abstract.)

This was the literal fact, but the true original intent is set forth in a receipt given by Kimball to Walker for his part of the purchase money, in which it is stated that the purchase, though made in the name of Kimball alone, was on the joint account of Kimball & Walker, (Page 28 of abstract.) In this last paper the original transaction is modified to embrace Moore who had bought a third intermediately.— These payments by Walker, were made on his part of the purchase money for the property that had been put into the new company.

Kimball is estopped to deny the fact he has so recited and stated in his own deed and bill of sale.

That part of the bill that seeks to give a Court of Equity jurisdiction, then, to enforce these individual sales by Kimball to Walker, and to Moore, is misconceived. I may as well here answer the 4th point in the plaintiff's brief, in which he would preclude the defendant's form questioning the jurisdiction after appearing and answering and submitting to the jurisdiction.

The Counsel overlooks an important distinction, and that is, the distinction between causes and persons over which the equity has *concurrent jurisdiction*, and those over which and whom it has *no jurisdiction*. In the former, the party waives his right to question it, by answering:—in the latter, the maxim that consent cannot give jurisdiction applies in its full force.

Cooper's Eq. Plead. 161, 2 side.  
23 Conn. R. 112.

Now equity has no jurisdiction to enforce ordinary money contracts, nor has it to adjudicate damages for common trespasses to person or property, and consent cannot give, neither can consent empower a Court of Equity to try an ejectment.

These are cases of a common agreement of bargain and sale, and Kimball can just as well sue Moore at law upon this sale as if the property had not been used in a partnership business. Could any one reasonably doubt that an action would lie upon that sale, if any part of the purchase money remained unpaid?

So the rule contested for may and will apply to cases of personal privilege, which

the party waives by answering, and to cases where another Court has, or might have jurisdiction, or the party has an election to sue in another jurisdiction. In all these cases, the question as to the jurisdiction is waived by answering.

Upon examination the cases in 2 and 3 Scam, relate to actual partnership transactions. The cases in Daniels' Chancery Practice, and in Massachusetts and New York were cases of concurrent jurisdiction. All of them are consistent with the law as I have stated it above.

They do not show that equity may proceed to enforce a common action of debt; because the defendant has answered instead of pleading to the jurisdiction.

Story Eq. Pl., Sect.'s 472-3-6-8-9.

" " " 480-481-2-490.

" " " 487-8.

Mitford Eq. Pl., 151-3.

Cooper Eq. Pl., 140-1, 160-1-2.

*Morss vs. Elmendorf*, 11 Paige R. 287.

Lord Coningsby's Case, 9 Mod. 95.

1 Daniels' Ch. Pr., top 636, side 615.

23 Conn. R., 112.

3 Maryl. Decis. 140, *Dunnock vs. Dunnock*.

20 Alab. 289.

2 Bailey 270.

2 Woodb. & Minch. 217.

3 Barb. Ch. R., 127, 528.

### III.

By waiving the question of jurisdiction, and also the question of joint liability, we insist upon the merits that by the evidence, Moore paid the full consideration for his third of this property, and also advanced large sums of money to Kimball over and above, and which the Court below ought to have given him a decree.

We might admit the right to treat this sealed bill of sale as a common receipt, as *prima facie*, only of the payment, and still the plaintiff has failed to meet and overcome the *prima facie* evidence of payment. It by no means follows that the money was not paid, because Judge Lord did not see it paid. It may have been arranged, or actually paid, before, or after the drawing up of the bill of sale by him, and before or after its delivery. Judge Lord does not swear that the bill of sale was delivered in his presence. (Page 7 of Abstract.)

But I deny wholly the right to introduce parol evidence to explain, alter or vary the sealed bill of sale, either in respect to the payment of the purchase money or in respect to its recitals of the purchase by Kimball of Frink & Co., being for himself,

The plaintiff has attempted to vary and contradict the writing in both respects by this witness. Judge Lord makes the parties say that Kimball purchased the property for himself and Moore, or for himself, Moore, and Walker. (Page 7 Abstract.)

Whereas Kimball in his bill of sale says that Frink & Co. sold and conveyed to him, and he sells to Moore for \$17,666 paid by Moore to him.

The plaintiff's counsel has cited several authorities under his second point, every one of which I have examined. They are *all cases of deeds of conveyance*. The rule which puts the recital of payment in a *deed* upon the common footing of *receipts* as to the *fact of payment*, which makes it *prima facie* only subject to parol explanation or contradiction, is an exception to the general rule in relation to explaining, varying or contradicting writings.

The *fact of actual payment* in *deeds of conveyance* is the only exception to the rule in this respect. It does not extend to the *fact of payment* in other written contracts, whether sealed or unsealed.

1 Greenl'f Ev., Sect.'s 275-6-7-282.

This distinction is recognized by the Court in Mitchell, &c., vs. Maupin, 3 Monroe R. 187. The Court say, "If then there was a bond for the conveyance, and no counter-obligation is shown securing the purchase money, according to well settled principles, the bond *per se* must be taken as evidence of consideration, and as such must be treated. Add to this that the writing produced, executed by Richard Mitchell to Samuel, explicitly acknowledges that Samuel had bought from Benton without hinting a lack of payment of the consideration, and that he, Richard, had purchased of Samuel. Hence we conclude that the presumption is fair that Samuel Mitchell had paid the purchase money, notwithstanding the denial of Richard Mitchell's answer."

