

12293

No. \_\_\_\_\_

# Supreme Court of Illinois


Galena & Chicago Union R.R.Co.

---

vs.

Yarwood.

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71641  7



United States of America  
State of Illinois Kane County

Plas before the Honorable Isaac G  
Wilson Judge of the thirteenth Judicial  
Circuit and Presiding Judge of the Kane  
County Circuit Court of the State of  
Illinois at a term of said Court begun  
and held at the Court House in Geneva  
in said County on the fourteenth day  
of May in the year of our Lord one  
Thousand Eight Hundred and fifty-five

Presents the Hon

Isaac G. Wilson  
Lawrence T. Barker

Judge  
Sheriff

Attest

Arthur Dearborn clerk

Be it remembered that on the  
13 day of October A.D. 1853. There was  
filed in the clerk's office of the Kane County  
Circuit Court a purchase which is in the words  
of the following writ

State of Illinois Kane County }

Kane County Circuit Court  
Nov 14 1853

James H. Yarnwood  
The Galena & Chicago  
Union Rail Road Company

Case



" will the clerk issue a summons in the above  
entitled case to the Sheriff of Cook Co  
returnable at the next term of said court  
Damages \$10,000.

Oct 3 1853

Edm Gifford

Pltff ally

And upon said process a summons  
was issued which is in the words of figures following  
to wit

State of Illinois,  
Kane County.

The People of the State of Illinois  
to the Sheriff of Cook County Greeting  
We Command you to summon  
the Galena & Chicago Union Railroad Company  
if they shall be found in your county personally  
to be and appear before the circuit Court of said  
County on the first day of the next term thereof  
to be holden at the Court House in Seneca  
in said County on the first Monday of November  
next to answer unto Lewis H. Garwood  
in a plea of case to the damages of the said  
plaintiff as he says in the sum of ten thousand  
Dollars and have you then return this writ with  
an endorsement thereon in what manner you  
shall have executed the same

Witness my hand & the seal thereof at Seneca





in said County this 13<sup>th</sup> day of October  
A.D. 1853

Within District Clerk  
 By G. A. Blanchard  
 Deputy

And upon the basis of said summons  
was the endorsement of the sheriff in the words  
of figures following to wit

Served by reading to William B. M.  
Sarrabus Secretary of the within named Rail Road  
Company October 19 1853. and John D. Turner  
president of the within named Rail Road  
Company October 24<sup>th</sup> 1853, & delivering to  
Each of them a copy of this writ

Cyrus R. Bradley  
 Sheriff of Cook County  
 By J. H. Strohm Deputy

And afterwards to wit on the  
day of                      A.D. 1853 the following  
Warrant was filed in said Clerk's office which  
is in the words of figures following to wit

Warrant

State of Illinois

Name County / Name County Circuit Court November A.D. 1853

Lewis. H. Garwood

The Galena & Chicago Union Rail Road Company / Case



Lewis. H. Garwood by Arnold & Gifford his attorneys  
 complains of the Galena & Chicago Union Rail Road  
 Company a corporation duly organized under the  
 Statute of the State of Illinois who have been duly sum-  
 moned & in a plea of trespass on the case. For that  
 on the second day of August in the year eighteen hun-  
 dred & fifty two at Belgin in the said county of Kane the  
 said Defendants were then & there the owners & proprietors  
 of a certain Rail Road called the Galena & Chicago Union  
 Rail Road then constructed & built from Chicago in the  
 county of Cook in said State to Belvidere in the county  
 of Boone State aforesaid and were then and there common  
 carriers upon said road, and the owners of certain En-  
 gines, passenger & freight cars, which the said defendants  
 were then & for a long time before that time had been  
 running over said roadway day excepting Sundays  
 from time to time from & to the said Chicago & Bel-  
 videre & from & to intermediate stations on said Road for  
 the carriage & conveyance of passengers from & to the  
 said places for hire & reward to them in that behalf  
 and thereupon afterwards (to wit) on the day & year  
 last aforesaid at Belgin in said county of Kane the  
 said Defendants received the said plaintiff into one of  
 their said cars as a passenger, for a reasonable compen-  
 sation to them the said Defendants in that behalf to be  
 conveyed from the said Belgin to Clinton in said  
 county of Kane (said Belgin & Clinton being then the  
 stations or stopping places for the said cars on said  
 road)



and it then and there became and was the duty of the said Defendants to carry the said plaintiff safely & carefully without any loss to him, by any culpability, negligence or breach of duty of the said defendants in that behalf and to furnish suitable cars & engine, competent, careful & skilful engineers & conductors to conduct & manage the same, and also to provide & furnish a permanent, substantial, safe & secure road & rail to run the said cars and engine upon at the said Rome County, yet the said Defendants not regarding their duty in that behalf knowingly & wilfully violated their said duty, and did then & there suffer & permit their said road & rails to be & remain in an insecure, unsafe & dangerous situation to run said engine & cars upon & more particularly did knowingly & culpably & negligently suffer & permit the iron & wooden rail upon which the said engine & cars then & there run, to be constructed of poor material & to be improperly & insufficient, fastened & secured to <sup>the</sup> said wood in so much so, that on the day & year last aforesaid the said plaintiff then being <sup>on</sup> one of the said cars of the said defendants as a passenger aforesaid and while the said cars were being run from the said Belgin to the said Clinton, by the said defendants & being managed & conducted by the engineer & conductor thereof servants of the said defendants, and just before reaching the said station or stopping place at the said Clinton, by the action of the wheels of the said engine & cars the said iron & wooden rails were torn up for a great distance (to wit) for the distance of twenty feet in consequence of the said rails being



constructed of poor material & so <sup>in</sup> sufficiently & insecurely fastened as aforesaid. the said car on which the said plaintiff was then & there a passenger as aforesaid was thrown violently off of the said road by reason of which the life of the said plaintiff was put in great peril & danger in so much so that the said plaintiff was obliged & did jump from the said car to the ground (the said car being then & there so off the said track & still running at a rapid rate over the ties of said road & apparently about to run off a very steep bank then & there being) in doing which the said plaintiff's left leg was broken near the knee, his ankle badly & severely strained & bruised & his body otherwise severely bruised & injured, all of which was caused by the negligence & carelessness of the said defendants & their servants & by reason of the said injuries so received as aforesaid the said plaintiff was confined to his room for a great length of time (to wit) for the space of four months & was sick, sore, & lame for a great length of time (to wit) hitherto & suffered great pain both of body & mind & by reason of the said injuries was obliged & did pay, lay out, & expend large sums of money (to wit) five hundred Dollars, for medicine, medical aid & nursing & in & about endeavoring to be cured of the said injuries. and by reason of the said injuries the said plaintiff was hindered & prevented from performing & transacting his necessary business by him, during that time at the said Elgin to be performed & transacted to the damage of the said plaintiff Ten thousand Dollars.



And whereas afterwards (to wit) on the day and year last aforesaid, at begin aforesaid, the said Defendants being then & there the owners & proprietors of a certain Rail Road called the Galena & Chicago Union Rail Road, then constructed from the said Chicago to the said Belvidere & also being then & there the owners & proprietors of certain engines, passenger & freight cars, which, the said defendants were then & for a long time before had been running from time to time on the said road from & to the said Chicago & Belvidere & from & to intermediate stations on the said road and carrying passengers & freight therein from & to the said places ~~from~~ & to the said intermediate stations for hire & reward to them in that behalf, did receive the said plaintiff into one of their said cars to be carried safely & carefully as a passenger, for a reasonable compensation to be paid to them in that behalf from the said begin to Clinton in the said County of Kane, and the said defendants were then & there in law bound to convey the said plaintiff safely & carefully without loss or injury to him by any carelessness, negligence or lack of duty on their part, from the said begin to the said Clinton, and also to provide a proper & safe road, proper & skilful engineers, conductors & brakemen, to conduct & run the same on said road & to run the said engine & cars in a safe & careful manner. Yet not regarding their said duty & obligations in that behalf, the said defendants, on the day <sup>and</sup> year aforesaid, at begin aforesaid carelessly & negligently



constructed the said road, and suffered the same  
 to remain, & to be & remain dangerously out of re-  
 pair, said not in any manner provide a safe  
 & secure road to run their said engine & cars upon  
 & did not provide prudent & skilful engineers, con-  
 ductors & brakemen to conduct the same, but on the  
 contrary the said cars, into one of which, the said plain-  
 tiff was received in, one of which, he then, was being con-  
 veyed from the 1<sup>st</sup> begin to the said Clinton, as afo-  
 said, by the said defendants, was run over the said  
 road at double the ordinary speed much faster than  
 the same could be run over the said road without  
 putting the lives of all the passengers in said cars in  
 great danger & peril, and in consequence of the great  
 & dangerous speed at which the said engine & cars  
 were then, & then run & run over the said Road  
 from the said begin to the said Clinton & just before  
 reaching the usual stopping place at the 1<sup>st</sup> Clinton  
 the iron & wooden rail of the said road was torn  
 up for a great distance (to wit) for the distance of  
 twenty feet & the car, in which, the 3<sup>rd</sup> plaintiff then  
 was as passenger aforesaid was thrown violently  
 off of the said track by reason of which, the life of  
 the plaintiff was in great peril and while the said  
 car was so off of the said track & said car being still  
 moving at a very rapid rate over the ties of said road  
 & apparently about to be thrown down a very steep  
 bank then & then being the said plaintiff to escape the



impending danger to save himself, jumped from the said car, to the ground & by reason of which his left leg was broken near the ankle, his ankle severely ~~shinned~~ strained & bruised & his body otherwise severely bruised & injured, all of which, was caused by the impudence, culpable negligence of the said defendants & their servants the said engineer, conductor & brakeman, by reason of the said injuries so received as aforesaid the said plaintiff was confined to his room for a great length of time (to wit) for the space of four months and was sick, sore, & lame & suffered great pain both of body & mind for a great length of time, (to wit,) hitherto and was obliged & did pay, lay out & expend large sums of money (to wit) five hundred dollars for medicine, medical aid, nursing, & in & about endeavoring to be cured of the said injuries, and by reason of the said injuries was hindered & prevented from performing & transacting his mercantile affairs & business by him to be performed & transacted during that time at Berlin aforesaid to the damage of the said plaintiff Ten Thousand Dollars.

