

12250

No. _____

Supreme Court of Illinois

Norton, et al

vs.

Stadley

71641  7

William Studley

vs

Trespass.

William Norton &

James Knight

Be it Remembered that on the 28th day of December A.D. 1855, came Milton T. Peters Esqr. into the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in and for the County of Bureau in the State of Illinois, and filed in Said Clerks office a process for Summons in the words and figures following To wit.

State of Illinois Circuit Court

Bureau County January Term 1856

William Studley

vs

Trespass

William Norton & Dam. \$ 200. 50

James Knight

The Clerk will please issue
a summons in the above cause.

Peters & Farwell
attys for Plff.

And on the same day to wit 28th day of December 1855, Summons Issued in the words and figures following To wit.

State of Illinois
Bureau County ss. The People of the State of Illinois.

To the Sheriff of Said County Greeting.

We command you that you summon William Norton
and James Knight, if they shall be found in your
County, personally to be and appear before the said
Circuit Court of Said County on the first day of the next
Term thereof To be helden at the Court House in the
Town of Princeton, in Said County, on the second
Monday in the month of January next, to answer
unto William Studley, of a plea of trespass, to the
damage of the said Plaintiff, as he says in the sum
of Two Hundred dollars, and have you then and
there this writ, with an endorsement thereon in what
manner you shall have executed the same.

Witness Edward McFadden Clerk of our said
Circuit Court, and the Seal thereof, at Princeton
this 28th day of December in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and
fifty five. Edward McFadden Clerk

Sheriff's Return on said Summons.

Served by reading to William Norton & James Knight
the 4th day of January 1856. Stephen G. Paddock
Sheriff Bu Co Ills

by William Jones Jr

and afterwards to wit. on the 4th day of
January AD 1856. Came the said Plaintiff by Peter &
Farewell his attorneys. and files his declaration herein
in the words and figures following to wit.

State of Illinois
Bureau County

Circuit Court

January Term AD 1856.

William Stedley

vs

Trespass

William Norton &

James Knight

William Stedley Plaintiff com
plains of William Norton & James Knight. defendants
of a plea of Trespass. For that the defendants on the
15th day of December AD 1855. at the County of Bureau
and State of Illinois. and on other days and
times between that day and the commencement of this
suit. with force and arms &c. broke and entered the
close of the Plaintiff. in the County and State aforesaid
and described as the South West quarter of section
No nine in Township No fifteen North of the Base line.
of range No Six east of the fourth principal Meridian
and then and there with shovels pick axes and
other iron instruments dug up turned & subverted the
earth and soil. To wit. One acre of Earth and
soil of the said close of the said Plaintiff. and then
and there put placed and erected and caused to

put placed and erected a bridge in and upon
the said Shore of the Plaintiff, and other wrongs, to
the plaintiff then and there did, and against the
peace and dignity of the People of the State of Illinois,
and to the damage of the said plaintiff, in the sum
of Two Hundred Dollars, & therefore he brings his suit,

Peters & Farwell

Plffs Atys

Plead before the Hon^l M. C. Hollister
judge of the ninth judicial circuit of the Circuit Court
of the State of Illinois, at the January Term of said
Circuit Court for the County of Bureau, begun and
held at the Court House in Princeton, within
and for said County, on Tuesday the Fifteenth
day of January in the year of our Lord One
thousand Eight Hundred and fifty six.

Present Hon^l M C Hollister judge

Edward Mc Farren Clerk

Stephen G. Paddock Sheriff.

W^m L Wallace dist attorney

Monday January 21st 1856.

William Studley

vs

Trespass

William Norton &

James Knight

Now comes the defendants by

Taylor & Stepp their attorneys and file their pleas to
said Plaintiffs declaration in the words and figures
following to wit: And the said defendants by
Taylor & Stepp their attorneys come and defend &c
and say that they are not nor is either of them guilty in
manner and form, as the said plaintiff hath complained
against them, and off this they put themselves
upon the country. Taylor & Stepp for defendants