Such conclusiveness was given to a presumption of payment from the fact of giving a bond for a deed, without recitals of the payment in it, where no instrument securing the payment was shown to have been taken.

"The want of consideration may also be proved, to show that the agreement is not binding, unless it is either under seal, or a negotiable instrument in the hands of an innocent indorsee."

Greenl'f. Ev., sect. 284, 303.

In the case of the Duke of New Castle vs. Clayton, Finch R. 246, the Court held that the acknowledgment of payment in a case was conclusive.

See Clifford vs. Turrill, 9 Jurist. 633.

The rule is the same both in law and equity.

There is a distinction between conveyances, receipts, &c., and other contracts, as to the right to show a different consideration than that set forth.

"A receipt containing an agreement, condition, or stipulation between the parties," is in "the nature of a contract, and its stipulations or conditions cannot be varied by parol."

3 Cow. & Hill's Notes, p. 383, Note 194.

The reason given by the Courts for making the recital of amount and payment of the consideration in deeds an exception to the general rule as to parol evidence,

tween Kimball as the acting manager and superintendent of the partnership business, with a view to adjust his accounts as such superintendent, and also with a view to ascertain the balance to be paid him for his interest under the agreement for a purchase by Walker and Moore.

Whatever interest Kimball had in the lands, lease holds, personal property, choses in action, and effects of the partnership, was sold and transferred by the agreement of sale, by Kimball to Walker & Moore. (See Abstract, page 17.)

If the firm became liable to Kimball for two-thirds of the capital stock as is assumed and urged in the 5th and last point made by plaintiff's counsel, then I answer that this claim and demand upon the company, admitting it to be just and due, would have passed, and did pass under the agreement sale to Walker & Moore.

*Taylor vs. Coffing*, MS. Opinion, April, 1859.  
Record, page 167 to 175.

The whole then passed under this agreement, as well his capital stock as the stages, horses and other property and effects of the company.

In no aspect of the case then has the plaintiff any show of right or pretense of a claim upon the company or either of its members.

If the merits of the case are to be gone into and investigated on the assignment of errors in this record, I claim then that the decision when affirmed, shall be made final against the plaintiff, and that he be not allowed twice to investigate the same merits upon the same facts.

WALTER B. SCATES,  
of Counsel for Defendants.

# IN THE SUPREME COURT.

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MARTIN O. WALKER AND JAMES MOORE,  
Appellants,  
vs.  
GRANVILL KIMBALL,  
Appellee.

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## POINTS FOR APPELLEE.

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This is an action to recover an installment of interest. The clause in the agreement on which the action is predicated, is as follows: "Said Walker & Moore agree to pay within three years from this date, to said Kimball, the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred and sixty dollars, *with interest annually*, at ten per cent."

It is claimed by defendant, that interest is not to be *paid* annually, but it is to be *computed* annually; this argument is a refinement that would make the agreement of no effect whatever, and overthrow its obvious meaning, and the intention of the parties. What does he agree to pay? He agrees to pay the principal within three years, and he, as plainly, agrees *to pay interest on the principal annually*.

In *Callin v. Lyman*, 16 Vermont, 44, the action was to recover an installment of interest upon a note for \$10,000, in ten years, with annual interest; the action was sustained.

In *Ferry v. Ferry*, 2 Cushing, 92, the court held that a note "with interest" annually, *may be enforced*, but if payment is delayed, interest upon interest cannot be recovered.

In *Hastings v. Wisewell*, 8 Mass. R. 455, the action was upon a note, as follows: "June 5, 1804. For value received of Mr. Isaac Nichols, I promise to pay him, or order, the sum of three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, in five years from date, *with interest annually*." The court held, "that the plaintiff might have brought his actions for the interest, at the *expiration of each year*."

E., A. & J. VAN BUREN,

35 Monroe 75  
24 Conn 505 56

Attorneys for Appellee.

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Sup Court

Martin O. Walker  
James Doane  
vs Appellants  
Granville Kimball  
Appellee  
Points for Aff

Filed May 4, 1859  
R. Holland  
Clerk

Supreme Court of Illinois  
Third Grand Division  
April Term 1859

Maria C. Walker

impledaded

v

Granville Kimball

Appeal from Cook County  
Circuit Court

And now comes the appellant  
by Scales McAllister & Jewell his counsel and says, that  
in the record and proceedings, and in the rendition  
of judgment in this cause, manifest error hath  
intervened in this ~~as~~ wit:

1st The Court found for the appellee,

2nd The Court rendered judgment for the appellee  
when, by the laws of the land, judgment should  
have been rendered for the appellant.

3d The Court misconstrued the contract or agree-  
ment between the parties

Scales, McAllister & Jewell  
For Appellant

United States of America }

STATE OF ILLINOIS, COUNTY OF COOK, S. S.