And whereas afterwards afterwards, (to wit) on the day & year last aforesaid at Berlin aforesaid the said Defendants were the owners & proprietors of a certain Rail Road & also of certain cars & engines & were then & there running the same on the said Road & were then & there engaged in, carrying freight & passengers for hire & reward



to them in that behalf from Belgin in said <sup>land</sup> County  
to Clinton also in said County & bring such carriers of  
passengers, the said defendants then & there received the  
plaintiff into one of their said cars as a passenger for  
a reasonable compensation to be paid to them in that  
behalf to be safely, carefully & securely carried from the said  
Belgin to the said Clinton it became & was the duty of  
the said defendants to have & keep in order & good repair  
a good, safe, proper & secure track on which their  
said engine & cars should run in safety & also to have  
suitable & safe cars & engines for the conveyance of &  
transportation of passengers & also to have good faithful,  
sober, shrewd & prudent engineers, conductors & brak-  
men to run said cars & engines with proper speed  
safely & carefully over & upon said road yet the  
said defendants not regarding their duty in that be-  
half, did not provide a good, safe, secure & proper track  
on which, their said cars & engine should run with safety;  
but on the contrary thereof, their said track was improperly,  
insufficiently, negligently & carelessly constructed & was dan-  
gerously out of repair, so that their said engine & cars were not run  
over upon the said Road in safety - nor did the said  
defendants, to wit, on the day & year & at the place afo-  
said employ suitable engineers, conductors & brakemen  
& run their said cars & engine at a safe & proper speed  
but on the contrary thereof, the said defendants then &  
there run their said cars so carelessly & negligently &  
with such dangerous rapidity over & upon the said road



to them in that behalf from Belgin in said <sup>(and)</sup> County to Clinton also in said County & bring such carriers of passengers, the said defendants then & there received the plaintiff into one of their said cars as a passenger for a reasonable compensation to be paid to them in that behalf to be safely, carefully & securely carried from the said Belgin to the said Clinton it became & was the duty of the said defendants to have & keep in order & good repair a good, safe, proper & secure track on which their said engine cars should run in safety & also to have suitable safe cars & engines for the conveyance of & transportation of passengers & also to have good faithful, sober, shrewd & careful engineers, conductors & brakemen to run said cars & engines with proper speed safely & carefully over & upon said road yet the said defendants not regarding their duty in that behalf, did not provide a good, safe, secure & proper track on which, their said cars & engine should run with safety; but on the contrary thereof, their said track was imperfectly, insecurely, negligently & carelessly constructed & was dangerously out of repair, so that their said engine cars were not run over upon the said Road in safety - nor did the said defendants, to wit, on the day & year & at the place aforesaid employ suitable engineers, conductors & brakemen & run their said cars & engine at a safe & proper speed but on the contrary thereof, the said defendants then & there run their said cars so carelessly & negligently & with such dangerous rapidity over & upon the said road



And in consequence of such improper & careless & speed  
 improper condition of the said track, that hereof to  
 wit, the day & year aforesaid, at Kane County aforesaid  
 & while I plaintiff as such passenger as aforesaid the  
car in which, said plaintiff was riding was thrown  
 with great violence off the said track & the said plaintiff with-  
 out fault on his part & by reason of said carelessness and im-  
 proper conduct of said defendants thereby came with  
 great force & violence upon the earth, and his left leg was  
 thereby broken near the ankle, his ankle severely strained  
 & bruised & other parts of his body severely bruised & injured  
 by reason of which injuries the plaintiff was confined  
 to his room, for a great length of time to wit, for the space  
 of four months, and suffered great pain both of body &  
 mind was sick, sore & lame for a long time, to wit, hitherto  
 by reason of the said injuries was obliged said pay, say out  
 & spend large sums of money, to wit, - five hundred dol-  
 lars - & about endeavoring to be cured thereof was also by the  
 said injuries so injured as aforesaid hindered & prevented from  
 performing & transacting his necessary business by him then & there  
 at Elgin aforesaid to be performed and transacted, to the  
 damage of the I plaintiff Ten thousand Dollars -

And whereas after-  
 wards (to wit) on the day & year last aforesaid at Elgin in said County  
 of Kane the said defendants were common carriers and were possessed  
 of a locomotive with cars thereto attached, engaged & employed upon the  
 Rail Road track of the said defendants in the business of the said de-  
 fendants in & about carrying passengers in said County of Kane



While the said train was driven, guided, managed & controlled along  
 the said track by an engine and servants of the said defendants &  
 which the said Defendants by their servants <sup>conjunction</sup> aforesaid had the man-  
 agement of the said train, the said plaintiff, at the special in-  
 stance & request of the said defendants became & was a passenger and  
 upon said train to be conveyed & carried from Elgin in the said  
 County of Kane to Clinton also in the said County for a certain  
 fare & reward in that behalf, and the said Defendants then & there  
 received the said plaintiff as such passenger, aforesaid & thereupon  
 it became & was the duty of said defendants, to have a good, safe &  
 proper track & have due & proper care that the said plaintiff should  
 be safely & securely conveyed & carried to the said Clinton in the  
 said County of Kane yet the said defendants, not regarding their duty  
 in that behalf then & there had a track so improperly constructed  
 & dangerously made & so badly and dangerously out of repair,  
 & by their said engine so carelessly, & improperly drove, managed & di-  
 rected ~~directed~~ said train, & locomotive, that by & through the carelessness, negli-  
 gence & improper conduct of the said defendants by their said engine,  
 in consequence of said improper track the said car of the said de-  
 fendants in, which said plaintiff was a passenger as aforesaid  
 was then & there thrown off the track with great violence & then  
 by the said plaintiff came with great violence & thereby the said plain-  
 tiff came with great force & violence upon the earth & his left leg was thereby  
 broke near the ankle, his ankle badly strained & bruised, and other parts of  
 his body severely bruised & injured & by reason of said injuries so received as aforesaid  
 the plaintiff was confined to his room for a great length of time (to wit) for the space of  
 four months & was obliged & did pay, lay out & expend large sums of money (to wit)

five hundred dollars, in & about endeavoring to be cured of the said injuries and suffered  
 great pain both of body & mind & was sick, sore & lame for a long time, to wit, hitherto, and during that time was hin-  
 dered & prevented from performing & transacting his usual business by him during that time to be performed  
 and transacted at Elgin aforesaid to the damage of the plaintiff Ten Thousand Dollars  
 Louis. H. Garwood



And afterwards writ on the 10<sup>th</sup>  
day of November A.D. 1858 the following  
Plea was filed in said Court which is in  
the words & figures following to wit

" Name Circuit Court  
" The Galena & Chicago  
Union Rail Road Company

vs

Lewis & Yarnwood

And the said defendant  
of James H. Collins  
their attorney comes and defends the wrongs and  
injuries wherein and says that they are not  
guilty of the said several supposed grievances  
above laid to their charge in manner and form  
as the said plaintiffs have above thereof  
complained against them & of this they  
put themselves upon the country &c

Jas H Collins

Defts Atty

And the Plff doth the  
like Nov 17, 1858

Gifford & Wilcox Atty for Plff

And afterwards on  
the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of May A.D. 1858 there was  
a Record from the Supreme Court of the  
State of Illinois filed in said office  
which is in the words & figures following to wit



At a Supreme Court tryan and held at  
 Ottumwa on Monday the 12<sup>th</sup> day of June in the  
 Year of our Lord one thousand Eight Hundred  
 and fifty four within and for the third  
 Grand Division of the State of Illinois  
 Present the Honorable Samuel H. Beat Chief Justice  
 " " John Catron Associate Justice  
 " " Nathl B. Seaton " "

Friday August 4. 1854.

Galena & Chicago Mini  
 Red Road Company } Error in Name  
 Lewis H. Woodward

On this day came again the  
 said parties and the Court having diligently examined  
 and inspected as well the Record and Proceedings  
 aforesaid as the matters and things therein assigned  
 for error and being now sufficiently advised of  
 and concerning the premises all of opinion that  
 in the Record and Proceedings aforesaid and in  
 the rendition of the Judgment aforesaid there is  
 manifest error. Therefore it is considered by  
 the Court that for that error and others in the  
 Record and Proceedings aforesaid the Judgment  
 of the Circuit Court in this behalf rendered  
 be reversed annulled set aside & wholly for



nothing returned and that this cause be remanded  
to the Circuit Court for such order and further  
proceedings as to Law and Justice shall appear  
and it is further considered by the Court that the said  
plaintiff in Error recover of & from the Defendant  
in Error its costs by them in this behalf  
expended and that it have execution therefor

I Lorenzo Seland Clerk of the Supreme  
Court of the State of Illinois do hereby certify  
that the foregoing is a true copy of the final  
order of the said Supreme Court in the above  
entitled cause of record in my office

In Testimony whereof I have set my  
hand and affixed the seal of the  
said Supreme Court at Ottawa this 18.  
day of May in the year of our Lord one  
thousand eight hundred and fifty five  
L Seland  
Clerk of the Supreme Court

State of Illinois  
Henn County

Whereupon a summons  
was issued in said cause from  
the Circuit Court of same to a persons  
which is in the words of figures following to wit

State of Illinois  
Henn County

The People of the State of Illinois  
to the Sheriff of said County greeting



do Command you that you  
 Summons. The Galena & Chicago Union Rail  
 Road Company if they shall be found in your  
 county personally to be and appear before the  
 Circuit Court of said County on the first day  
 of the next <sup>spring</sup> term thereof to be holden at the  
 Court House in Genoa in said County this  
 on the 3<sup>d</sup> Monday of January next to answer  
 unto Lewis H. Yarwood in a plea of Case  
 to the damage of said Plaintiff as he says in the  
 sum of Ten Thousand Dollars and have you  
 then and then this writ with an Endorsement  
 thereon in what manner you shall have  
 executed the same

Witness Luther Dearborn Clerk of said  
 Court and the Seal thereof at Genoa in  
 said County this 21<sup>st</sup> day of Dec<sup>r</sup> A.D. 1854

Luther Dearborn

Clerk

And upon the back of said  
 Summons is the Endorsement of the Sheriff  
 in the words & figures following to wit

"Personally Served the within writ by delivering a copy  
 of the within writ to Charles D. Smith as Station  
 Agent of the Galena & Chicago Union  
 Rail Road Company this 21<sup>st</sup> day of December  
 A.D. 1854.

L. B. Burdick

Sherriff



And whereas on the 15<sup>th</sup> day of January A.D. 1855 the same being one of the days of the January Special Term of said Court the following among other proceedings were had to wit

Lewis H. Yawwood

144,

Galena & Chicago  
Union Railroad

lease

This day comes the parties to this suit by their attorney by consent of parties it is ordered by the court that this suit be continued

And afterwards writ on the 33<sup>rd</sup> day of May the same being one of the days of the May Term Term of said Court A.D. 1855 the following among other proceedings were had to wit

Lewis H. Yawwood

59

The Galena & Chicago  
Union Railroad

lease

This day comes the Plaintiff by Blackwell Hazen & Sudley his attorney & the Def<sup>t</sup> by Plato and Samworth also come & on motion of Plaintiff it is ordered by the court that a jury come wherein come a jury of good and lawful men to wit Nathaniel Grady & Charles G. Hurlburt Ermon Drash Seth Sherwood



Timothy Garfield Timothy Hovey John  
Robinson Amos Goy John Van Sickle Charles  
Shorman Amos C. Hinds Harvey E. Dunster  
who being severally blessed tried & sworn also  
come & after hearing a portion of the evidence  
it is agreed that the jury may separate  
& meet the court to morrow morning at 8 1/2 o'clock

And afterwards took on the  
24<sup>th</sup> day of May A.D. 1853 the same being  
one of the days of the May assizes & may  
term of said court the following among other  
proceedings were had to wit

59 Lewis A. Fairwood } Case  
Galena & Chicago  
vs. Road Roadles

This day Amos the parties  
to this suit by their attorneys & the  
jury heretofore impaneled herein also come  
after hearing a <sup>ballance</sup> portion of the evidence & it  
a portion of the argument of counsel it is  
agreed that the jury may separate & meet  
the court to morrow morning at 8 1/2 o'clock

And afterwards took on  
25<sup>th</sup> day of May the same being one of the days  
of the assizes & may term of said court the



Following among other proceedings were had in

Lewis A. Woodward

59 The Galena & Chicago Union Railroad Co. vs. The Jury heretofore impeached  
 This day comes the parties to this suit by their attorneys  
 here also come. And after hearing  
 the ballance of the argument of Counsel and being instructed  
 by the Court return under charge of a sworn officer of  
 this Court to consider of their verdict and subsequently  
 return into Court and for a verdict upon their oaths  
 say we the jury find the issues joined in favor of the  
 Plaintiff and assess his damages at the sum of twenty  
 five Hundred Dollars. And thereupon comes the  
 Defendants by its attorney & moves the Court for  
 a new trial. After arguments of Counsel the  
 Court being fully advised overrules said motion

It is therefore considered by the Court  
 that the said Plaintiff have and recover from the  
 Defendant the aforesaid sum of Twenty five  
 Hundred Dollars damages together with his costs  
 in this behalf expended <sup>that he</sup> & have Execution therefor  
 And thereupon the Defendants pray an appeal  
 to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois  
 which is allowed on condition that the  
 Defendants file a Bond herein conditioned  
 according to Law with John B. Sumner  
 or William H. Brown as security



in the sum of Four Thousand Dollars.  
 Bond to be filed & Bill of Exceptions to be settled  
 in thirty days from this date