And the Plaintiff doth the like

Peter & Farwell his attys

and for a further plea in this behalf the said defendants
by leave of the Court for this purpose first had and
stated say that by reason of anything in the said
declaration alledged, the said Plaintiff ought not to
have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against
the said defendants or either of them, because they say
that at the said several times when &c. There was
and right ought to have been a certain common
and public highway, into through and over the
said close in which &c. for all the good citizens
of the State of Illinois, and having occasion to use the
same way, at the said several times when &c. The
said defendants at the said several times when &c.
went with shovels, pick axes, and other instruments
digging up timber and subverted a little of the earth and
soil, and erected a bridge upon said highway
along over and through the said close, as the same

passed over & through the said Close so that without digging up, turning and subverting the earth & building said bridge upon and along said highway as the same passed through said Close, the said highway would be impassable through and over the said Close in which &c. And the defendants say that in doing the said digging up, turning and subverting of the earth & soil, and building said bridge upon said highway over said Close, they did not, nor did either of them do any unnecessary damage to the said Plaintiff on these occasions which are the same supposed trespasses in the said declaration mentioned and wheresof the said Plaintiff hath above complained against them the said defendant, and this they are ready to verify, wherefore they pray judgment if the said plaintiff ought further to maintain his aforesaid action thereof against the said defendants or either of them.

Taylor & Stipp attys for Dfnts

and the Plaintiff comes by Peters & Farwell his attorneys and files his replication to said plea in the words and figures following to wit,

And the said Plaintiff says that he ought not to be precluded from having or maintaining his aforesaid action against them the said defendants, by reason of anything alleged in their several pleadings by them pleaded, because he says that at the said several times when &c. there was no such common and public

Highway into through and over the said close of
the said Plaintiff for the use of all the good
citizens of the State of Illinois to pass and repass.
and of right ought to be, as alleged in said defen-
dants plea, and of this the said plaintiff prays may
be enquired of by the County.

Peters & Farwell

Plffs attys

And said defendant doth the like

Taylor & Stapp for Deft.

Pleas before the Hon^r M. E. Hollister judge
of the Ninth judicial circuit of the Circuit Court of the
State of Illinois, at the March Term of said circuit
Court begun and held at the Court House in Princeton
in said County, on the twenty fourth day of March
in the year of our Lord One Thousand Eighty Nine
hundred and fifty six.

Present Mr. C. Hollister Judge
Edward M. Fisher Clerk
Stephen G. Paddock Sheriff

To wit March 29th 1856.

Now comes Mr. T. Peters attorney for said Plaintiff
and on his motion and affidavit. Said Plaintiff has
leave to file a double replication herein. and said

plaintiff comes by his said attorney and files his second replication herein in the words and figures following to wit and for a further replication to defendants 2^d plea by leave of the Court had and obtained the said plaintiff says that he ought not to be precluded from having or maintaining his action of assart by reason of any thing alleged in said plea, because he says that the highway set up by said defendants in said plea was located by the Commissioners of highways of the Town of Brandy in said County on the 3^d August AD 1854 through the premises of Plaintiff described in said declaration without the damages sustained by Reason of the laying out and opening of said road being assessed by said Commissioners and their filing a statement thereof with the Town Clerk of said Town and said damages have not as yet been so assessed or determined notwithstanding no agreement was made with the owner of said premises who was a private person in relation to said damages and said owner did not in writing release all claim to damages nor was there any such agreement or release filed in the office of the Town Clerk of said Town nor never has been and this the said plaintiff is ready to verify wherefore he prays Judgment &c

Peters & Farnell Piffs attys

To wit on the 2^d day of April 1856
it now comes the defendants by Taylor and Stipp
their attorneys and file their demurser to plaintiffs
second replication to defendants second plea filed herein

and having heard the argument of Counsel and the Court
being fully advised in the premises, it is considered
that Said demurrer be sustained - Whereupon on motion
of Plffs attorney leave is given Said plaintiff to amend
his Said replication, and the plaintiff by his Said attor-
ney files his amended replication herein as follows to wit,