Pleas, before the Honorable George Mancine)

Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois, and Sole Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, in the State aforesaid, and at a term thereof begun and held at the Court House in the City of Chicago, in said County, on the First ~~in~~ Monday, (being the First ~~in~~ day) of March ~~one~~ in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and Eighty Eight ~~one~~ and of the Independence of the said United States the Eighty Second

Present, Honorable George Mancine, Judge of the 7th Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois.)

Charles Haven States Attorney.

John S. Wilson Sheriff of Cook County.

Attest: Wm L. Church Clerk.

Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on  
the 5<sup>th</sup> day of February in the year of Our Lord  
One Thousand Eight hundred and fifty eight,  
Oranville Kimball plaintiff, by E. A. and J.  
Van Buren his attorneys, sued out of the Office  
of the Clerk of the bank aforesaid, the People's  
Writ of Summons, directed to the Sheriff of  
Cook County to execute and clothed in the words  
and figures following, to-wit.

State of Illinois,

County of Cook } The People of the State of Illinois  
to the Sheriff of Said County Greeting.

(1) We command you that you summon  
Martin O'Walker and James Morris, if they shall be  
found in your County, personally to be and appear  
before the Circuit Court of Cook County, on the first  
day of the next term thereof, to be holden at the  
Court House in Chicago, in said County on the first  
Monday of March next, to answer unto, Oranville  
Kimball, in a pleaf of trespass on the easement  
promises, to the damage of the said plaintiff, as is  
said, in the sum of Nine Thousand Dollars; and  
have given him and there his writ with an endorse-  
ment thereon; in what manner you shall have ex-  
ecuted the same.

Witness, William S. Church, Clerk of  
our said bank, and the seal thereof ~ E. A. and J.  
at Chicago aforesaid the 5<sup>th</sup> day of February  
A.D. 1858

Wm. S. Church  
Clerk

And afterwards, to wit on the 8<sup>th</sup> day of February in the year last aforesaid, said sum was returned into the bank aforesaid, by said Sheriff, endorsed as follows, to wit,

Served by reading to the within named Defendant Martin O'Walker, the other Deft not found in my County, the 8<sup>th</sup> day of February, 1858,  
Ses. I Service 50<sup>¢</sup> 1 mile 5<sup>¢</sup> 1 Return 10<sup>¢</sup>, 65<sup>¢</sup> paid by  
plff atty. John S. Wilson, Sheriff

by George Anderson, deputy

And afterwards, to wit on the 16<sup>th</sup> day of February in the year last aforesaid, said plaintiff, by his attorney aforesaid, filed in the bank aforesaid, his certain declaration, which is in the words and figures following to-wit,

(2)

Circuit Court of Cook County of the March term 1858  
State of Illinois,

County of Cook, Granville Kimball Plaintiff  
in this suit by & at the law office of Van Buren his attorney, com-  
plains of Martin O'Walker and James Morris, defen-  
dants, who were summoned & on a plea of trespass  
on the case on promise;

For that whereal, the said defen-  
dant heretofore, to wit on the first day of April in  
the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight hundred  
and fifty six, at said County of Cook, made a  
certain agreement in writing, with the said  
plaintiff, in the words and figures following to-  
wit,

"Whereas Granville Kimball, James Moore  
and Martin O'Walker, have been staging in the  
State of Missouri and Territory of Kansas, under  
the name & style of Kimball Moore & Co., and where-  
as, said Kimball has sold his interest in said  
joint concern, to said Martin O'Walker and James  
Moore, and Whereas a settlement of all joint affairs  
and interest up to this date, is agreed upon between  
said Kimball of the one part and Walker and  
Moore of the other part,

(3) Now Know all men by these presents  
that the contract made and entered into by and  
between the said Granville Kimball of the one part  
and Martin O'Walker and James Moore of the  
other part, witnesseth, that the said Granville  
Kimball for and in consideration ~~of~~ of the under-  
taking on the part of said Walker and Moore  
hereinafter expressed, has granted bargained sold  
assigned set over and delivered to said Martin  
O'Walker and James Moore, all the right title  
claim and interest, of said Kimball in and to  
all the personal property, heretofore and at  
present belonging to the firm of Kimball Moore &  
including stages, horses, barns, mail contracts  
with the United States, also all other property  
not herein enumerated, also all the interest of  
said Kimball in and to all the Real Estate  
belonging legally or equitably, to said firm  
of Kimball Moore & Co including leasehold and

- all other interest, whatever the same is, now in  
said firm, or in the name of either or any of the  
individual members of said firm, or in the  
name of any other parties. And it is agreed by  
and between the parties hereto that deeds  
or leases, and all other necessary evidences of title  
to be within a reasonable time made by said  
Kimball to said Moore & Walker, for his said  
interest in such Real Estate. It is further agreed  
by and between the parties hereto, that the  
partnership heretofore existing between said  
parties, is this day dissolved by mutual consent,  
being understood, that said business is to be continued  
by said Walker & Moore & it is agreed by and  
between the parties hereto, that an account is  
to be taken, and settlement made by William  
Tamm, of and concerning all monies received  
by said Kimball, belonging to said firm & of  
and concerning all disbursements made by said  
Kimball for and on account of said firm, and  
all accounts between said late firm of Kimball  
& Moore &c. and said Kimball, are to be finally  
and fully settled, by the decision of the said  
Tamm, and in the settlement of said accounts  
said Kimball is to be allowed the sum of  
One hundred dollars <sup>per year</sup> from July 10 1854  
as a salary for his services, and in consideration  
of the above sale, the said Walker & Moore  
agree to convey to said Kimball, all the interest