And afterwards to wit on the  
 18<sup>th</sup> day of June A.D. 1855 the following bill  
 of exceptions was filed in said cause which  
 is in the words & figures following to wit

Levi H. Yarwood {  
 Galena & Chicago { Plaintiff  
 Union Railroad Co {  
 vs {  
 Defendant  
 May Term 1855

Be it remembered that  
 on the trial of this cause the Plaintiff introduced  
 the following testimony in this cause

Samuel LeCone who testified as follows I reside  
 in Elgin & did in August 1852 about  
 the first day of August 1852 I took passage  
 then on the rail road on the west side of the river  
 to Clinton about then or four miles. Myself, Fay  
 and Yarwood went together. Wm. Higgins  
 was Conductor on that day we left Elgin in  
 the forepart of the afternoon. From Elgin to  
 Clinton the first part of the road was T. rail  
 the rest strap - I think the T rail was near  
 half of the way it is a down grade to Clinton



Elgin to the bridge it is about thirty feet to the  
 mile, I think it is a down grade most of the way  
 I discovered no change in the speed after leaving the  
 T rail. The cars ran off the track nearer Clinton  
 than Elgin. I and others jumped off. I saw Yamwood  
 lying on the ground. he said he felt faint. I went  
 to get some water for him. I jumped from the  
 Platform of the Baggage car. A great deal  
 of motion in that car at the time not steady - rough  
 riding. I was a little a little back of the center  
 of the Baggage car. Could not walk steady  
 got to the platform - lost track till the wind blowed  
 away the dust. Saw what was the matter and  
 jumped alighted in all fours. It was the motion  
 of the cars and not the speed that made me fall  
 it was apparently from things in the Baggage  
 car that something had happened. I knew something  
 was wrong in the train when I jumped. I knew  
 from the motion of the cars I supposed that  
 it was a snake head that caused the accident  
 a part of the train was off of the track. The  
 first clasp car was off or partly off. I am  
 certain the hind end of the second clasp or  
 the end of the first clasp were off. Don't know  
 when the Plaintiff was when he jumped  
 don't know when Fay was he must  
 have been in the second clasp car when  
 we ran off. Don't recollect any alarm



from locomotive. Was going slow when I jumped. Can't tell the rate of speed from the time I first noticed my jump we ran about two hundred feet. from examination of the position and when the flanges of the wheels had been on the ties. Knew the cars were off. On the East side of the track was graded off quite level when we stopped a sand on the west side and a ditch cut. I was not injured by jumping of any consequence - did not examine the track particularly - noticed a piece of flat rail just broken six or eight feet long it was back of where I found Yarwood back of the hind end of the first flat car. Don't remember more than one piece of rail. After the accident got a small car and took Yarwood and Lang to Elgin on the track on the East side of the river took Yarwood to Pabelford rode on the hand car with them, then noticed the track part of the way noticed 2 or 3 places where the end of the rails was up we went back part of the way on the same track we had passed down. My impression that one of the loose rails was broken he was confirmed. His bed room for to six weeks. When he got out used two crutches then a crutch and a cane was confirmed. His bed



Some time. He had attendance day & night  
was attended by Dr. McColm, Vacy and  
Kerr

Onlerop

Examination Witness said

Then was there or from cars  
in the train the baggage car, second class car  
and first class car passenger car don't know  
whether there was a freight car or not. Higgins  
asked plaintiff to go so did say so. Maybe  
we asked him first Higgins said we had  
better go into the baggage car as the passenger  
car was full or nearly full. I first asked  
plaintiff to go then Higgins said come along  
Higgins said we had better go into the  
baggage car as the passenger car was  
full. That passenger car was full and  
we better go into the baggage car the  
former words are correct as near as I can recollect.  
Don't recollect that I swore on the other trial  
that conductor said the passenger car was full  
and we would have to get into the baggage  
cars. We all then got into the baggage car it was  
warm weather. They had coats and pants on and  
no vests. John Desmond and some others was  
in the baggage car. Harwood Fay and I  
began playing. He commenced pulling up shirts.  
Each others shirts I went out of the baggage  
car. Sam Harwood went out first then Fay followed.



My impression is that Gaywood pulled up  
 Fay's shirt and started. Fay pulled down  
 his shirt & started followed him. I went  
 forward into the Second Class car. Gaywood  
 was then on the Platform or just going into first  
 class car. I then turned and went back this  
 was a very short time before the accident. Fay  
 had not got back don't know the rate of speed  
 my attention was otherwise taken up. I  
 noticed on the T rail we was running pretty  
 fast. I am an Engineer or have been a civil Engineer  
 never run an engine. The cars were in a shallow cut  
 we were all single men. There was no snuffling  
 about pulling up the linen. There was some exertions  
 used to do it and some to prevent it. Gaywood had  
 had been at Elgin more than two years before that  
 time & had been on this road before.

On the Examination of Plaintiff witness said

Wiggins said we had better go into the Buzzards fear  
 that he would be in there pretty soon or in a few minutes  
 we were all then acquainted with the conductor Wiggins  
 Gaywood and Wiggins are relatives Wiggins is his uncle  
 they had not been out before this shirt pulling  
 they quit about the time we crossed the Bridge  
 just before we struck the strap rail had  
 run a quarter or half a mile after we quit  
 playing on the strap rail. On cross  
 Examination again witness said Wiggins said



Cars are full. nearly full or pretty full and we must take the Baggage Car. Can't repeat the exact language. I have before stated as near as I can.

Abbit R. Hays

I testified that he was on the train we got aboard of the train on the west side of the river to go to Clinton. Jones myself Plaintiff I was I rode from Elgin to the Junction with the East branch nearly three quarters of a mile. half way of the way to Clinton strap rail. It is down grade the speed was as I thought pretty fast no great change in the speed. Accident occurred over two miles from Clinton we had been running about a mile on the flat rail when the accident occurred the cars ran off the track. I was on the platform of the 3<sup>rd</sup> class car when I jumped next to the Baggage car I was injured by the fall. The first I saw of Woodward he was on the hand car. I turned up the track once or twice and jumped. I suppose the ties were the usual distance apart. The motion of the cars when I jumped was violent and zig zag & curved over I jumped because I thought I was in danger. The brakeman was on the opposite platform Woodward was in the bed when I first saw him. Some six weeks afterwards his leg an ankle began to swell on the way up



Yarrowd before the accident was Bookkeeper  
to the Elgin Manufacturing Company. He did not  
get out for six weeks. I did not know of  
his going into business until Sunday afternoon.

Coroner's Examination Witness said  
I don't recollect whether I heard the whistle  
or not. I was inside of the second clasp car  
when the cars ran off. I followed & and  
he passed to the first clasp car. I went  
to the middle of the second clasp car and  
was standing there - there was but very  
few in there. I did not go into the first  
clasp car at all. I noticed when the cars  
had cut the ties. I was not in much pain  
at first. I came down in a heap when I  
lighted. The cars ran nearly the length of two  
cars after I jumped. Yarrowd & I had  
been pulling each other's shirt only the scuffling  
and shirt pulling occupied but a short time.  
My shirt was pulled but once. I think  
Yarrowd pulled my shirt. We were only going  
to Clinton we paid no fare. I expected to pay  
fare before the time when the accident happened.  
We had not seen the conductor after leaving Elgin.  
I had rode to Clinton several times before. I was  
conductor at Elgin. He made some remark that  
the cars were pretty full & that we had better get



into the Bazzage car and so. We then went into the Bazzage car and I suppose from the remark the conductor made. I have a suit against the company for the same injury. I have heard some remarks about the decision of the Supreme Court have not read the decision.

Direct Examination Resumed  
 by Plaintiff we were not commanded to get into the Bazzage car I cannot use his precise words. There was something said about the cars being full and conductor said we had better get into the Bazzage car. Passengers sometimes consider it a privilege to get into a bazzage car. There was no particular bargain about going into the bazzage car - the kind of shirt tail scuffling we had was the shirts were pulled some I don't know for whom first I don't know whose shirts were pulled first we had no suspender our shirts were pulled up some and puffed out and so pulled them then was no chasing we all went out into the other car before the accident took place.

Cross Examination Resumed  
 at some time before sitting riding in the Bazzage car to the second class car I did not sit in the second class car we sat down on the bazzage. The scuffling began while we were sitting. part of us were sitting



most of the time we were in the Buzzards car the scuffling commenced soon after we left Elgin when the cars stopped I was at the head end of the first clap car the Plaintiff had a vest and coat on

J. S. Johnson testified as follows

I was an Engineer of the train. I saw the Snake head before Locomotive passed some ten or fifteen rods ahead. Could not have avoided it by reversing the engine we were running twelve or fourteen miles in the hour. at this rate of speed it could probably be brought up from seventy to one hundred feet if brakes were applied at the signal if grade was level - had run over the track before had seen Snake heads then before such a rail is subject to Snake heads don't run as fast on flat rail always slowed the train on the flat rail run twenty five miles to the hour on T rail

Crap Examination Witness said

Twelve or fourteen miles is a safe rate of speed on that road. This road was a better road than the mad River Road which is the only flat rail road I ever saw before then they run the same speed we did here. I do not recollect whether



I counted the whistle overaged the engine or not but have no doubt I did, <sup>for I always did</sup> when I thought I saw a snake head. The reason I am not willing to swear I counted the whistle is because I don't do it so constantly whenever anything I cannot say whether I did or not at any particular time

Direct Examination resumed  
by Plaintiff

Strap rail is not as safe as T rail and that is the reason we run slower Snake heads will raise with the best of care on flat rail

The Plaintiff here admitted that this road was as good as flat and could be made

Walter M. Aubrey Testified as follows

I was in the train on the hindmost passenger car. It was not full it was not over  $\frac{3}{4}$  full the Plaintiff Counsel then asked the witness the following question. What was the condition of things in that car at the time of the accident. To which question the Defendant's Counsel objected. The Court overruled the objection and allowed the question to be answered. On which ruling and decision of the Court in allowing said question to be put and answered. On the part of the Defendants Counsel at the time. Excepting the witness answered there was a good deal of



of Confusion in the cars, was very unpleasant and I thought rather dangerous but I was not very much excited. If I had been when I could have jumped off I think I should have done so the cars ran about six rods off the track the first clasp car leaned towards the west I thought at one time it probably would tip over.

On Cross Examination witness stated I got on at Elgin I was near the center of the cars. Those who continued in the cars were not injured. Baggage car was not off the track. I had a little girl sitting beside me I don't recollect seeing any one standing in the cars. No passengers jumped from that car the passengers went on in the baggage car to the junction.

W. A. Higgins testified as follows. - I was conductor of the train at the time am still in the employ of the company - I think the speed was fifteen or sixteen miles an hour - I think I stated as on the other trial, just before the accident I had seen Garwood in the first clasp car - he rushed off the platform - told Garwood the cars were off the track before he jumped.

On Cross Examination witness said -

I first saw Garwood after we left Elgin about the middle of the first clasp car - he said to me we have had a regular tear in the baggage car - I think I replied, take care you don't tear yourself off the track - I went to the door and he followed me and said I believe we are



off the track now - cannot recollect whether car was full or not - Mr Yarwood did not take a seat in the cars - that rate of speed was safe, it was the usual practice to slacken speed on flat rail - no one was injured, that remained in the car - Yarwood and Fay jumped off and they were the only persons injured - the hind truck of the second class, and the forward truck of the first class were off the track - no other car was off the track - The train consisted of a locomotive, tender, baggage car 2<sup>d</sup> class car & 1<sup>st</sup> class car.

