

12360

No. _____

Supreme Court of Illinois

Monroe

vs.

McCoy

71641  7

~~51~~ 51
Eleanor Monroe
Elle van de M' boy

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12360.

1857

X

Entrance Monoa v Supreme Court Judgement 1886

vs

Stephens & Co. And now comes the said appellant by his attorney and says that in the record and proceedings aforesaid and in the execution of the judgment aforesaid there is manifest error wherefore the said court rendered judgment in favor of the said appellee and against the said appellant when by the law of the land the court should have rendered a judgment in favor of said appellant.

And the said court did in overruling the motion for a new trial.

Wherefore appellant prays that said judgment may be reversed and for nothing otherwise.

Ed A. Powell
atty for appellant

Anath Pack Appellee comes and says there is no error in the record pursuant to judgment & this he is ready to swear by the record.

By George M. W. Jr.

of or land or any other property of office or book
paper parchment for good & sufficient consideration
of sum and date contained in sum above was recd
or present hand on this day of one thousand eight
hundred and twenty four and received by the
person named herein and acknowledged before
me and affixed thereto my hand & seal this
day of April anno domini eighteen hundred
and twenty four at the office of the Clerk
of the Circuit Court of Peoria County Illinois
for a sum of one hundred dollars
to pay to the said Jacob Gale for his
services as Judge of the Circuit Court
offered and given according to a certain

Proceedings at a term of the Circuit Court
begun and held at the Court House at the City of Peoria
in and for the County of Peoria in the State of Illinois
on the second Monday of May in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty six
it being the twelfth day of said month
Present the Honorable Jacob Gale, Judge of the
sixteenth Judicial Circuit in the State of Illinois
David D. Irons Sheriff and James S. Bartman
Clerk to wit;

Wednesday May 12th A.D. 1856

Alexander M^c Coy

John Warren

v.

Objection,

Eleanor Morrow

This day came the plaintiffs, the said Alexander M^c Coy in person and the said John Warren by Groves M^c Coy his attorney and the said defendant Eleanor Morrow by Powell & Hopkins her attorney and by their agreement leave is given to the plaintiffs to file an Amended declaration herein on behalf of the said Alexander M^c Coy as of the November Term of this Court A. D. 1855 when the original declaration herein was filed which Amended declaration is substituted for the original declaration and the original declaration by agreement withdrawn, and thereupon the said Amended declaration having been filed by agreement of parties a trial by jury is waived and all matters both of law and fact arising in this cause are submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury, on an agreed statement of facts filed

in the case, and the court not being fully advised
in the premises took time to consider.

I do remember that afterwards to wit on the 1st day
of June A.D. 1856 there was filed in the office of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County of Peoria in the
State of Illinois ~~an agreed statement of facts~~^{bills of exceptions} in said cause a certain
cause wherein Alexander McCay is plaintiff and Eleanor
Morrow is defendant which said bills of exceptions are as
follows:

If Alexander McCay vs Eleanor Morrow - Be it remembered that this cause came on to be
tried upon the following agreed state of facts made and agreed upon between the parties and was
submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury.

Alexander McCay } Circuit Court, Peoria
at } County, May Term A.D. 1856.
Eleanor Morrow }

In Effectment.

This suit was brought by the Plaintiff to re-
cover the possession of the undivided half of
the South east quarter of Section Number twenty
(20) in Township number Eleven (11) North of
the Base line of Range number Seven (7) East
of the fourth Principal meridian in Peoria
County.

It is hereby agreed between the parties
to this suit, that the said Plaintiff claims
title to the undivided half of said land
under the following described chain of title
viz.

1. Patent from the United States to Allen Sturdevant dated December 15th 1817.

2. A deed from Allen Sturdevant to Ebenezer L. Warren dated August eleventh A.D. 1818, which deed was duly recorded in the ^{State} Recorder's office soon after its execution.

3. That said Ebenezer L. Warren departed this life on or about the 10th day of August A.D. 1830 in the county of Adams in the State of Illinois, that said Ebenezer L. Warren left as his sole heirs him surviving John Warren, and Ann W. Warren since intermarried with William Mc Vaughn they being his only children and heirs.

4. A deed from Ann W. Vaughn and William Mc Vaughn to Henry Warren bearing date May 1st A.D. 1849, conveying by quit claim "all the right title and interest which we have (the said Ann W. Vaughn & William Mc Vaughn) in any way in any lands that were formerly owned by said Ebenezer L. Warren or in what said Warren had any title or interest in the counties of Peoria, Warren, Knox, Fulton, Mercer, Adams, McDonough, Schuyler, Tipton, Calhoun and Putnam or in any other other lands in

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the Military Bounty tract in the State of Illinois" which deed was recorded in the Recorders office of Peoria county Illinois on the 29th day of March A.D. 1855.

5. That said Henry Warren by deed bearing date June 10th A.D. 1854, conveys to Alexander McCay the plaintiff in this suit all his right title and interest to the 10 gr. 20. 11 A. G. being the land in controversy which deed has never been recorded.

6. That the declaration in this cause was served on the defendant on the 23rd day of November A.D. 1855. and filed in Court December 11th 1855. at the November Term of the Peoria County Circuit Court A.D. 1855. And that defendant was in possession of the premises at the time the declaration was served.