and for a further replication to defendant
D plea by leave of the Court had and obtained the said
plaintiff says that he ought not to be precluded from
having or maintaining his action aforesaid, by reason
of anything alleged in Said plea, because he says
that the highway set up by Said defendants in Said plea
was located by the Commissioners of highways of the Town
of Bramby in Said County on the 3^d August AD 1854,
through the premises of Plaintiff described in said
declaration without the damage sustained by
Reason of laying out and opening of Said road,
being assessed, or any decision upon the question of
Said damages by Said Commissioners, and ^{their} filing
a statement thereof with the Town Clerk, and Said
damages have not as yet been so assessed or de-
termined, notwithstanding no agreement was made
with the owner of Said premises who was a private
person in relation to Said damages, and Said owner
did not in writing release all claims to damages,
nor was there any such agreement or release filed
in the office of the Town Clerk of Said Town,
nor never has been, and this the Said Plaintiff

is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment etc.
Peters & Sonnell
Plffs Atlys

To wit April 3^d 1856.

And now come the defendants, and by their said attorneys file their demurrer to the amended replication to defendants second plea, and after argument of Counsel and the Court being fully advised in the premises considers that said demurrer be overruled, and the defendants by their said attorneys with draw their first plea filed herein and decline to answer over as to the said second plea.

It is therefore considered by the Court that said Plaintiff ought to recover of the said defendants his damages by reason of the premises, and doth assess the said damages at the sum of five cents.

It is therefore considered by the Court that the said Plaintiff have and recover of the said defendants the said sum of five cents his damages assessed as aforesaid, together with all his cost and charges in and about his suit in this behalf expended, and that he have execution thereon,

and the said defendants by their said attorneys pray an appeal herein to the Supreme Court, which is allowed upon the defendants filing bond in the sum of Two hundred dollars, with J S Taylor as security, within Thirty days.

State of Illinois
Bureau County ss. I Edward M Fisher Clerk
of the Circuit Court within
and for said County in the State aforesaid, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of
the record in the above entitled cause, as appears
from the Records & files in my office.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set
my hand and the seal of said Court
at Princeton in said County this 15th day
of May AD 1856

Edward M Fisher Clerk

Clerks fee

Copy Record 2.50
efft & seal $\frac{35}{2.85}$

And now comes the said appellants and say
that in the record of the proceedings aforesaid
in the rendition of the judgment aforesaid
manifest error hath intervened to their prejudice
in this, to wit, that the said Circuit Court
erred in denying the demurrer of the
said appellants to the replication of
the appellee to the plea of the appellants
numbered two. Wherefore &c.

Steph. W. Blackwell
P. G.

76.

William Studley

vs

William Stanton
James Heming

Copy of Record

Filed May 23, 1856.
L. Leland Clerk

William Norton & State of Illinois
James Knight Supreme Court, 3^d
as Grand Division.
William Studley June Term 1856

{ Appeal from Bureau

Argument for Appellants

The amended Replication of Plaintiff
below is as follows-

- 1st Because it does not aver, or show, that the plf was the owner of the land over which the Highway set up in Afts plfr, was located, at the time of the location of the said Highway.
- 2nd Because it does not allege, or aver that the owner of the land did not sustain his damages, or that he ever claimed any.
- 3rd Because it does not aver that the owner of the land appealed from the order of the Commissioners of Highways establishing the Highway in question.
- 4th Because it does not aver that the owner of the land over which the Highway was located sustained any damages thereby.

First. The replication shows that the Road was located 3^d August 1854, by the Commissioners of Highways of the Town of Bramby in Bureau County & consequently, that it was established under an act entitled "An act to provide for Township Organization, in force

April 1 1851, & approved Feb. 17 1851.
By that law no one is entitled to damages
but the owner of the land at the time of the
location of the Road (see that act section 6,
article 24, on page 72 of "Laws of Ills 2d
Session 498 51) If the owner of land, over
which a Highway is located by the proper au-
thority, sees proper to lie by, either ~~because~~ either
because he may think he has sustained no dam-
age, or for any other reason, and makes no
objection to the location of his of a road across
his land, does he not ~~so far~~ waive his right
to damages? and can his grantees ~~afterwards~~
afterwards sustain trespass against a per-
son who travels the road, or makes, or repairs
a Bridge therein? Although no one's
private property is to be taken for public
use, without just compensation; yet it is
not, in this case, the person whose property
has been taken that makes the complaint.
And while the law ought strictly to guard
the private property of the citizen against
unjust encroachment on the part of the pub-
lic, it ought also to protect the public
against vexatious law suits, in a case when
~~the public they~~ ^{have} a right to suppose from the
conduct of the citizen that he has relinquished
his right. A. owns a tract of land,
the public locate a Highway thereon,
suppose A. sustain damages thereby. A
then conveys to B. Does the right to damage
gs, or in other words, the cause of action
pass to B. Or does it remain with ~~for~~ A.
I understand the rule of the Common Law to
be well settled, that such a right of action