John A. Brown - testified as follows - I was on the train on the forward platform of the first class car - I turned the Brakes and got off the train, the train went a little over half the length of a car before stopping, after I got off I went over the road often every day for some days - I jumped over the road from time to time till accident happened - I was in employ of Michigan Central Rail Road at that time.

On cross examination witness said - I heard the ~~whistle~~ whistle and took hold of the brake immediately - Higgins took hold also - I jumped off - we had run half of the length of a car after I jumped - part of the trucks only were off the track - I don't think there was any danger on the inside of the car - there is always more danger on the platform than on the inside of the car - Passengers were not allowed to stand on the platform - could not say whether any printed rules to that effect on that train or not -



Frederick Swain - testified as follows. - I was on the train as brake man - I was on the hind end of the second class car, I turned the brake and jumped off, because I thought I was safer on the ground - I thought I was in danger, on the train therefore I jumped. Mr Brewer and I jumped together - I was not hurt. Cars ran about the length of a car and a half after they left the track.

John Cox testified as follows

I was in the employ of the Company as track repairs, my instructions were to keep the road in order - the road in question had not been examined, after the proceeding had passed over - one freight train went over the road.

On cross examination witness said - I had charge of the road - I went over the road twice a day - I went over twice that day - I preceded the Papinger train on a hand car - I passed the road to see that it was in order, it was in order, it was a good ~~road~~ road for a strap rail road, well graded - it was as good as any road.

The plaintiff has admitted that it is impossible to make a strap rail road without having snake heads.

John Clark testified as follows -

I was in the employ of the road as Superintendent of track repairs - Mr Cox was under me, the instructions were that men should pass over as often as was necessary - as a general thing it was necessary.



after every train - the passing of every train has a tendency to make snake heads - don't know what care was taken on the day of the accident -

Our Gross examination witness said - All due and proper care was taken of this road by the ~~road~~ company to keep it in order - it was in good repair

Doct. Thos. New testified as follows -

Found plaintiff at Elgin with a fracture of the left leg on the outside and of the ankle on the inside - both broken - don't think the leg will be as good as before - he was confined several weeks -

Defendants admit they ~~are~~ are a rail road company and were common carrier of passengers -

The Plaintiff here puts his case on the defendant's intrusion as witness Gilman W. Merrill who testified as follows -

I know the Plaintiff - I had conversation with him some six or eight weeks after he was injured, he was at the office - he said he "didn't blame any one but himself for his injury because he was such a damned fool as to jump off - he said he had passed through the train from the Baggage car - he blamed himself for his want of self preservation" -

John Cox (recalled) testified as follows -

I had some talk with Garwood some after he was hurt - he said he "didn't care so much about the hurt as about how foolish he done it" - I have been over



this part of the road the week before and made a thorough overhauling of it by removing the injured rails - I did not think it necessary to go over this part of the road after each train - it is impossible to prevent snake heads - that was the best part of my road - it was in as good repair as it could be - it was a fine ribbon - this is better than oak - I passed over the road between Belton and Fowler 9 o'clock of the same day - The accident was about 4 o'clock P.M. - there was no snake heads when I passed over it.

On cross examination - witness said - if there came a snake head after 12 o'clock I should not have known it.

John Devermond testified as follows - I was on the train as Stage Agent - I was in the Baggage car from Belton until the accident Garwood - Fay - Jones and baggage man Clark were there, these young men Jones, Garwood and Fay were scuffling when we first left Belton. They continued until a short time before the accident - I saw them all go out - just before they left they were pulling up their shirts - they were scuffling together on a sort of a good natured spree - I remained in the Baggage car with the Baggage man - Garwood, Jones and Fay went out together, they went out fast - they seemed to be chasing one another - there was something extra motion in that car - not violent - I did not consider myself in any danger - that car was on the track all the time - the Baggage man went to the brake - Garwood and the others left



the Baggage cars then or four minutes before the cars ran off

Our cross examination witness said - The scuffling was pulling at shirt tails - they seized hold of each others shirts, they walked out of the car rather quicker than usual

Wm. A. Higgins being recalled testified as follows - It was not safe for passengers to run about the cars or stand on the platform - Mr Garwood had frequently passed over this road - those standing about the cars are most liable to be injured

Our cross examination witness said - I don't remember that there were any printed rules, not in the habit of having rules in the Baggage cars - Garwood was on the platform when I told him the cars were off the track. I don't remember what directions I gave - as to where Garwood Fay and sons should go - we ~~remembered~~ endeavor to help the passengers off the Platform. -

The foregoing was all the evidence given in the cause the Plaintiff then asked the Court to instruct the jury as follows -

Kane County Circuit Court

Lewis, Pl. Garwood

May Term 1853

The Galena & Chicago

Union Rail Road Co

And now comes the said plaintiff by his counsel and moves the Court to instruct



the jury empanelled herein as follows—

1<sup>st</sup> That if the jury believe, from the evidence that the Plaintiff was a passenger on board of the cars of the Defendants in the month of August 1852 at the County of Kane, that the cars of the Defendants were thrown off the track of the road by reason of the unskillfulness or negligence of the Defendants or their agents and that by means of such accident the Plaintiff was injured in his person, they will find a verdict for the Plaintiff and award him damages—

2<sup>d</sup> That if the plaintiff was injured by means of an accident occurring on the rail road of the Defendants while was a passenger on their cars, that then the burden of proving that such accident was not the result of the negligence or unskillfulness of the Defendants or their agents is cast upon the said Defendants—

3<sup>d</sup> That in order to entitle the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff it is not necessary for the jury to be satisfied that the Defendants were guilty of gross or even ordinary neglect in the reparation of their road or management of their train, but if the jury believe, from the evidence that slight neglect of the Defendants or their agents was the cause of the accident and injury of the plaintiff and award him damages, provided the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was a passenger on board the cars of the defendants at the time of such accident and injury—



4<sup>th</sup>

given

That carriers of passengers by railroad are bound to use all precautions as far as human foresight will go, for the safety of their passengers, and are answerable to injured passengers for slight neglect of themselves and agents in the operation of the track and conduct and management of their trains whereby injury occurs.

5<sup>th</sup>

given

The omission of any precaution which would prevent or increase the safety of or reduce the probability of danger to the passenger, constitutes such a neglect in carriers of passengers as will make them answerable in damages to a passenger injured by means of such neglect.

6<sup>th</sup>

given

That Railroad Companies are answerable for injuries to a passenger, resulting from a defect in their track, which might have been discovered by a most careful and thorough examination, and if the Jury believe, from the evidence, that the injury complained of in this case was occasioned by the neglect of the Company, or their agents to examine the track prior to the passage of the train on which the accident occurred they will find a verdict for the plaintiff and assess his damages.

7<sup>th</sup>8<sup>th</sup>

given

That if the Jury believe, from the evidence that the accident and injury occurred by reason of the too rapid speed of the train by reason of the neglect to apply the brake in time or because of any other neglect or unskillful management of the train they will find a verdict for the plaintiff.



and afeel his damages.

9<sup>th</sup>

given

That if the jury believe from the evidence that the accident and injury complained of happened by reason of the neglect of the engineer in charge of the locomotive, attached to the Defendants train, or to blow his whistle in time, or by reason of the neglect of the conductor to warn the Engineer in time, or by reason of the neglect of the brakeman to apply the brakes in season, they will find a verdict for the plaintiff and afeel his damages.

10<sup>th</sup>

given

That if the jury believe from the evidence that the accident and injury happened by reason of the bad order of the track and want of due care and attention of the Company or any of their agents in the reparation of the track, or in the management and conduct of the train on which the Plaintiff was, they will find a verdict for the Plaintiff and afeel his damages.

11<sup>th</sup>

given

That the mere fact that the Plaintiff jumped from the cars, while they were in motion, to the ground and thus sustained the injury complained of, will not alone deprive him of his right to a recovery against the Defendants, if the jury believe from the evidence that an accident had occurred, that the cars were off the track and running at the rate of from 3 to 5 miles an hour, and the Plaintiff had reasonable ground to believe, and did believe, that his life or limb were in danger, and that it was necessary to leap from the cars in order to avoid the danger which threatened him, provided



that the injury was not occasioned by the plaintiff's own neglect, nor that his negligence contributed to produce the injury, complained of

11<sup>1/2</sup>

That although the jury may believe that the Plaintiff would not have received injury had he not leaped from the car, and that as the writ proved his jumping was an unwise act that does not necessarily prevent the Plaintiff from recovering in this case. The question is not so much whether there was in point of fact any danger as whether the Plaintiff was reasonably apprehended danger and so leaped from the car and in judging of his state of mind the jury should take into consideration whatever circumstances of alarm and confusion existed at the time, the law not requiring the same coolness and accuracy of judgment in a person under a state of excitement and alarm as under other circumstances.

12<sup>th</sup>

That in determining the question whether the plaintiff had reasonable ground to believe himself in danger the jury have the right to consider the experience and knowledge of the plaintiff in regard to persons of this character, the commotion and consternation if among the passengers and the fact if it be so that one of the brakemen abandoned his post and leaped from the car.

13<sup>th</sup>

That the mere fact that the plaintiff was a few minutes previous to the occurrence of



the accident and injury, scuffling and playing in a sportive manner with others on the cars, will not deprive the plaintiff of his right to recover from the Defendants ~~or their agents~~ <sup>if the jury</sup> believe from the evidence that the Defendants or their agents were guilty of any neglect however slight whereby the accident and injury occurred provided the injury was not occasioned by the Plaintiff's own neglect nor that his negligence contributed to produce the injury complained of.

14<sup>th</sup>

That in estimating the damages which the plaintiff may have sustained by reason of the injury complained of, the jury if they find for the Plaintiff are not confined to such damages as may have resulted to the plaintiff by loss of time, and expense of medical attendance, but may give such additional damages for the loss of natural use of the plaintiff's limb which the jury exercising a sound discretion, and in view of all circumstances may see proper to award not exceeding the amount claimed in the declaration.

15<sup>th</sup>

That unless the jury believe from the evidence that the passenger cars were full and that it was a part of the contract that the Plaintiff should occupy during the trip the baggage car the mere fact that the Plaintiff left that car and went into the first class passenger car is not of itself such negligence on the Plaintiff's as to defeat a recovery in this case.



That passengers upon Rail Road are not to be bound or affected by rules established by such Roads in relation to the conduct of passengers unless the proof shows that the passenger had a knowledge of such rules and regulations —

Which instructions were given by the court to the jury giving of which instructions on the part of the said Plaintiff the Defendants by their counsel at the time excepted —

The Defendants then asked the Court to instruct the jury as follows —

1<sup>st</sup> A

That if the jury believe from the evidence that this injury to the Plaintiff in this suit happened to him by mere accident without fault on the part of the Defendants then the Plaintiff cannot recover in this action.

5<sup>th</sup> B

If the jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff while on his passage from Selma to Clinton was guilty of carelessness and imprudence exposed himself to danger by standing and cuffling on the cars, or by imprudently passing from one car to another while the cars were in motion, and that said carelessness or imprudence contributed in any degree to produce the injury, then the Plaintiff cannot recover.

6<sup>th</sup> C

If the jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff while on Defendants cars imprudently and carelessly exposed



himself to danger by unsetting, playing, running or jumping and that the injury to him was in any way produced by such carelessness or impudence or that such carelessness and impudence in any way contributed to produce the injury then the plaintiff cannot recover even though the jury may believe that the defendants have also been guilty of negligence.

7<sup>th</sup> D

If the jury shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence while a passenger upon the defendants' cars and that his negligence concurred with the negligence of the defendants in producing the injury then the plaintiff cannot recover.

10<sup>th</sup> C

If the jury shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff leaped from the cars the Defendants made a rash and undue apprehension of danger when in reality there was no danger and that the injury to the plaintiff was the result of such leaping then the plaintiff cannot recover.