(4)

which said Morris now has, in a tract of about  
thirty acres of land, laying north of Diving, which  
is estimated at Seventy five hundred dollars, the one  
half of said land already belonging to said  
Rimball, and said Walker & Morris agree to  
pay to said Rimball, the sum of Six Thousand  
Dollars, within four months from the date hereof,  
with ten per cent from the date hereof, and  
said Walker & Morris, agree to pay within three  
years from this date, to said Rimball, the  
sum of Thirteen thousand one hundred and sixty  
six dollars, with interest annually at ten per  
cent, said last mentioned sum to be decreased  
or increased, according to the result of the  
settlement to be made by the said ~~and~~ <sup>between</sup> the  
aforesaid, and said Walker & Morris agree to  
pay all indebtedness & liabilities, now owing  
& unpaid, by said late firm of Rimball & Morris  
to him, and to indemnify and save harmless said  
Rimball therefrom.

At witness our hands upon this  
first day of April AD 1856.

(Signed) "O. Rimball  
James Morris  
M. Walker

By means whereof, the said defendants, on the first  
day of April AD 1857, became liable to pay to the said  
plaintiff, One year interest on said sum of Thirteen  
Thousands One hundred one hundred, and sixty six

dollars, at the rate of ten per cent per annum, amounting to the sum of One Thousand three hundred and sixteen dollars and sixty cents, <sup>94</sup> being so liable in consideration thereof, then and there undertaken and promised to pay the same to the said plaintiff, according to the tenor and effect of the said agreement, to wit at the place aforesaid:

2 Count.

(6)

Also for that whereas, the said defendants afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid and at the place aforesaid, made their certain agreement in writing, bearing date the day and year aforesaid, a copy of which is herein before set forth, in and by which said agreement the said defendants agreed, to pay within three years from the date thereof, to said plaintiff the sum of Thirteen Thousand one hundred and Sixty-Six dollars, with interest annually at ten per cent, to be lessened or increased according to the settlement to be made by said William Vernon;

That in pursuance of ~~the~~ said agreement the said William Vernon, on the first day of April in the year of our Lord One thousand Eight hundred and fifty seven, at Chicago in the County of Cook aforesaid, made a settlement between the said plaintiff and defendants, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement aforesaid in and

by which said Settlement, the said William Vernon  
found and awarded, that there was due to the  
said plaintiff, from said defendants, on the  
1<sup>st</sup> day of April 1856, the sum of Eight Thousand  
Seven Hundred Seventy Eight dollars and thirty  
cents. By reason whereof, and of the said ac-  
c<sup>s</sup>sessment statement or award so made by said  
Vernon, there was due the said plaintiff from  
the said defendants, on the first day of April  
1854, for interest thereon, from the first day of  
April A.D. 1856, to the first day of April 1857,  
being for such interest the sum of Eight hundred  
and Seventy Seven dollars and Eighty three  
cents, being interest at the rate of ten per cent  
per annum for one year;

(7)

By means whereof the said defendants  
became liable to pay said plaintiff, said sum of  
money last mentioned, and being so liable in consider-  
ation thereof, than and there undertook and promised  
to pay to the said plaintiff, the said sum of money  
last mentioned, when thereunto afterward re-  
quested;

3 Count

And whereas also the said defendant, after-  
wards, to wit on the day and year last aforesaid,  
at the County of Cook aforesaid, were indebted to  
the said plaintiff, in the further sum of Five  
Thousands dollars, of like lawful money, for  
so much money, before that time and then due  
and payable, from the said defendants to the said

plaintiff for interest upon and for the forbearance  
of divers larger sums of money, before that time due  
and owing from the said defendants to the said  
plaintiff, and by the said plaintiff forbore to  
the said defendants for divers long spaces of time  
before than elapsed, at the like special instance and  
request of the said defendants, and having so in  
debted, they the said defendants afterwards, to wit  
on the day and year last aforesaid, at the County  
of book aforesaid, undertook and then and there  
faithfully promised the said plaintiff to pay him  
the said last mentioned sum of money, when they  
the said defendants should be thenceforth after  
wards requested,

A Count  
(8)

And whereas also the said defendants  
afterwards, to wit on the first day of April in the  
year of our Lord One Thousand Eight hundred  
and fifty seven, to wit, at said County became  
and were indebted unto the plaintiff in a large  
sum of money, to wit, One Thousand dollars, for  
money before that time lent and advanced to  
said defendants by said plaintiff at said defen-  
dants request; and also in the like sum for money  
before that time paid, laid out and expended,  
by said defendants, by the said plaintiff, at the like  
special request of said defendants; and in the like  
sum for money, before that time had and received  
by said Defendants, to and for the use of said plai-  
ntiff; and also in the like sum for goods, wares and

3

merchandise, before that time sold and delivered by  
said plaintiff, to said Defendants, at the like special  
instance and request; and also in the like sum for  
the labor care and diligence, of said Plaintiff  
before that time done and performed by said  
Plaintiff for said Defendants, at the like instance  
and request of said Defendants; and also in  
the like sum, then and there found to be due and  
owing to said Plaintiff on an account stated between  
them; And being so indebted, said Defendants  
in consideration thereof, then and there undertook  
and promised to pay said Plaintiff said several  
sums, above mentioned, when required, afterward  
requested.