shall not pass that no person shall
thus purchase a law suit. If any one
is entitled to damages it must be who
has sustained them - If then no one but
the owner of land is entitled to damages
it is necessary that the replication shew
over that the plaintiff was the owner of
the land at the time of the location of the
road. I understand the rule of pleading to
be, that when the pleading is capable of
more than one construction, that which
is most unfavorable to the pleader is to
be adopted. Again is it the policy of
the law, in a matter so important to the
public, as the construction of Roads, to allow
the owner of land to his by, allow a road
to be laid out & travelled, make no com-
plaint himself, and then permit him to
transfer a right to his grantees to sus-
tinue an action of trespass against any
one who may be so unfortunate, as to
have occasion to travel the road.
I think this Court ought not so to
decide, unless absolutely compelled to
do by the law - And I hope to be ab-
le to show from the Statute & good ~~and~~
Authority in the course of this argument,
that there is, by law, no such unbroken
necessity - But

2d. the said replication is bad, because it
does not allege that the owner of the
land did not cause his damages. Admit
mitting this, for the sake of the argument
, that the owner of the land can transfer to
his grantees the right of action for damages.

or in other words the right to defeat
a public Highway for the purpose of
securing damages. Is it not necessary
~~that~~^{owner} the plaintiff should show that the
land not waived his damages - This
Court say, in the Case of County of San
Joaquin vs Brown et al 13th Ills.
page 212 "He must object in the
first instance to the location of the
road across his land, or he will be
concluded from afterwards insisting
on damages. He must claim damage
as at the proper time, so that if the
County considers the payment of the
damages too great a sacrifice for
the benefits to be derived from the road
it may abandon the road altogether
or locate it somewhere else" This
Court also say, in the Case of Harris vs
Ward et al, 4th Gil. page 507, near the
top of the page, "A claim for damage
yes is not to be presumed, but must
be expressly made, at the proper time,
so that if the State or County thinks the
payment of damages too great a
sacrifice for the benefits to be obtained
by having a road, may abandon the
project or locate it somewhere else"
This it will be recollective was in a case
of protection for a penalty, when the
rule is, that laws should be strictly
construed in favor of a defendant
It will not be presumed ~~that~~ then
that the owner of the land over which a
road is located ~~will~~ has a claim for dam-

ages, ~~but~~ much less than ought to be
presumed that the grantee of the owner
has, after the location of the road, acquired
from him a claim for damages; and
yet that presumption must be indulged,
or this replication is bad, for, if not an
affirmation that the owner had not avoided
his damages - I wish now to ~~say~~
call the attention of the Court to the
4th reason assigned, why the replication is
not good, to wit, that it does not
aver that the owner of the ~~land~~ ~~actu-~~
~~ally sustained any damages~~ - ~~but that~~ ~~it~~
~~was unreasonable~~, that a public High-
way should be defeated, & a passenger travel-
ing it subjected to damages, ~~when the~~ ~~per-~~
~~petriff is not willing to aye & pay~~
~~for the damage done him, and~~
~~has offered at the trial of the plf~~
~~to prove his grantee of the owner, & in that~~
~~case it is not most unreasonable~~
, that a public Highway should be defeat-
ed, and a traveller subjected to damages, ~~at~~
the suit of a grantee of the owner of the land
over which the road is located, simply because
there has been no decision of the question of dam-
ages, and that in a case where the plf is not
willing to ave & prove that the owner of
the land actually sustained any damages.
Hence then, in order to sustain this rep-
lication the Court must rule
1st that the owner of land may lie by, make no
objection to the ~~same~~ location of a road over
his land, & afterwards transfer a right to
defeat the road to his grantees -

- 2^d that the presumption of law is, that the owner has not sustained his damages, and that it is not necessary for him to claim any damages; 3^d that the presumption of law is that the owner of the land does ~~not~~ sustain damages & that therefore it is not necessary to aver that fact - While according to the Statute of Cases already cited the course of these several propositions seems to be the law.