13<sup>th</sup> F

If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff carelessly leaped from the cars of the defendants and that such carelessness or manner of leaping contributed to produce the injury to the Plaintiff then the jury should find for the Defendant.

18<sup>th</sup> G

If the jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff leaped from the car of Defendants ~~without~~ while it was in motion under a rash and undue apprehension of danger when in reality there was not



danger, and that the injury was caused by such leaping, they should find for the defendants, although the Plaintiff might have <sup>never</sup> thought himself in danger and leaped from the ground to save himself from harm. the question is whether under the circumstances, his jumping was an act of rashness.

If the Jury believe from the evidence that the injury to the Plaintiff was the result of the negligence or impermanence of both Plaintiff and Defendants their verdict should be for the Defendants.

Which was done by the Court.

The Defendants then also asked the Court to instruct the jury as follows viz —

If the Jury shall believe from the evidence that the Defendants exercised due care, diligence and skill in the preservation and repair of their track, and in managing and operating their road at the time of the accident and that the accident could not have been prevented by the use of said care, diligence and skill then the Plaintiff cannot recover in this action — but due care required the use of the utmost prudence & caution; a carrier of passengers being liable for slight negligence.

That every traveller in a public stage which must meet the risks incident to the mode of travel he adopts and if the Jury shall believe that the injury to the Plaintiff was the result of an accident which could not be avoided



by the exercise of due care and skill in the preparation and management of the means of conveyance on the part of the defendants then the plaintiff cannot recover but due care requires the use of the utmost prudence & caution

8<sup>th</sup> 10

Given with  
qualification

That the Plaintiff before he can recover in this action must not only show that the injury to him was the result of carelessness or negligence of the defendants but also that he himself was without fault in procuring said injury \*

9<sup>th</sup> 11 L

Given with  
qualification

That in this action the plaintiff cannot recover unless the jury shall believe that he exercised proper care and circumspection while on his passage from Reims to Clifton and that the defendants were guilty of negligence from which the injury resulted, and the burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff to show not only that the defendants were negligent but he himself was not guilty of negligence \*

13<sup>th</sup> 16

Given with a  
qualification

Unless the Plaintiff has proved to the satisfaction of the jury, that the defendants was guilty of ~~the~~ gross negligence or misconduct, and also that Plaintiff used proper care and prudence, and that his own misconduct, want of care, or negligence did not contribute to produce the injury complained of the jury should find for the Defendants \*

Qualification to Rights 8<sup>th</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> & 13<sup>th</sup>

Instructions

\* But proof that the plff was a passenger of the



accident, and the injury, make a prima facie case of negligence & throws the burden of explaining upon the defendant.

18<sup>th</sup>

The

jury

The Jury are also instructed that it is their duty to regard and obey the law as given them by the Court — and the Jury are not at liberty to disregard or override it —

Which, the Court refused to give, as asked but gave with the following qualifications viz — by adding to the first of said instructions these words — "But due care requires the use of the utmost prudence and caution, a carrier of passengers being liable for slight negligence" —

And by adding to the 2<sup>d</sup> of said instructions these words "But due care requires the use of the utmost prudence and caution."

And by adding to the rest three of said instructions, these words — Qualification to Defts 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> & 15<sup>th</sup> instructions "But proof that the Plff was a passenger of the accident, and the injury, make a prima facie case of negligence and throws the burden of explaining upon the defendant" —

And the last of said instructions by striking out the following words therefrom viz — "Once that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in their decisions is the highest judicial authority of the land"

To which Decision of the Court in refusing said instructions as asked & each of them and qualifying them each of them as aforesaid the



Defendants then and there expected.

And the Defendants then also asked the Court to give the Jury the following instructions

14<sup>th</sup> O

Refused

If the Jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff leaped from the car of Defendants under circumstances that would not have justified such an act on the part of a prudent careful man, and that the injury was the result of such jumping from the cars, then the Plaintiff cannot recover, unless the Jury believe that such injury was wilfully caused by the Defendant.

3<sup>d</sup> P

Refused

That the Defendants as a common carrier of passengers is not an insurer of the personal safety of the passengers against all accidents but is liable only for the want of such care and diligence as is characteristic of cautious persons, and if the Defendants exercised such care and diligence in the transportation of the Plaintiff, then the Plaintiff cannot recover in this action.

Galena & Chicago

Rail Road Company

and

Yarwood

Instructions for Defendants

The Court is asked to instruct the Jury on the part of the said Defendants.

2<sup>d</sup>

Refused

That if they believe from the evidence that Yarwood and his companions when they took passage in the cars of Def<sup>t</sup> at Elgin were told by the conductor that the passengers cars were



full, but they could go in the baggage car, and that there upon they got into the baggage car to ride to Clinton, then it was the duty of Garwood to remain and ride in that car

R

Refused

And if the Jury further believe from the evidence that at the time of the accident, and when the plaintiff jumped off the car, the baggage car was not off the track, nor in any danger, but that the plaintiff with his companions had got into a play and scuffle, which brought on a racing through the other cars and in one of which Garwood was brought to that apprehension of imminent peril, which induced him to leap from the car, and thereby received the injury complained of - then the Plaintiff cannot recover, and the Jury should find for the Defendants -

S

Refused

And the Jury are further instructed that if they ~~any~~ believe from the evidence that Garwood the plaintiff with his companions, at the time they took passage in defendants cars at Elgin to ride to Clinton were told by Capt. Wiggins the Conductor, to go in the Baggage car, as the passenger cars were full, and that plaintiff in pursuance thereof went into said baggage car, then it was his duty to continue therein <sup>to the</sup> said Clinton -

J

Refused

And if the Jury further believe from the evidence at the time of the accident, the plaintiff had left the baggage car and gone into another car - and had thereby placed himself into a position of apprehension of imminent peril, which induced him to leap



from the cars, and thereby received the injury complained of and that the baggage car was not off the track at all or in any danger. — then such conduct of the plaintiff was culpable negligence and the jury should find for the defendants.

W

Refused

If the jury believe from the evidence, that the standing upon the platform of cars or going about from car to car by a passenger, whilst the cars are running, are acts of impudence & negligence, and if they further believe that at the time the cars were off the track, the plaintiff was so standing, or going about and that such conduct of the plaintiff increased his apprehensions of peril, and he was thereby induced to leap from the cars when in motion, and in consequence of such leap received the injury, when, had he remained in the cars he would not have been injured, he is not entitled to recover in this action.

V

Refused

If the jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff leaped from the cars of the Defendant under circumstances that would not have justified such an act on the part of an ordinarily prudent careful man and that the injury was the result of such leaping, then the Plaintiff cannot recover.

Qualification

tion asked by Defendants to Plaintiff's Instruction No 9

W

Refused

But unless the plaintiff has proved to the satisfaction of the jury that his own carelessness or negligence did not



contribute or assist to produce the injury complained of then the Jury should find for the Defendant and the burden of such proof is upon the Plaintiff.

u  
X

If the Jury believe from the evidence that at times the Plaintiff took passage on the Defendant's cars at Elgin he was ~~not~~ directed by the Conductor to take his place in the Baggage car because there was not room for him in the passenger car, and that the Plaintiff did go on board of the baggage car at the time of starting and that whilst on the way from Elgin to Clinton he left said car without any reasonable cause and that the injury to the Plaintiff happened in consequence of his so leaving the car then he is not entitled to recover in this action.

Which the Court refused, and marked the same refused. To which decision of the Court in refusing to give said last mentioned instructions, the Defendants then and there assented.

And the Defendants then also asked the Court to give the Jury the following instructions.

If the Jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff with his companions, at the time they took passage in Defendants' cars at Elgin, to ride to Clinton, were told by the conductor of the train that the passenger car was full, or nearly full, and that they could go in the baggage car, and that Plaintiff in pursuance thereof went into said baggage car, then

Refused

G

(consent)

Given



then it was his duty to continue there unless it was necessary to leave the same - and if the Jury further believe from the evidence, that at the time of the accident the plaintiff had unnecessarily left the baggage car and gone into another car, and was walking about, or standing upon the platform of the hind car - and had thereby placed himself in a position of peril, or apprehension of great kind peril - while the baggage car was not off the track, or in damage, then such conduct was culpable negligence -

If the Jury believe from the evidence that Gamwood was unnecessarily standing upon the platform of one of defendants cars at the time of accident then he was guilty of improper conduct and negligence in so doing.

That it is the duty of every passenger on a rail road car, to take his place in the car in which he takes passage, and to remain therein unless it is necessary to leave the same for reasonable refreshment or some other necessary purpose.

Which the Court marked "guilty" "consent", and when the Court read the last mentioned instructions to the jury, he remarked to the jury and in their hearing presence, that he gave those by the consent of Plaintiff - To which remark of the Court as affirmed the Defendants then and there objected -

The jury thereupon retired and afterwards came into Court, and rendered the following verdict -



"We the jurors find the defendants guilty and  
 assess the damages Twenty five Thousand Dollars"

Foreman — John Vandickes

Upon  
 the rendition of said verdict the defendants by their counsel  
 moved the court for a new trial, which motion  
 was overruled by the court under judgment rendered for the  
 Plaintiff on said verdict, to which decision of the court  
 in overruling the said Defendants motion for a new trial,  
 the said Defendants by their counsel at the time accepted  
 and forgo that their Bill of Exceptions may be signed  
 and sealed — which is done

Isaac G. Wilson

Sergeant 

And after-  
 wards, to wit, on the 8<sup>th</sup> day of July 1855 the following Appeal  
 bond was filed, to wit:

We now all men by these Presents that the  
 Galena and Chicago Union Rail Road Company as princi-  
 pal and John B. Turner as surety are well and firmly bound  
 unto Lewis A. Garwood in the penal sum of Four Thousand  
 Dollars lawful money of the United States to be paid unto the  
 said Lewis A. Garwood or his certain Attorney, Executors, admin-  
 istrators or assigns, for which payment well and truly to  
 be made, we bind ourselves, successors, heirs, Executors and  
 administrators and each and every of them, jointly and severally  
 firmly by these presents sealed with the seal of the said  
 Galena and Chicago Union Rail Road Company acting



by their President and Secretary and with the seal of the  
said this eighth day of June AD 1853

Whereas at the May Term of the New County, Circuit  
Court AD 1853 Judgment was rendered by the said court  
in favor of the above named Lewis N. Garwood against the said  
Galena and Chicago Union Rail Road Company for the sum of  
twenty five hundred Dollars damages, besides costs of suit and  
whereas the said Galena and Chicago Union Rail Road Company  
have prayed an appeal from said judgment to the Supreme  
Court of the State of Illinois - Now therefore the condition of this  
obligation is such that if the above named Galena & Chicago  
Union Rail Road Company, shall duly prosecute the said appeal  
and will pay or cause to be paid the said judgment, costs and  
interest and damages in case the said judgment shall be affirm-  
ed then the above obligation to be void otherwise to be and remain  
in full force -

In witness whereof the said Galena & Chicago Union  
Rail Road Company have attached their Corporate Seal  
to this Bond and have caused the same to be signed by their  
President and Secretary - and the said John B. Turner has  
hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year above written



Wm. H. Lanahan  
Secretary

John B. Turner President  
John B. Turner (Seal)



State of Illinois  
Name County

I Luther Dearborn Clerk  
of the Circuit Court in and for said  
County in the State aforesaid do hereby Certify  
that the above foregoing is a full perfect  
and complete copy of all the Hearings Bill  
of Exceptions. Record of Supreme Court and  
of all orders in said Cause (Since the filing of the  
Record of Supreme Court reversing the judgment in  
this cause.) as appears from the Record of files  
of said Circuit Court

Witness Luther Dearborn clerk of said Court  
with seal thereof at Genoa in said  
County this 28<sup>th</sup> day of May A.D. 1860

Luther Dearborn  
Clerk



And now the said Appellants by E. Peck  
& J. F. Farnsworth their Attorneys assign  
for error in the foregoing record the  
following

- 1 The Court Erred in overruling the objection  
to the question asked the Witness Walter Mc-  
Caully, and allowing the said Witness to answer it.
- 2 The Court Erred in giving each of the  
instructions asked & given on the part of Farnwood.
- 3 The Court Erred in refusing to give the second. fourth  
eighth. ninth. fifteenth. & eighteenth  
instructions as asked by the appellants. &  
each of them.
- 4 The Court Erred in qualifying the said  
last mentioned instructions, and each of them.
- 5 The Court Erred in refusing to give the jury the  
instructions numbered 14-D. 3. and letters  
Q. R. S. T. U. V. W. and X. and each  
of them.
- 6 The Court Erred in telling the jury that he  
gave them the instructions Marked. Y. Z. D. and  
"Consent". By the Consent of the plaintiffs.
- 7 The Court Erred in overruling the motion of  
appellants and refusing to grant a new trial.