(9)

If eth the said Defendants, notwithstanding  
their said promise and undertaking, but  
contriving re, although often requested so to do,  
have not paid said Plaintiff, either of said  
sums of money above mentioned, or any part  
thereof, but so to do have hitherto wholly neg-  
lected and refused, and still do neglect and  
refuse, to the damage of said Plaintiff of Five  
Thousands Dollars, and therefore having this  
suit re,

"E. A. & J. Van Buren, Plaintiff, attorney  
Copy of instrument and account signed"

Chicago April 1<sup>st</sup> 1854  
Martin O'Walker & James Moore

S. Granville Kimball 10

1. Money Lent and advanced	\$ 5000
2. Money paid laid out and expended	\$ 5000
3. Money had & recd to & for the use of said plaintiff	\$ 5000
4. goods, wares & merchandise sold & delivered	\$ 5000
5. labor and services	\$ 5000
6. Interest on \$ 141 55. 49	\$ 1415.49
7. Interest on \$ 8478. 50	\$ 847.85

(Copy of Account)

1854 Granville Rimball esq. in account. Rimball, Morris & Co  
Oct 1. 1. Amount he received for horses &c sold. 3 Quan. 54 \$988.44

" "	" "	" "	" "	4 "	" "	965.50
" "	" "	" "	" "	1 "	" 55	664.04
" "	" "	" "	" "	2 "	" "	1095.09
" "	" "	" "	" "	3 "	" "	959.50
" "	" "	" "	" "	4 "	" "	1817.20
" "	" "	" "	" "	1 "	" 56	1845.50

(10)

"	Draw Collected	3 " 54	12581.20
"	" "	4 "	26948.86
"	" "	1 "	20480.74
"	" "	2 "	20017.46
"	" "	3 "	15241.76
"	" "	4 "	26398.08
"	" "	1 "	14424.50

" amt for transporting mails. 3 quar 54 to 1 quar 56 inclusive 69219.20

" " special service 3 " 54 7500.00

Rimballs notes taken up. 1839 Northway	84.19
J. Johnson	115.74
P. H. Johnson	625.34
Walt & Ronkle	96.00

Rumballs notes taken up.	& or enough	106,64
O Andrus	42,31	
M O Walker	1396,13	
S G Spaulding	219 -	
E Shurn	100 -	
J Sedmell	49 -	
D W Jones	191,95	
Wentlington & Frank	112,50	
S. Monk	241 -	
W S. Whaley	292,90	
D Armstrong	200 -	
M Dougall	50 -	
S.S. Remmon	6410,65	
R Ridgley	94,20	
E Violett \$60	218,60	
J J Armstrong \$60	1000 -	
R W Johnson & Son	76 -	12021,91

(11)

" Amounts due by company at date of sale to be charged Rumball, as he is credited with the bills

E Violett \$60	120,43
M Walker & Durry	150,00
M Remmon	250 -
J J Anderson \$60	1000 -
A Casgrove	216 -
J J Rogers	700 -
	\$ 436,43
	284,162,98

Dr Amounts brought forward	\$ 2436.43	\$ 237462.98
J J Anderson Hb.	1000 -	
C Myres	408.93	
E Wing	194.22	
E Sevring	1108 -	
Maurit	325.42	
J Sangm	200.45	
J J Anderson Hb.	1000 -	
E R Twelt Hb.	<u>189.65</u>	
	6666.40	

.. Cash left of \$5,000 to pay in next due date 90.11

By Bills paid 3 quav 54	42547.47
" 4 "	40523.22
" 1 55	37054.94
" 2 "	34340.15
" 3 "	40849.89
" 4 "	36147.15
" 1 56	28383.91

(12) Dr. S. Spaulding bill 1 quav 55. I credit him + charge his fees, as all his cash was accounted for

3383.44

Dr Note for lost, McRae's Bank N.Y.	\$ 5007.18
, M O Walker's acceptance	5000 -
, Note to Patterson	credited to Rimbull in 2000 -
" " " Gardner	error. 3 quav 54 <u>1700 -</u>
	15707.08

Dr Note due at maturity and at date of sale. 6000 -

" special services omitted 5431. -

By Balance down due by Rimbull day of sale 4384.90  
\$ 264654.87 \$ 264657.87

4

1856

April 1

So Am't due by G. Kimball at date of sale \$384.70

" Am't paid him on accts of his interest sold. 5000,-

By amount they agreed to pay, eighteen thousand one hundred sixty six dollars,

\$18,000.00 to be paid in four months  
with ten per cent, & thirteen thousand one hundred  
& sixty six dollars, together with one half of  
thirty acres of land north of Union, the other  
half of the land belonging to Kimball.