I wish now to call the attention of the Court, to the 3^d reason assigned, why the replication is not good, to wit, that the replication does not aver that ~~so~~ the owner of the land appealed from the decision of the Office of the Commissioners of Highways establishing the road - And I respectfully ask the particular attention of the Court to this point, because I have no doubt it is fatal to the replication, although I, unfortunately, should not be able to show it clearly -

Now if this Replication can be sustained upon any principal, it must be upon the ~~Constitutional~~ principle that it is unconstitutional to take private property for the public use without compensation - I wish to call the attention of the Court to the rule on this subject, laid down by the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Blood versus Mohawk & Hudson Rail Road Company 2^d Amer icon ~~Brown~~ v. Rail Way Company page 419 They ~~say~~ say "It has never been decided ne-

"ssary that the compensation which the constitution requires should be made for private property, when taken for public use, should be actually paid before entering upon or taking possession of the property. If legal provision is made for compensation, the spirit of the constitution is complied with, and the property which is required for public use may lawfully be entered upon and taken. This it seems to me is at once a rule which will subserve the interests of the public, and secure to the citizen all his just rights.

Now it will appear from the laws under which this road was located, that ample legal provision was made for the compensation of the owner of the land over which it was located, and that if he has not had his damages ^{if any he has sustained,} it is his own fault. And he should not now look to the public or individuals responsible for his own neglect. Your Attention of the Court is now called to the law under which the road in question was located. It is to be found in the Act to provide for Township Organization, approved Feb 1st 1851, ~~on~~ beginning with Article 24th on page 78 of the Laws of Ills. 2d Session 49 & 51, The 1st, 2^d, 3^d, 4th, & 5th sections show how the location of a Road shall be petitioned for, advertised, & located, and the duty of the Town Clerk to file the order. ~~that to the~~ ~~the~~ ~~is~~ ~~in relation to damages that~~

The 6th & 7th sections are in relation to damages & to these the attention of the Court is particularly called - The 8th & 9th sections are in relation to appeals, to which the attention of the Court is respectfully called and are in these words, to wit, Sec. 8 Any person or persons, being owners of or agents for any tract of land, over which any highway, altered discontinued, or laid out, shall run, finding themselves aggrieved by any order made by the Commissioners of Highways, may appeal from the same at any time within thirty days after the filing of such order in the Town Clerk's office. Such appeal shall note the time that such order was filed, and shall be made to three Supervisors of the County, neither of which shall be a resident of the town in which said Highway is situated. All persons who desire to make an appeal from such order shall act in concert, and make their appeal to the same three Supervisors. Sec 9 Every such appeal shall be in writing addressed to the Supervisors, and signed by the party or parties appealing. It shall briefly state the ground upon which it is made, and whether it is brought in relation to damages asserted by the Commissioners of Highways, or in relation to the alteration, discontinuance, or laying out of the road, or whether it is brought

to reverse entirely the determination of the
Commissioners, or only to reverse a part
thereof; and in the latter case it shall specify
what part &c.

Now when the Commissioners filed their order to establish
by the Road, if the Owner of the land
was damaged, he could have appealed
from that order, at any time within 30
days, and could have stated the
ground of his appeal to be, that no
damages were assessed to him, & could
thus obtained his damages; and
it appears from the Statute that, that
was the express intention of the Legislature
now it may have been, and ~~not~~ was,
the opinion of the Commissioners that the
owner sustained no damages, & that is
undoubtedly the reason why they assessed
him none. But, admitting that it
was the duty of the Commissioners, in
case they believed the owner had sustained
no damages, to file a statement saying they
assessed him none, yet if they did not
do so, the owner had as clear a right
to appeal from the order for the reason
that they had omitted to say anything about
damages, as he would have had, had they
filed such statement. Now the Court
will perceive from the language of sec-
tion 8th above quoted that it is from
the order of the Commissioners that the appeal
is to be taken, not from the Statement
of damages. And the Court will also
perceive from that part of section 9