E. Peck. & J. F. Farnsworth  
attys for appellants

Since the said appeals by Ireland & Farnsworth have  
attorneys come, and says that there is not any error  
in the record appearing in manner & form as above set out  
& that he  
Ireland & Farnsworth  
k.d.

in Hall



Galena & Chicago  
Union Rail Road Com  
appellants

Lewis H. Garwood  
appellee

Transcript &c

Filed June 11, 1886

L. Selmon

clerk



# SUPREME COURT.

GALENA & CHICAGO UNION RAIL R. Com.

APPELLANTS.

VS.

LEWIS H. YARWOOD

APPELLEE.

} Appeal from Kane.

## ABSTRACT OF RECORD.

*Trespass on the case*, by Yarwood against the Appellants, for personal injuries.

4 The 1st count of the declaration avers that Yarwood was a passenger on the cars of the appellants from Elgin to Clinton in the county of Kane, on the second of August 1852.

5 That "just before reaching the said station or stopping place at the said Clinton, by the ac-  
tion of the wheels of the said engine and cars, the said iron and wooden rails were torn up for  
6 a great distance (to wit) for the distance of twenty feet, in consequence of the said rails being  
constructed of poor material, and so insufficiently and insecurely fastened as aforesaid, the  
said car on which the said plaintiff was then and there a passenger as aforesaid, was thrown  
violently off of the said road, by reason of which the life of the said plaintiff was put in great  
peril and danger, insomuch so that the said plaintiff was obliged, and did jump from the said  
car to the ground (the said car being then and there so off the said track, and still running at  
a rapid rate over the ties of said road, and apparently about to run off a very steep bank  
then and there being) "in doing which the said plaintiff's left leg was broken near the ankle,  
"his ankle badly and severely strained and bruised, and his body otherwise severely bruised  
"and injured, all of which was caused by the unskillfulness and carelessness of the said defend-  
"ants and their servants, and by reason of the said injuries so received as aforesaid, the said  
"plaintiff was &c"—concluding with the damage.

8 The second count is substantially like the first, only avering that the cars were run at double  
their usual rate of speed, and at a dangerous rate of speed, &c.

And avering that the car which the plaintiff was a passenger in, was off the track &c., like the  
first count.

11 The third count avers that "the car in which said plaintiff was riding was thrown with great vio-  
lence off the said track, and the said plaintiff without fault on his part, and by reason of said  
"carelessness and improper conduct of said defendants, thereby came with great force and vio-  
lence upon the earth, and his left leg was thereby broken near the ankle" &c. &c.

12 Fourth count substantially like the third.

13 *Plea. General Issue.*

17 The case was tried the 23rd of May 1855, by a Jury.

19 Verdict for plaintiff of twenty-five Hundred Dollars.

Motion for new trial overruled and Judgment upon the verdict—and exceptions, and appeal.

### *Testimony.*

*Samuel C. Jones*, a witness for Yarwood, testified :

20 That about the first of August 1852, he took passage on the said Road at Elgin for Clin-  
ton—about three or four miles. Himself, Fay and Yarwood went together. Wm. Wiggins  
was conductor on that day. We left Elgin in the forepart of the afternoon. From Elgin to Clin-  
ton the first part of the Road was "T" rail, and the rest strap. Think the "T" rail was near half of  
21 the way—it is a down grade to Clinton. Elgin to the bridge it is about thirty feet to the  
mile. Think it is a down grade most of the way. I discovered no change in the speed after  
leaving the "T" rail. The cars ran off the track nearer Clinton than Elgin. He and others  
jumped off. He saw Yarwood lying on the ground. He (Yarwood) said he felt faint. Wit-  
ness went to get some water for him—he jumped from the platform of the baggage car—a  
great deal of motion to that car at the time—not steady—rough riding. He, (witness) was  
a little back of the centre of the baggage car—could not walk steady—got to the platform—  
dust thick till the wind blowed away the dust. Saw what was the matter, and jumped—  
alighted on all fours. It was the motion of the cars and not the speed, that made him fall—  
it was apparently from the Baggage car that something had happened—knew something was  
wrong when he jumped; knew from the motion of the cars. Supposed it was a snake head  
that caused the accident. A part of the train was off the track. The first class car was off,  
or partly off. Was certain the hind end of the second class, and fore end of the first class were  
off; didn't know where the Plaintiff was when he jumped; didn't know where Fay was; he  
22 (Fay) must have been on the second class car when car ran off; didn't recollect any alarm (22)  
from Locomotive; were going slow when he jumped; couldn't tell the rate of speed; from  
the time he first noticed roughness ran about two hundred feet; from examination of the po-



sition, and when the flanges of the wheels had been on the ties, knew the cars were off.— On the east side of the track was graded off quite level where they stopped; a bank on the west side, and a ditch cut; was not injured by jumping of any consequence; did not examine the track particularly; noticed a piece of flat rail, fresh broken, six or eight feet long. It was back of where he found Yarwood; back of the hind end of the first class car; didn't remember more than one piece of rail; After the accident, got a small car and took Yarwood and Fay to Elgin, on the track on the east side of the river; took Yarwood to Padelford; rode on the hand car with them; then noticed the track part of the way; noticed two or three places where the end of the rail was up; they went back part of the way on the same track they had passed down. His impression that one of the loose rails was broken. He (Yarwood) was confined to his room four to six weeks; when he got out used two crutches; then a crutch and a cane; was confined to his bed (23) sometime. He had attendance day and night; was attended by Doctors Mc Clure, Vacy & Kerr.

On cross examination Witness said:

There were three or four cars in the train; the Baggage car; second class car; and first class passenger car; didn't know whether there was a freight car or not. Wiggins asked Plaintiff to go: so did Fay and Witness. May be they (F. and Witness) asked him first. Wiggins said we had better go into the baggage car, as the passenger car was full, or nearly full. Witness first asked Plaintiff to go; then Wiggins said come along. Wiggins said they had better go into the Baggage car, as the passenger car was full, that passenger car was full, and they better go into the baggage car—the former words are correct, as near as he could recollect. Didn't recollect that he swore on the other trial that Conductor said the passenger car was full, and they would have to get into the baggage cars. They all then got into the baggage car; it was warm weather. They had coats and pants, and no vests. John Demond and some others was in the baggage car. Yarwood, Fay, himself began playing. They commenced pulling up each others shirts; he went out of the baggage car; saw Yarwood go out front; then Fay followed (24) His impression is that Yarwood pulled up Fay's shirt and started. Fay pulled down his shirt and followed him. He (Witness) went forward into the second class car. Yarwood was then on the platform, or just going into first class car. He (Witness) then turned and went back. This was a very short time before the accident. Fay had not got back. Didn't know the rate of speed; his attention was otherwise taken up; he noticed on the "T" rail they were running pretty fast. He was an Engineer, or had been; a civil Engineer; never saw an engine. The cars were in a shallow cut. They were all single men; there was no scuffling about pulling up the linen; there was some exertions used to do it, and some to prevent it. Yarwood had been at Elgin more than two years before that time, and had been on the road before.

On Re-examination by Plaintiff, Witness said:

Wiggins said they had better go in to the baggage car, that he would be in there pretty soon, or in a few minutes. They were all then acquainted with the Conductor Wiggins. Yarwood & Wiggins were related; Wiggins is his uncle; they had not been out before this shirt pulling; they quit about the time they crossed the bridge, just before striking the strap rail; had near a quarter or half a mile after they quit playing, on the strap rail. On cross examination again Witness said: Cars were full, nearly full, or pretty full, and they must take the baggage car; could'nt repeat the exact language; had before stated as near as he could.

Albert R. Fay:

Testified, was on the train with Jones and Yarwood; the speed he thought pretty fast; no great change in the speed—accident occurred over two miles from Clinton; had been running about a mile on the flat rail when the accident occurred. The cars run off the track.— He was on the platform of the second class car when he jumped, next to the baggage car. He was injured by the fall—the first he saw of Yarwood he (Yarwood) was on the hand car. He (witness) turned up the brake once or twice and jumped—supposed the ties were the usual distance apart—the motion of the cars when he jumped was violent and zig zag, and careened over. He jumped because he thought he was in danger—the brakeman was on the opposite platform. Yarwood was on the bed when he (witness) first saw him, some six weeks afterwards—his leg and ankle began to swell on the way up. Yarwood, before the accident, was book-keeper to the Elgin Manufacturing Company—he did not get out for six weeks.— He (witness) did not know of his going into business until January afterwards.



On Cross Examination, Witness said did not recollect whether he heard the whistle or not. Was inside of second class car when the cars ran off; followed Yarwood; he passed to the first class car. He (witness) went to the middle of second class car, and was standing there; they were but very few in there; did not go into the first class car at all; noticed when the cars cut the ties. He (witness) was not in much fear at first; he came down in a heap when he *alighted*; the cars were ran nearly the length of two cars after he jumped. Yarwood and witness had been pulling each others shirt out; the scuffling and shirt pulling occupied but a short time. His, witness, shirt, pulled but once he thought; Jones pulled his shirt; they were only going to Clinton; they paid no fare; he expected to pay fare before the time when the accident happened. They had not seen the conductor after leaving Elgin; he rode to Clinton several times before; saw Conductor at Elgin; he (conductor) made some remark that the cars were pretty full, and that they had better get into the baggage car, and he (witness) supposed from the remark the conductor made. He had a suit against the company for the same injury. Had heard some remarks about the decision of the Supreme Court; had not read the decision.

27

Direct examination resumed by Plaintiff.

They were not commanded to get into the baggage car; he could not use the precise words; there was something said about the cars being full, and conductor said they had better get into the baggage car. Passengers sometimes consider it a privilege to get into a baggage car. There was no particular bargain about going into the baggage car. The kind of shirt tail scuffling they had was—the shirts were pulled some: did not know by whom first. Did not know whose shirt was pulled first; had no suspenders over shirts; were pulled out some and puffed out, and they pulled them; there was no chasing. We all went into the other car before the accident took place.

Cross-Examination Resumed:—At some time prefer riding in the baggage car to the second class car. He did not sit in the second class car; they sat down on the baggage; the scuffling began while they were sitting; part of them were sitting most of the time; they were in the baggage car; the scuffling commenced soon after leaving Elgin; when the cars stopped he was at the hind end of the first class car. The Plaintiff had a vest and coat on.

28

L. D. Johnson, Testified as follows:

Was an Engineer of the train; saw the snake head before locomotive passed, some ten or fifteen rods ahead. Could not have avoided it by reversing the engine. They were running twelve or fourteen miles to the hour. At this rate of speed it could probably be brought up from seventy to one hundred feet, if brakes were applied at the signal, if grade was level.—Had run over the track before; had seen snake heads there before; such a rail is subject to snake heads; dont run as fast on flat rail; always slowed the train on the flat rail; run twenty five miles to the hour on "T" rail.