2. Balance down due to Granville Kimball \$77830.

18166.11

18166.11, 18166.00

By Balance down \$ 8448.30

(18)

In reviewing my decision of accounts referred to me  
by Granville Kimball, Martin O'Sullivan & James  
Moore, I find in going over the whole matter care-  
fully, that there was due to Granville Kimball  
on the first day of April, eighteen hundred &  
fifty six, the sum of, Eight Thousand Seven  
hundred & seventy eight dollars thirty cents

W Tamm

\$ 8448.30

Refugee

And afterwards, to wit: at the March Term of  
said Court, to wit: on the 4<sup>th</sup> day of March A.D. 1858  
the following, among other proceedings, were had and  
entered of record therein, to wit:

This day comes the said plaintiff by his  
attorney, and due personal service of process of  
summons, issued herein being had on said defendant

Martin O'Walker only, and he having been  
three times solemnly called, in open court, comes  
not, nor does any person for him, but herein he  
makes default, which is ordered to be taken and  
entered of Record; wherefore said plaintiff  
ought to have and recover of said defendant  
Martin O'Walker impleaded with James Morra  
his damages herein sustained by occasion of the  
premises, and the Court after hearing the alleg-  
ations and proofs submitted by said plaintiff,  
and being well advised in the premises, now  
assesses said plaintiff's damage herein, to the  
sum of fourteen hundred and thirteen dollars  
and thirty seven cents:

Wherefore it is considered that said  
(14) plaintiff do have and recover of said defan-  
dant Martin O'Walker, impleaded with  
James Morra, his damages of fourteen hundred and  
\$ 1413<sup>34</sup> thirteen dollars and thirty seven cents, in comp-  
any aforesaid assessed, together with his costs and  
charges, by him in this behalf expended, and  
have execution thereon.

And afterwards, to-mor. at the same  
term of said Court, to-mor. on the 24<sup>th</sup> day of March in  
the year last aforesaid, the following, among other  
proceedings, mentioned and entered of record there-  
in to-mor.

This day come the said defendant M O  
Walker impleaded to, and moves the Court to set

asidr the assessment heretofore made herein, and  
for a new assessment of damages, and the Court  
after hearing the Counsel on said motion, and  
not being well advised in the premises, states  
the same under advisement;

And afterwards, to wit, at the same  
term of said Court, to wit on the 31<sup>st</sup> day of March  
in the year last aforesaid, the following, among  
other proceedings, was had and entered of re-  
cord therein, to wit:

(15) This day comes again, the said plain-  
tiff by his Counsel, and the said defendant  
Walker impleaded &c. by his Counsel also comes,  
and the Court being now well advised in the  
premises, doth order that the former assessment  
of damage made by the Court in said cause  
and the judgment thereon, be, and the same  
are hereby vacated and set aside and for nothing  
esteemed: And on motion of the plaintiff, the  
said defendant by his Counsel consenting, it is  
ordered that the plaintiff have leave to amend  
his declaration, & file a copy of the award therein  
referred to, once good time as of the date of  
filing his said declaration, which is done;

And now, neither of the parties demanding  
a jury, the Court after hearing the allegation  
and proofs submitted, and being fully  
advised in the premises, assesses the Plaintiff  
damages, by reason of the premises, to the sum

of Eight hundred and Saventy Savan dollars  
and Eighty Three Cents;

Wherefore it is considered that the  
said plaintiff do have and recover of the said  
defendant Martin O'Walker, impleaded &c  
his damages, of Eight hundred and Saventy  
Savan dollars and Eighty three Cents, in form as  
aforesaid assessed, together with his costs and  
Charges by him about his suit in that behalf  
Expended, and have Execution therefor,

And to the said assessment and judg-  
ment of the Court, the said defendant Walker  
by his Counsel here excepts, and prays an  
appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court of the  
State of Illinois: which is granted on condition  
that the said defendant make and execute  
his appeal bond, in the penal sum of fifteen  
hundred dollars, with Samuel B'Walker as  
surety, conditioned according to Law and  
file the same with the Clerk of this Court  
within ten days, and it is further ordered  
that he have ten days, to file his Bill of Excep-  
tions,

And afterwards, to wit on the 31<sup>st</sup> day of  
March in the year last aforesaid, said defendant  
Martin O'Walker impleaded &c, filed his certain  
Bill of Exceptions, which is in the words and figures  
following, to wit:

State of Illinois County of Cook. &c.

Martin O'Walker  
mispleaded with  
James Morris

and

In the Cook County Circuit Court  
of the March Term 1858

(17) Granville Kimball Behr remembered that the default of the defendant Martin O'Walker, having been previously entered in the cause, and the same coming on for the assessment of damages as then in against said defendant Walker, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day of March, that being one of the days of the March Term AD 1858 of said Court; The said plaintiff for the purpose of proving said damage, on his part, offered in evidence, an agreement between the plaintiff & the said defendant mentioned in the declaration, in the words and figures following to wit:

Whereas, Granville Kimball, James Morris and M O'Walker, have been dealing in the State of Missouri and Territory of Kansas, under the name and style of Kimball Morris & Co; And whereas said Kimball has sold his interest in said joint concern to said Martin O'Walker and James Morris, and whereas, a settlement of affairs and interest up to the date so agreed upon between the said Kimball of the one part and Walker and Morris of the other part;