above quoted that the appeal is to
state whether it is brought in relation
to the assessment of damages, or in
relation to other ~~parts~~ of the matter -
there can then be no possible doubt
then that the owner of the land had a
clear right to appeal from the order
of the Commissioners for the express
purpose of obtaining his damages.
The 17th section of the same 24th article
provides from the damages, when assessed
by the Commissioners, or Supervisors to whom
the appeal may have been taken, shall be
paid - And the 24th section of the same
24th article provides, that "Whenever the
Commissioners of Highways through un-
closed lands &c, and their determination
^{not} shall have been appealed from, then
after notice to occupy, they shall cause
road to be opened - There is no
doubt from the whole law that
it was the intention of the legislature,
that in the very words of the 8th section
before quoted "Any person, or persons,
being owners &c, feeling themselves
aggrieved by any order may appeal
&c, whether that grievance is that
the Commissioners have assessed too
little damages, or have made no as-
sessment at all - According to the
statute then, the Commissioners are di-
rected to assess damages, but if they do
not do so, it points out the remedy by
appeal; and that remedy is plain,
adequate, & complete - This being the

case there seems to be no reason why
the court should hold, under this stat-
ute, that there is no highway unless the
damages have been assessed - it being
the fault of the owner equally with the
commissioners that no assessment has
been made - This court decided, in
the Case of Summing et al vs Matthews
, 16th Illinois Rep., page 310, that, where
a road had been laid out under the stat-
ute ~~of~~ in force April 16th A.D. 1849
entitled "an act for township & county
organization, under which any county may
organize whenever a majority of voters
of such County, at any general election
shall so determine," approved Feby 12
1849, found in Public laws of Ills 1849
~~page~~ in article 24th of that act
on page 190, evidence which
showed that ~~a~~ road had been located
but did not show that the ~~not~~ damages had
ever been assessed, was ~~an~~ admissible
to establish the Highway, unless connect-
ed with other evidence showing the
assessment of damages - The attention
of the court is called to the difference
between that act, and the act before
referred to under which the road in question
was located. By the act of 1849 a parti-
cular mode of the assessment of damages is
pointed out, but no appeal is given -
And in the Case of Summing vs Matthews the
evidence offered showed that an assess-
ment of damages had been commenced
but had never been completed -

and had been commenced by the Com-
missioners of Highways - the 11th section
of Art. 24 of the act of 1849 provides
that either the owner of the lands, or
the Commissioners might commence the
proceedings before a Justices for
the assessment of damages, and when
the Commissioners commenced the
proceedings, it followed that the owner
could not commence; and the con-
sequence was that the owner had no
remedy, but keep his land - unless the
Commissioners & others finished the pro-
ceeding, which in the case of Damning
as I have seen they did not do -

There was by the law of 1849 an appeal
from the order establishing the High-
way; but not for the purpose of as-
sessing the damages - Why did the legis-
lature provide in the act of 1851, that
the appeal might be taken from the
order establishing the road for the pur-
pose of having damages assessed, if it was
not to get rid of the difficulty that the
act of 1849 presented - It would seem
then that the law now is, that if the
owner of land, feels aggrieved, because
a road has been located across his land
, either because he thinks the road not re-
quired by the public good, or because his
damages have not been assessed high
enough, or not assessed at all, his chanc

remedy is to appeal -

I wish now to call the attention of the court to the following query to wit, where the owner of land over ~~which~~ which a road is located by the proper authority, lies by & makes no objection that his damages have not been assessed & suffers people to travel it, is it not an implied license at least, to the public to travel it, and are they not at liberty to travel it until the license is revoked - If so the replication is bad because it does not ally any notice of the revocation of the license to the defendants.

Lastly, We are of the opinion that the replication is bad, because it may be, that every fact alleged in it, may be true, and yet the road set up in defendants plea ~~in~~ which it professes to answer, may still exist. That is, the replication only alleges evidence ~~which~~ which tends to prove, that the road set up in the plea is not a legal road, but which does not conclusively prove it - Now it might be, that every fact alleged in the replication may be true, and yet there may be a highway there by a dedication thereof to the public - Such dedication need not be by writing, it may be verbal, or the damages may have

been released in many other ways be
sides the method pointed out by the
statute - The replication ought to
have been a answer of the pleader

All which is respect
fully submitted.