Cross-Examination, Witness said,

Twelve or fourteen miles is a safe rate of speed on that road. This is a better road than the Mad River Road, which is the only flat rail road he ever saw before; there they run the same speed they did here. Did not recollect whether he sounded the whistle or reversed the engine, or not, but had no doubt he did, for he always did, when he thought he saw a snake head. The reason he was not willing to swear he sounded the whistle, was because he sounded it so constantly whenever anything h——; could not say whether he did or not, at any particular time.

29

Direct Examination resumed by Plaintiff:

Strap rail is not so safe as "T" rail, and that is the reason they run slower. Snake heads will raise with the best of care on flat rail.

The Plaintiff here admitted that this road was as good as flat rail could be made.

Walker McAuley, Testified as follows:

Was on the train on the hindermost passenger car; it was not full; it was not over three-fourths full. The Plaintiff's counsel then asked the witness the following question:

"What was the condition of things in that car at the time of the accident? To which question the defendants, by their counsel objected. The court overruled the objection, and allowed the question to be answered, to which ruling and decision of the court, in allowing said question to be put and answered to the Jury, the defendants by their counsel, at the time, excepted. The witness answered—"there was a good deal of confusion in the cars—was very

30



unpleasant, and I thought rather dangerous, but I was not very much excited. If I had been where I could have jumped off, I think I should have done so; the cars ran about six rods off the track; the first class car leaned toward the west; I thought at one time it probably would tip over."

On cross-examination witness stated he got on at Elgin. Was near the centre of the cars; those who continued in the cars were not injured. Baggage car was not off the track. He had a little girl sitting beside him. Did't recollect seeing any one standing in the cars. No passenger jumped from that car; the passengers went on in the baggage car to the Junction.

Wm. Wiggins, testified as follows:

He was conductor of the train at the time, and is still in the employ of the Company. He thought the speed was fifteen or sixteen miles an hour; thought he stated so on the other trial; just before the accident he had seen Yarwood in the first class car; he rushed off the platform; told Yarwood the cars were off the track before he jumped.

On cross-examination, witness said he first saw Yarwood after they left Elgin, about the middle of the first class car. He (Yarwood) said to him "we have had a regular tear in the baggage car" He (Wiggins) thought he replied—"take care you dont tear yourself off the track." He (witness) went to the door, and Yarwood followed him and said "I believe we are off the track now;" did not recollect whether car was full or not. Mr. Yarwood did not take a seat in the cars; that rate of speed was safe; it was the usual practice to slacken speed on flat rail; no one was injured that remained in the car. Yarwood and Fay jumped off, and they were the only persons injured; the hind truck of the second class, and the forward truck of the first class were off the track. The train consisted of a locomotive, tender, baggage car, 2nd class car, and 1st class car.

John J Brewer—testified as follows:—Was on the train, on the forward platform of the first class car. He turned the brakes, and got off the train; the train went a little over half the length of a car before stopping, after he got off. He went over the road often, every day for some days. He passed over the road four times a day till accident happened. He was in employ of Michigan Central Rail Road at the time.

On cross-examination witness said he heard the whistle and took hold of the brake immediately; Wiggins took hold also. He (witness) jumped off; he ran half the length of a car after he jumped; part of the trucks only were off the track. He dont think there was any danger on the inside of the car—there is always more danger on the platform, than on the inside of the car. Passengers were not allowed to stand on the platform; could not say whether any printed rules to that effect on that train or not.

Frederick Swain—testified as follows:—Was on the train as brakeman; was on the hind end of the second class car; he turned the brake and jumped off, because he thought he was safer on the ground; he thought he was in danger on the train, therefore he jumped. Mr. Brewer and he jumped together. He (witness) was not hurt. Cars ran about the length of a car and a half after they left the track.

John Cox—testified as follows:—Was in the employ of the Company as track repairer.—His instructions were to keep the road in order; the road in question had not been examined after the preceding train had passed down; one freight train went over the road.

On cross examination, witness said—he had charge of the road; he went over the road twice a day; went over twice that day; he preceded the passenger train on a hand car; he passed the road to see that it was in order; it was a good road for a strap rail road; well graveled; it was as good as any road.

The plaintiff here admitted that it is impossible to make a strap rail road without having snake heads.

John Clark testified as follows:—

He was in the employ of the road as Superintendent of track repairs; Mr. Cox was under him. The instructions were that men should pass over as often as was necessary; as a general thing it was necessary after every train; the passage of every train has a tendency to make snake heads; dont know what care was taken on the day of the accident.

On cross examination, witness said, all due and proper care was taken of this road by the Company, to keep it in order; it was in good repair.

Doct. Thos. Kerr, testified as follows:—Found plaintiff at Elgin with a fracture of the left leg on the outside, and of the ankle on the inside; both broken; did't think the leg would be as good as before; he (plaintiff) was confined several weeks. Defendants admitted they are a rail road company, and were common carriers.



The plaintiff here rested his case, and the defendants introduced as witness, Gilman H Worrell—who testified as follows:

He knew the plaintiff; had conversation with him some six or eight weeks after he was injured; he (plaintiff) was at the office; said he “did’nt blame any one but himself for his injury, because he was such a damned fool as to jump off”; he said he “had passed through the train from the baggage car”; he blamed himself for his want of self-possession.

John Cox (recalled) testified as follows:

34 Had some talk with Yarwood soon after he was hurt; he (Yarwood) said he “did’nt care so much about the hurt as about how foolish he done it.” He (witness) had been over this part of the road the week before, and made a thorough overhauling of it by removing the injured rails; he did not think it necessary to go over this part of the road after each train; it is impossible to prevent snake heads; that was the best part of his road; it was in as good repair as it could be; it was a pine ribbon; this is better than oak; he passed over the road between eleven and twelve o’clock of the same day; the accident was about 4 o’clock P. M. There were no snake heads when he passed over it.

On cross examination, witness said, if there came a snake head after 12 o’clock he should not have known it.

John Drummond, testified as follows:—Was on the train as stage agent. He was in the baggage car from Elgin, until the accident; Yarwood, Fay, Jones and Baggage man Clark were there; these young men, Jones, Yarwood and Fay were scuffling when they first left Elgin; they continued until a short time before the accident; he saw them all go out; just before they left, they were pulling up their shirts; they were scuffling together on a sort of a good natured spree. He remained in the baggage car with the baggageman. Yarwood, Jones and Fay went out together; they went out fast; they seemed to be chasing one another; there was some extra motion in that car; not violent. He (witness) did not consider himself in any danger; that car was on the track all the time; the baggageman went to the brake; 35 Yarwood and the others left the baggage car, three or four minutes before the car ran off.

On cross examination, witness said—the scuffling was pulling out shirt tails; they seized hold of each others shirts; they walked out of the car rather quicker than usual.

Wm. H. Wiggins, being recalled, testified as follows: It was not safe for passengers to run about the cars, or stand on the platform. Mr. Yarwood had frequently passed over the road; those standing about the cars are most liable to be injured.

On cross examination, witness said—he did’nt remember that there were any printed rules; not in the habit of having rules in the baggage cars. Yarwood was on the platform when he (witness) told him the cars were off the track; he did’nt remember what directions he gave as to where Yarwood, Fay and Jones should go; endeavored to keep passengers off the platform.

36 The foregoing was all the evidence given in the cause. The Plaintiff then asked the court to instruct the jury as follows:

KANE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT.

LEWIS H. YARWOOD

vs.

THE GALENA & CHICAGO UNION RAIL ROAD CO.

} May Term, A. D. 1855.

And now comes the said Plaintiff by his counsel, and moves the court to instruct the Jury empannelled herein as follows:

1st. That if the Jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff was a passenger on board of the cars of the Defendants, in the month of August 1852, at the county of Kane; that the cars of the Defendants were thrown off the track of the road by reason of the unskillfulness or negligence of the Defendants or their agents, and that by means of such accident the Plaintiff was injured in his person, they will find a verdict for the Plaintiff, and assess his damages.

2. That if the Plaintiff was injured by means of an accident occurring on the rail road of the Defendants, while was a passenger on their cars; that the burden of proving that such accident was not the result of the negligence or unskillfulness of the defendants or their agents is cast upon the said defendants.

3. That in order to authorize the jury to find a verdict for the Plaintiff, it is not necessary for the jury to be satisfied that the Defendants were guilty of *gross* or even *ordinary neglect* in the reparation of their road, or management of their train: but if the Jury believe from the



evidence that SLIGHT NEGLECT of the Defendants or their agents, was the cause of the accident and injury of the Plaintiff, and assess his damages; provided the jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff was a passenger on board the cars of the Defendants, at the time of such accident and injury.

37 4. The carriers of passengers by rail road are bound to use all precautions, as far as human foresight will go, for the safety of their passengers; and are answerable to injured passengers for SLIGHT NEGLECT of themselves and agents, in the reparation of the track, and conduct and management of their trains, whereby injury ensues.

5. The omission of any precaution which would produce, or increase the safety of, or reduce the probability of danger to the passenger, constitutes such a neglect in carriers of passengers, as will make them answerable in damages to a passenger injured by means of such neglect.

6. That Rail Road Companies are answerable for injuries to a passenger resulting from a defect in their track, which might have been discovered by a most thorough and careful examination; and if the Jury believe from the evidence, that the injury complained of in this case, was occasioned by the neglect of the Company, or their agents, to examine the track prior to the passage of the train on which the accident occurred, they will find a verdict for the plaintiff, and assess his damages.

8. That if the Jury believe from the evidence that the accident and injury occurred by reason of the too rapid speed of the train; by reason of the neglect to apply the brake in time, or because of any other neglect or unskillfulness, management of the train, they will find a verdict for the plaintiff, and assess his damages.

38 9. That if the Jury believe from the evidence that the accident and injury complained of happened by reason of the neglect of the engineer in charge of the Locomotive attached to the defendants train, or to blow his whistle in time; or by reason of the neglect of the conductor to warn the engineer in time; or by reason of the neglect of the brakeman to apply the brakes in season, they will find a verdict for the plaintiff, and assess his damages.

10. That if the Jury believe from the evidence, that the accident and injury happened by reason of the bad order of the track, and want of due care and attention of the Company, or any of their agents, in the reparation of the track, or in the management and conduct of the train on which the Plaintiff was, they will find a verdict for the Plaintiff and assess his damages.

11. That the mere fact that the plaintiff jumped from the cars, while they were in motion, to the ground, and thus sustained the injury complained of, will not alone deprive him of his right to a recovery against the Defendants, if the Jury believe from the evidence that an accident had occurred; that the cars were off the track, and running at the rate of from 3 to 5 miles an hour; and the Plaintiff had reasonable ground to believe, and did believe, that his life or limb were in danger, and that it was necessary to leap from the cars in order to avoid the danger which threatened him, provided that the injury was not occasioned by the Plaintiff's own neglect, nor that his negligence contributed to produce the injury complained of.

39 11½. That although the Jury may believe that the Plaintiff would not have received injury, had he not leaped from the cars, and that as the event proved his jumping was an unwise act; that does not necessarily prevent the Plaintiff from recovering in this case. The question is not so much whether there was *in point of fact* any danger, as whether the Plaintiff reasonably apprehended danger, and so leaped from the cars; and in judging of his state of mind, the Jury should take into consideration whatever circumstances of alarm and confusion existed at the time, the Law not requiring the same coolness nor accuracy of judgment, in a person under a state of excitement and alarm, as under other circumstances.

12. That in determining the question whether the Plaintiff had reasonable ground to believe himself in danger, the Jury have the right to consider the experience and knowledge of the Plaintiff in regard to perils of this character, the commotion and consternation if among the passengers; and the fact, if it be so, that one of the brakemen abandoned his post and leaped from the cars.