Now I know all men by these presents, that this

Contract made and entered into by and between  
said Granville Kimball of the one part and  
Martin O'Walker and James Moore of the other part,  
Witnesseth, that the said Granville for and in con-  
sideration of the undertaking on the part of the said  
Walker & Moore herein after expressed, has granted  
bargained, sold, assigned, set over and delivered  
to said Martin O'Walker and James Moore, all  
the right title claim and interest of said Kimball  
in and to all the personal property, heretofore,  
and at present belonging to said firm of Kimball  
Moore &c, including Stages, Horses, Teamsters, Mail  
contracts with the United States, also all other  
property not herein enumerated, also all the  
interest of said Kimball in and to all the Real  
estate belonging legally or equitably to said  
firm of Kimball Moore &c, including leasehold  
and all other interests whatever whether  
the same is now in said firm or in the name of  
either or any of the individual members of said  
firm, or in the name of any other parties, and  
it is agreed by and between the parties hereto  
that Deeds Releases and all other necessary evi-  
dence of title shall be within a reasonable time  
rendered by said Kimball to said Moore & Walker  
for his said interest in such Real Estate. It is  
further agreed by and between the parties hereto  
that the partnership heretofore existing between  
said parties is this day dissolved by mutual

(18)

consent, it being understood that said business is  
to be continued on by said Walker and Morra and  
it is agreed by and between the parties hereto, that  
an account is to be taken and settlement made  
by William Vernon of and concerning all monies  
received by said Rimbll to said firm, and of  
and concerning all disbursements made by said  
Rimbll for and on account of said firm, and  
all accounts between said late firm of Rimbll  
Morra & Co and said Rimbll are to be finally  
and fully settled by the decision of said Vernon  
and in the settlement of said accounts said Rimbll  
is to be allowed the sum of One hundred dollars per

(119) year since July 1854, as a salary for his services,  
and in consideration of the above date, the said

Walker + Morra agree to convey to said Rimbll  
all the interest which the said Morra now has in  
a tract of about thirty acres of land laying north  
of Winton, which is estimated at ~~Twenty~~ <sup>six</sup> thousand  
dollar, the one half of said already belonging  
— said Rimbll, and said Walker + Morra agree

to pay to said Rimbll the sum of Six Thousand  
Dollars, within four months from the date hereof,

And the said Walker + Morra agree to pay, within  
three years from this date to the said Rimbll the  
sum of Thirteen thousand one hundred and sixty  
six dollars, with interest annually at ten per cent;  
said last mentioned sum to be lessened or in-  
creased according to the result of the settle-

- mark to be made by said Wm Tarnow as aforesaid,  
 - and said Walker and Moore agree to  
 pay all indebtedness and liabilities now remaining  
 and unpaid by said late firm of Kimball  
 Moore & Co., and to indemnify and save, said  
 Kimball harmless therefrom; as witness our  
 hands upon this first day of April 1856

Wm Kimball

James Moore  
Wm Walker

Plaintiff next introduced the account or Report of  
 William Tarnow, made in pursuance of said  
 agreement, also mentioned in the declaration as follows:  
 (Granville Kimball Esq)

1854  
Oct 1  
(20)

	in a/c with Kimball & Moore					
3. Horses to Sald.	3	quarter	of	54	44	3988
" "	4	"	"	"	30	963
" "	1	"	"	55	07	667
" "	2	"	"	"	49	1098
" "	3	"	"	"	50	959
" "	4	"	"	"	50	1819
" "	1	"	56	"	50	1845
" " Dras Collected	3	"	54	"	20	12531
" "	4	"	"	"	86	26408
" "	1	"	55	"	77	20480
" "	2	"	"	"	46	20019
" "	3	"	"	"	46	13291
" "	4	"	"	"	08	26398
" "	1	"	56	"	50	17924

Amts for transporting Mail, Squaw 54 to Igwinten,  
Special Service Squaw 54

69219.94  
70.00

Rimball's notes to W. Morthy taken up. 84, 19

John Johnson	115.44
P. H. Johnson	625.34
Watt Randall	96.00
E. W. Enoch	106.04
O. Anderson	42.31
M. Orrather	1396.03
Say Spalding	219.00
E. Meau	110 -
J. S. Sidwell	49 -
J. W. Jones	191.95
Buntington & Grunk	113.50
S. Merle	241 -
H. Brinkley	292.90
H. Armstrong	200 -
M' Donald	50 -
S. D. Dammon	6910.65
R. Ridgely	94.20
E. Violette Co.	218.60
J. J. Anderson & Son	1000 -
R. H. Johnson & Son	76.00
	\$12031.91

So Amts due by company at date  
of sale to be charged to Rimball  
as he is credited by all the bills

E. Violette Co. 124.43

Walker Drury 150.00

W. Sherman	950.00
J. J. Anderson	100.00
A. Cusayron	216.00
J. S. Ryan	7.00
J. J. Anderson & Son	100.00
C. Myers	408.43
E. Wing	199.22
E. Devaney	408.00
Wm Cash	325.00
D. Zanger	210.95
J. J. Anderson	15.00
E. R. Violett & Co.	189.65

Cash left of \$ 5000.  
6666.40  
9.0.11

By Bills paid 3 quater 54

(22)

4	"	42544	47
1	55	40583	22
2	"	37054	94
3	"	34340	15
4	"	40849	89
5	"	36147	15
6	06	28383	91

③ J. D. Spaulding bill 1 quater 55. I credit  
and charge his fares, as his cash  
was accounted for

5383.44

S. Note Prob. McLean & My	500.00
" M. O'Walker's acceptance	500.00
" Note to Palmer	200.00
" " " Gardner	100.00

Credit Rimbull in error

3 quarter 54.