Taylor & Stipp for
appellants.

William Weston
vs James Knight
or
William Sturley
argument for
appellants

Filed June 21, 1856

S. Leland
Clerk

Mr Norton et al
vs
Wm Strelley -

The defendant in error insists in answer to the first point made by plff in error that the replication should allege that the plaintiff ^{below} was the owner of the land at the time the highway was laid out, that the Statute expressly declares that unless the damages are apayed the road shall not be opened worked or used, that there was no highway through the premises until such an assent had been made, and that it would be strange indeed that if there was no highway through them premises while held by the original owner that as soon as he conveyed the premises that there would be a public's highway through the premises where there were none before.

as to Plff's 2^d Point, the law is impulsive that the damages shall be apayed before the highway is worked or used and the owner is not required to object to opening of the highway as under the road laws in force before the township Organization law & the decisions he cites were made in reference to these laws.

as to Plff's 3^d point, there was no order made in reference to plff's damages to appeal from & to appeal in regard to the expediency of the road would not bring up the subject of damages, but the appeal would be confined to a review of the question adjudicated by the Courts of highways, and as ^{the question} to whether damages had been sustained or not would not determine whether the public's needed the highway ~~or not~~, & the superisions on appeal in regard to the expediency of the road could not open damages because they are confined to subjects of the appeal

as to Pleffs in Error 4th Point. The question whether damages had been sustained could not be tried by the Circuit-Court, but is alone determinable in the way pointed out by Statute.

5 as to whether Defendants below might not have had license. I answer that the plea sets up a highway & not a license or dedication, & the replication is in fact a denial of the plea of highway & would be liable to special damages but not to general damages.

The only objection raised to the decision of this Court in Holls 310 not being in point is that the law of 1849 did not give an appeal on the amount of damages & either party could apply for an assessment, the last objection is in favor of the defendant even because by the law of 1851 the application could alone be made at the instance of the Comr of highways, & how the question of appeal could affect the question whether an assessment should be made I cant see & besides even under the law of 1849, the Board of Supervisors could review the question of damages.

William Peters
for Dft in Error

Mr. Justice
or
Mr. Justice
Suggs by Dft
in error

Filed July 8, 1852
A. Leland
Clerk

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Supreme Court,

{ ss.

The People of the State of Illinois,

To the Sheriff of the County of Bureau — Greeting:

BECAUSE in the record and proceedings, and also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which was in the circuit court of Bureau county, before the Judge thereof, between William Studley Plaintiff & William Norton & James Knight

defendants it is said that manifest error hath intervened, to the injury of the said Defendants

as we are informed by their complaint, the record and proceedings of which said judgment we have caused to be brought into our Supreme Court of the state of Illinois, at Ottawa, before the Justices thereof, to correct the errors in the same, in due form and manner, according to law; therefore we command you, that by good and lawful men of your county, you give notice to the said William Studley

that he be and appear before the Justices of our said Supreme Court, at the next term of said court, to be holden at Ottawa, in said state, on the second Monday in June next, to hear the records and proceedings aforesaid, and the errors assigned, if he shall see fit; and further to do and receive what said court shall order in this behalf; and have you then there the names of those by whom you shall give the said Studley

notice, together with this writ.

Walter B. Scates

WITNESS, the Hon. Samuel H. Treat, Ch^r. Justice of our said Court, and the Seal thereof, at Ottawa, this 23^d day of May
in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-six.

L. Leland

Clerk of the Supreme Court.
By J. D. Rice Deputy.

I have Executed the within on't this 29th
day of May AD 1856 by reading the same
to the within named William Studley -

Stephen G. Paddock
Sheriff Bu Co. Ills.

Attest
By A. O. Nottoway, I do
certify that the above is a true copy of the original record.

True copy of a judgment rendered in this court
between the plaintiff, George W. Smith, and the defendant, John H. Smith, who
to give the necessary due notice of service, and no other attorney or party can be found; and
certified to be rendered in Criminal or civil cases, in the County of Marion, State of Illinois,
and for the purpose of being a true copy of the same of sufficient weight in the court of equity.