40 13. That the mere fact that the Plaintiff was a few minutes previous to the occurrence of the accident and injury, scuffling and playing in a sportive manner with others on the cars, will not deprive the plaintiff of his right to recover from the defendant's, if the Jury believe from the evidence, that the Defendant's or their agents were guilty of any neglect, however



slight, whereby the accident and injury occurred; provided the injury was not occasioned by the Plaintiff's own neglect, nor that his negligence contributed to produce the injury complained of.

14. That in estimating the damages which the Plaintiff have sustained by reason of the injury complained of, the Jury if they find for the Plaintiff, are not confined to such damages as may have resulted to the Plaintiff by loss of time, and expense of medical attendance, but may give such additional damages for the loss of natural use, of the Plaintiff's limb, which the jury, exercising a sound discretion—and in view of all circumstances, may see proper to award, not excluding the amount claimed in the declaration.

15. That unless the Jury believe from the evidence, that the passenger cars were full, and that it was part of the contract, that the Plaintiff should occupy during the trip, the baggage car; the mere fact that the Plaintiff left that car and went into the first class passenger car, is not of itself such negligence in the Plaintiff as to defeat a recovery in this case.

41 16. That passengers upon Rail roads are not to be bound or effected by rules established by such roads in relation to the conduct of passengers, unless the proof shows that the passenger had a knowledge of such rules and regulations.

Which instructions were given by the Court, to the giving of which instructions on the part of the said Plaintiff, the Defendants by their counsel, at the time excepted.

Defendants then asked the Court to instruct the Jury as follows:—

1, A.—That if the Jury believe, from the evidence, that the injury to the Plaintiff in this suit, happened to him by mere accident without fault on the part of the defendants, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this action.

5, B.—If the Jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff while on his passage from Elgin to Clinton, was guilty of carelessness, and unnecessarily exposed himself to danger by wrestling and scuffling on the cars, or by imprudently passing from one car to another while in motion, and that said carelessness or imprudence contributed in any degree to produce the injury, then the plaintiff cannot recover.

42 6, C.—If the Jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff, while on defendants cars imprudently and carelessly exposed himself to danger, by wrestling, playing, running or jumping; and that the injury to him was in any way produced by such carelessness or imprudence, or that such carelessness and imprudence in any way contributed to produce the injury, then the plaintiff cannot recover, even though the Jury may believe that the defendants have been guilty of negligence.

7, D.—If the jury shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence while a passenger upon the defendants cars, and that his negligence concurred with the negligence of the Defendants in producing the injury, then the Plaintiff cannot recover.

43 10, E.—If the Jury shall believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff leaped from the cars of the Defendants under a rash and under apprehensions of danger, when in reality there was no danger, and that the injury to the Plaintiff was the result of such leaping, then the Plaintiff cannot recover.

12, F.—If the Jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff carelessly leaped from the cars of the Defendants, and that such careless manner of leaping contributed to produce the injury to the Plaintiff, then the Jury should find for the Defendant.

13, G.—If the Jury believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff leaped from the car of the Defendant while it was in motion, under a rash and undue apprehension of danger, when in reality there was not danger, and that the injury was caused by such leaping, they should find for the Defendants, although the Plaintiff might have really thought himself in danger, and leaped to the ground to save himself from harm; the question is whether under the circumstances his jumping was an act of rashness.

16, H.—If the Jury believe from the evidence that the injury to the Plaintiff was the result of the negligence or imprudence of both Plaintiff and Defendants, their verdict should be for the Defendants.

Which was done by the Court.

The Defendants then also asked the Court to instruct the Jury as follows, viz:—

2, I.—If the Jury shall believe from the evidence that the Defendants exercised due care, diligence and skill in the preservation and repairs of their track, and in managing and operating their road at the time of the accident, and that the accident could not have been prevented by the use of said care, diligence and skill, then the Plaintiff cannot recover in this action.

4, J.—That every traveler in a public                      which must meet the risks incident to the mode of travel he adopts, and if the Jury shall believe that the injury to the Plaintiff was the



result of an accident which could not be avoided by the exercise of due care and skill in the preparation and management of the means of conveyance on the part of the Defendants, then the Plaintiff cannot recover.

8, K.—That the Plaintiff, before he can recover in this action must not only show that the injury to him was the result of carelessness or negligence of the Defendants, but also that he himself was without fault in producing said injury.

9, L.—That in this action the Plaintiff cannot recover, unless the Jury shall believe that he exercised proper care and circumspection while on his passage from Elgin to Clinton, and that the Defendants were guilty of negligence, from which the injury was received, and the burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff to show not only that the defendants were negligent, but he himself was not guilty of negligence.

15, M.—Unless the Plaintiff has proved to the satisfaction of the Jury that the Defendants was guilty of negligence or misconduct, and also that Plaintiff used proper care and prudence, and that his own misconduct, want of care, or negligence, did not contribute to produce the injury complained of, the Jury should find for the Defendants.

1 Qualification to Defendants 8th, 9th, and 15th Instructions.

45 "But proof that the Plff. was a passenger, of the accident, and the injury make a *prima facie* case, of negligence, and throws the burthen of explaining upon the Defendant.

18, N.—The Jury are also instructed that it is their duty to regard and obey the Law as given them by the Court, *and that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in their decisions, is the highest Judicial authority of the law*—and the Jury are not at liberty to disregard or override it.

Which the court refused to give as asked, but gave with the following qualifications, viz:—by adding to the first of said instructions these words—"But due care required the use of the utmost prudence and caution; a carrier of passengers being liable for slight negligence;" and by adding to the second of said instructions these words—"But due care required the use of the utmost prudence and caution."

And by adding to the next three of said instructions these words—"Qualification to Defendants 8th 9th and 15th instructions—"But proof that the Plff was a passenger, of the accident, and the injury, make a *prima facie* case of negligence, and throws the burden of explaining upon the Defendant."

And the last of said instructions by striking out the following words therefrom, viz: "And that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in their decisions, is the highest Judicial authority of the land."

46 To which decision of the Court in refusing said instructions as asked, and each of them, and qualifying them and each of them as aforesaid, the defendants then and there excepted.

And the defendants then also asked the court to give the jury the following instructions—

14, O.—If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff leaped from the car of defendants under circumstances that would not have justified such an act on the part of a prudent careful man, and that the injury was the result of such jumping from the cars, then the plaintiff cannot recover, unless the jury believe that such injury was willfully caused by the defendant.

3, P.—That the defendants as a common carrier of passengers, is not an insurer of the personal safety of the passengers against all accidents, but is liable only for the want of such care and diligence as is characteristic of cautious persons. And if the defendants exercised such care and diligence in the transportation of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this action.

GALENA & CHICAGO RAIL ROAD COMPANY

*ads*  
YARWOOD.

} Instructions for Def'ts.

The court is asked to instruct the jury on the part of the said defendants,

47 Q.—That if they believe from the evidence that Yarwood and his companions when they took passage in the cars of defendant at Elgin, were told by the conductor that the passenger cars were full, but they could go in the baggage cars, and that thereupon they got into the baggage car to ride to Clinton, then it was the duty of Yarwood to remain and ride in that car.

R.—And if the jury further believe from the evidence that at the time of the accident and when the plaintiff jumped off the cars, the baggage car was not off the track, nor in any danger, but that the plaintiff with his companions had got into a play and scuffle, which brought on a racing through the other cars, and in one of which Yarwood was brought to that appre-



hension oimminent peril which induced him to leap from the cars, and thereby received the injury complained of, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and the jury should find for the defendants.

S.—And the jury are further instructed, that if they believe from the evidence, that Yarwood, the plaintiff, with his companions, at the time they took passage in defendants cars at Elgin, to ride to Clinton, were told by Capt. Wiggins, the conductor, to go in the baggage car, as the passenger cars were full, and that plaintiff, in pursuance thereof, went into said baggage car, then it was his duty to continue therein to the said Clinton.

48 T.—And if the jury further believe from the evidence, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff had left the baggage car, and gone into another car, and had thereby placed himself into a position of apprehension of imminent peril, which induced him to leap from the cars and thereby received the injury complained of, and that the baggage car was not off the track at all, or in any danger, such conduct of the plaintiff was culpable negligence, and the jury should find for the defendants.

W.—If the jury believe from the evidence that the standing upon the platform of cars, or the going about from car to car by a passenger whilst the cars are running, are acts of imprudence, and if they further believe that at the time the cars run off the track, the plaintiff was so standing or going about, and that such conduct of the plaintiff increased his apprehension oi peril, and he was thereby induced to leap from the cars when in motion, and in consequence of such leap received the injury; when had he remained in the cars, he would not have been injured, he is not entitled to recover in this action.

V.—If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff leaped from the cars of the defendant under circumstances that would not have justified such an act on the part of an ordinarily prudent careful man, and that the injury was the result of such leaping, th n the plaintiff cannot recover.

Qualifications asked by defendants to plaintiff's instruction Number 9.

49 W.—But unless the plaintiff has proved to the satisfaction of the jury that his own carelessness or negligence did not contribute or assist to produce the injury complained of, then the jury should find for the defendant, and the burden of such proof is upon the plaintiff.

X.—If the jury believe from the evidence, that at time the plaintiff took passage on the defendants cars at Elgin, he was directed by the conductor to take his place in the baggage car, because there was not room for him in the passenger cars, and that the plaintiff did go on board of the baggage car at the time of starting, and that whilst on the way from Elgin to Clinton he left said car without any reasonable cause, and that the injury to the plaintiff happened in consequence of his so leaving the car, then he is not entitled to recover in his action.

Which the court refused, and marked the same refused—to which decision of the court in refusing to give said last mentioned instructions, the defendants then and there excepted.— And the defendants then also asked the court to give the following instructions—

50 Y.—If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff with his companions at the time they took passage in defendants cars at Elgin, to ride to Clinton, were told by the conductor of the train, that the passenger car was full, or nearly full, and that, they could go in the baggage car, and that plaintiff in pursuance thereof went into said baggage car, then it was his duty to continue there, unless it was necessary to leave the same; and if the jury further believe from the evidence, that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff had unnecessarily left the baggage car and gone into another car, and was walking about or standing upon the platform of the hind car, and had thereby placed himself in a position of peril, or apprehension of great peril, while the baggage car was not off the track, or in danger, then such conduct was culpable negligence.

Z.—If the jury believe from the evidence that Yarwood was unnecessarily standing upon the platform of one of defendants cars at the time of accident then he was guilty of improper conduct and negligence in so doing.

&.—That it is the duty of every passenger to take his place in the car in which he takes passage, and to remain therein, unless it is necessary to leave the same for a reasonable refreshment, or some other necessary purpose.

Which the court marked "given" "consent," and when the court read the last mentioned instructions to the jury, he remarked to the jury, and in their presence, that he gave these by the consent of plaintiff—to which remark of the court as aforesaid, the defendants then and there excepted.

The jury thereupon retired, and afterwards came into court, and rendered the following verdict:

51 "We the jurors find the Defendants guilty, and assess the damages Twenty Five Hundred Dollars.

Foreman—JOHN VAN SICKLE."

Upon the rendition of said verdict, the defendants by their counsel moved the court for a new trial, which motion was overruled by the court, and a judgment rendered for the plaintiff on said Verdict, to which decision of the court in overruling the said defendants motion for a new trial, the said defendants by their counsel at the time excepted, and prays that this their Bill of Exceptions may be signed and sealed—which is done.

E. PECK & J. F. FARNSWORTH,  
Att'ys for Appellants.

ISAAC G. WILSON,  
Judge. (Seal)



Lewis H. Garwood  
Abstract

*Abstract*

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