5134.7.08

	<del>Amount Due</del>	X	<del>Amount</del>
	To Dr. to South Bend		6000 -
	Special Service Omitted		3781 -
	By Balance due from Rimbald.		4384 4/
1836			\$ 264689.84 / 264689 87

April 1 So Am't from Dr. to South Bend 4384 4/  
 This amount paid him on also his rights sold. 5000 -  
 By Am't they agreed to pay - 18166 -  
 Nine thousand to be paid in four months  
 at ten percent and thirteen thousand one  
 hundred & eighty six dollars, together with  
 one half of (30) thirty acres of land  
 north of Dixon, the other half belonging  
 to Rimbald 8748 30

By balance due of Rimbald. 18166 - 18166 -  
 8748 30

In reviewing my decision of accounts  
 referred to me by Granville Rimbald  
 Martin O'Walker + James Morris, I find  
 in going over the whole matter carefully  
 that there was due to Granville Rimbald  
 on the first day of April. Eighteen hundred  
 and fifty six, the sum of Eight thousand  
 seven hundred and seventy eight dollars  
 and thirty cents - On Demand  
 Refund

no objection was made to the introduction of said agreement and award in evidence.

The foregoing was all the evidence offered by the plaintiff on said assessment. No evidence was offered on the part of the defendant, and the court thereupon assessed the damages against the said defendant Martin O'Walker at the sum of eight hundred and seventy seven Dollars and Eighty three Cents (\$ 877<sup>83</sup>), and the said defendant by his counsel moved the court to set aside the judgment and assessment so there & assessed aforesaid, and for a reassessment of damages:

(27) Which motion was overruled by the court and judgment rendered against said defendant upon said assessment for the sum of Eight hundred & seventy seven dollars & eighty three cents,

In the overruling of which motion for a reassessment & the entering up of said judgment the defendant by his counsel then and there excepted, and prayed that his Bill of Exceptions might be signed & sealed by the court, which is accordingly done.

O George Manumwa Seal

Judge of the 4<sup>th</sup> Judicial Circuit Ills

And afterwards, to wit: on the 5<sup>th</sup> day of April in the year last aforesaid, said defendant Martin O'Walker impleaded & filed in the Office of the Clerk of the court aforesaid, his certain Appeal Bond, which is in the word and figure following, to wit:

Know all men by these presents, that we the  
Martin O'Walker and Samuel D'Walker, of the  
County of Cook and State of Illinois, are held and  
firmly bound unto Granville Kimball, also of  
the same County and State, in the sum of  
Fifteen hundred dollars lawful money of the  
United States, for the payment of which well and  
truly to be made, we bind ourselves our heirs ex-  
ecutors and administrators, jointly severally and firm-  
ly by these presents:

Witness our hands and seals this first day of April  
AD 1858. The condition of the above obligation is  
such, that whereas the said Granville Kimball  
did, on the thirtieth day of March, AD 1858, in  
the Circuit Court, in and for the County and State  
aforesaid, and of the March Term thereof AD 1858,  
recover a judgment against the above bounden  
Martin O'Walker, for the sum of Eight hundred  
and Seventy Seven dollars and Eighty three cents,  
besides costs of suit: from which said judgment  
of the said Circuit Court, the said Martin O'Walker  
has prayed for, and obtained an appeal to the  
Supreme Court of said State;

Wherefore, if the said Martin O'Walker  
shall duly prosecute his said appeal  
with effect, and moreover, pay the amount of  
said judgment, costs, interest and damages  
rendered, and to be rendered, against him in  
case the said judgment shall be affirmed

in the said Supreme Court, than the above obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue;

Martin O'Walker  
Samuel R. Walker

Seal  
Seal

State of Illinois, }  
COUNTY OF COOK. } S. S.

I, WILLIAM L. CHURCH, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, in the State aforesaid, do hereby certify the above and foregoing, to be a true, perfect and complete copy of the Original Writ, Pleasance & Papers filed & proceedings had and entered off record in a certain cause lately pending in said Court on the Common law side thereof, wherein Granville Kimball was plaintiff and Martin O'Walker and his wife was defendant

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the seal of our said Court at Chicago, this Thirtieth day of March A. D. 1859

See for Record #7, 35

W. L. Church

Clerk.

Under seal of witness  
Martin O'Walker for  
by App't  
Granville Kimball app'r  
And now comes the said Appellee by  
E. A. & F. Van Buren his attorney to say  
there is no sum in the record proceedings  
nor in the cause of the present appeal  
such & such that the same may be in all  
things affirmed E. A. & F. Van Buren  
Attest for appellee

230  
Granville Kniball

ADS

Martin O'Walla <sup>Impd.</sup>

Transcript of Record

Filed April 20, 1859  
L. Leland  
CLR