True copy of a copy and properly made of the same, now due notice to the party
defended to render the original in due time, in due form and manner, according to law, therefore no cause
of complaint against the party defendant for failing to do justice
in rendering the same, and the party defendant, John H. Smith, having acknowledged the same
as a true copy, and having been duly informed of the same, doth hereby certify the same.

William Norton et al

vs
William Studley

Scire Fazias

1. Service
22 May 1856
John H. Smith

Filed June 4, 1856
Leland Clerk

In the name and by the command of the court, commanding the defendant to do justice
in rendering the same, and having acknowledged the same to be a copy of the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction, and the party defendant, John H. Smith, having acknowledged
the same to be a true copy, and having been duly informed of the same, doth hereby certify the same.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SUPREME COURT,
To JUNE TERM, 1856.

Appeal from Bureau.

WILLIAM NORTON and JAMES KNIGHT vs. WILLIAM STUDLEY.

ABSTRACT OF THE RECORD.

TRESPASS *q. c. f.* in the Bureau Circuit Court by appellee against appellants.

The declaration contains one count, in the usual form.

- Pleas.* 1. Not guilty, and issue thereon, (afterwards withdrawn.)
2. That the *locus in quo* was a public highway.

Replication to second plea, that a highway had been located over the close in question, but damages not assessed and paid to appellee, who was the owner of said close, &c.

Demurrer to this replication, which was sustained, and leave given to appellee to amend.

An amended replication was thereupon filed in these words, viz. :

"And for a further replication to defendant's 2d plea, by leave of the Court had and obtained, the said plaintiff says, that he ought not to be precluded from having or maintaining his action aforesaid by reason of anything alleged in said plea, because he says that the highway set up by said defendants in said plea was located by the Commissioners of Highways of the town of Bramby, in said county, on the 3d August, A. D. 1854, through the premises of plaintiff, described in said declaration, without the damage sustained by reason of laying out and opening of said road being assessed or any decision upon the question of said damages by said Commissioners, and their filing a statement thereof with the Town Clerk of said town, and said damages have not as yet been so assessed or determined, notwithstanding no agreement was made with the owner of said premises, who was a private person in relation to said damages, and said owner did not in writing release all claim to damages, nor was there any such agreement or release filed in the office of the Town Clerk of said town, nor never has been, and this the said plaintiff is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment, &c."

To this replication appellants demurred, and the cause was heard upon said demurrer, and judgment rendered for appellee, the Court assessing his damages at *five cents*; from which judgment this appeal is taken.

The only error assigned is the overruling of the demurrer.

STIPP & BLACKWELL,
for Appellant.

STATE OF HENRICKSBURG COURT.

To June Term, 1846.

Attest Your Bearer,

MATTHEW Norton and THOMAS KENNEDY Esq. ATTORNEYS

ELDER,

Award of the Record.

That you, in the Bureau Office Court, for the above reasons be-

held in your name, the record of the case made, as follows:

The record of the cause of action between the plaintiff, John D. McGehee, and the defendant, John C. Gandy, for damages over the sum of one thousand dollars, was filed in the office of the

Defendant to the defendant, and the record of the same, was filed in the office of the plaintiff.

At a meeting of the court held in the office of the plaintiff, on the 2d day of October, 1845, it was ordered, that the said John D. McGehee, and his wife, Mary, be allowed to file a bill of complaint against the defendant, John C. Gandy, for damages over the sum of one thousand dollars, and that the same be filed in the office of the plaintiff, and the record of the same, be filed in the office of the defendant, and the record of the same, be filed in the office of the plaintiff.

To this judgment, the defendant, John C. Gandy, has filed a bill of exception, and the same is now pending in the office of the plaintiff, and the record of the same, is now pending in the office of the defendant.

To this judgment, the defendant, John C. Gandy, has filed a bill of exception, and the same is now pending in the office of the plaintiff, and the record of the same, is now pending in the office of the defendant.

Attest, &c.

ELIAS E. BYRD, M.L.

Attest, &c.

Attest, &c.

Attest, &c.

Attest, &c.

Attest, &c.

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William Norton et al
vs
William Studley

71

1856

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X