It is further agreed between the parties to this suit that the defendant claims title to said tract of land as follows. to wit:

1. That said Cheneze L. Warren died intestate on or about the 10th day of August A.D. 1830 in the County of Adams State of Illinois

2. That letters of Administration on the estate of said Ebenezer Y. Warren deceased were duly granted to Willard Tyes by the Probate Judge of Adams County Illinois on the 28th day of October A.D. 1830.

3. That an inventory and appraisers Bill of the personal property and effects of the said Ebenezer Y. Warren deceased was duly made and filed in the Probate Court of Adams County aforesaid by said administrator in due time and according to law.

4. That a sale Bill of the personal property and effects of the said Ebenezer Y. Warren deceased was duly filed by the said Administrator in said Probate Court.

5. That a final settlement of the said estate was made by the said Administrator on the 5th day of December A.D. 1834 so far as the effects had been inventoried and claims had been filed and allowed against said estate.

6. That no inventory of any real estate owned by said Ebenezer Y. Warren at the time of his decease had been made and filed in the Court

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of Probate at any time prior to the final settlement of said Administrator as mentioned in Number five of this agreement as above stated.

7. That on the 29th day of August A.D. 1855 the said Willard Keeves administrator of said estate of Ebenezer G. Warren deceased filed in the County Court of Adams County Illinois an Inventory of the real estate belonging to the estate of said Ebenezer G. Warren deceased in which Inventory is the said South east quarter of Section number twenty (20) in Township number Eleven (11) North of the base line of Range number Seven (7) East of the fourth Principal meridian the land in controversy.

8. That at the August term of the County Court of Adams County Illinois A.D. 1855 there was a claim duly presented, filed, proved & allowed in said Court in favor of John Ware for the use of William C. Condy against the estate of Ebenezer G. Warren deceased for the sum of Eight thousand eight hundred and eighty eight dollars (\$888) And also at the same term of Court another claim was proved and allowed against said estate in favor of the Kennebeco Bank for the use of

William P. Goudy for the sum of Ten thousand one hundred and forty five dollars (\$10145) making in all the sum of Eighteen thousand nine hundred and eighty three dollars (\$18983)

9. That at a term of the County Court of Adams County Illinois held on Monday the 9th day of January A.D. 1856 pursuant to law the said Willard Keys administrator of said Ebenezer Y. Warren deceased presented his petition for authority to sell real estate of which the said Ebenezer Y. Warren died seized to pay the debts of said deceased which petition was against John Warren, Ann W. Vaughn and William W. Vaughn sole heirs at law of said Ebenezer Y. Warren deceased

10. That at the said January term of said County Court of Adams County Illinois held on the 9th day of said Month A.D. 1856 on the presentation of said petition and the said defendants and all other persons interested being duly notified according to law by publication in the Quincy Herald a newspaper published in the city of Quincy in the County of Adams and State of Illinois for three weeks successively

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Commencing at least six weeks before the presenting of said Petition of the intention of said Administrator of presenting the same to said Court for the sale of the whole or so much of the real estate of which said Ebenezer Y. Warren died seized as will be sufficient to pay the debts of said deceased and requesting all persons interested in the real estate of said deceased to show cause why the real estate should not be sold for the purpose of paying the debts of said deceased in pursuance of the Statute in such case made and provided, the said Court rendered a decree for the sale of the real estate of which said Ebenezer Y. Warren died seized and as mentioned and described in said Petition (in which Petition was mentioned and described the said South east quarter of Section number twenty (20) in Township number Eleven (11) North of the base line of Range number Seven (7) East of the fourth Principal Meridian being the land in controversy) or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the debts of said deceased

11. That said Willard Keyes Administrator as aforesaid in pursuance of said decree proceeded to sell the said tract of land having given the notice required by law

and at the place mentioned in said decree did on the 15th day of April A.D. 1856 at the door of the Court House in the city of Flora Illinois expose at public vendue the said S. D. Do. 111 S. R. Y. C. of the fourth principal meridian between the hours of Ten O'clock A.M. and two O'clock P.M. of said day in pursuance of the terms of said decree and struck off and sold said tract of land above described to Eleanor Morrows defendant in this suit for the sum of two hundred and ninety eight dollars the being the highest and best bidder therefor that said McCoy was present at the sale and gave notice to all bidders at the sale that he claimed title to the one half of said premises under conveyance and from said Vaughn and wife

12. That said Willard Keys administrator as aforesaid in pursuance of said sale so made by him on the — day of April A.D. 1856, did make, execute, acknowledge and deliver to the said Eleanor Morrows a deed for the aforescribed premises which deed recites at large the said decree so rendered as aforesaid.

It is hereby agreed between the parties to this suit that this cause shall be submitted to the Judge of the Circuit Court of Peoria County without the intervention of a jury upon the facts herein agreed upon without producing any ^{of the} papers, or records, or deeds mentioned in this agreement the same as if all such papers records and deeds were thrown, and that the Court shall decide said cause according to law.

It is further agreed that if either party shall be dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court in the premises, he or she may take an Appeal to the Supreme Court without giving bond, and that this agreement may be made a Rule of exceptions to be signed by the Judge.

Peoria May 14th 1856.

Browne & McCay for
A. McCay

Torrell & Hopkins

Atty's for Deft."

The court after hearing the arguments of counsel found the issues for the plaintiff to which finding of the court the defendant then and thereby her ~~counsel~~ Counsel excepted and moved the court for a new trial for the following reasons, First, the court found against law, Second, the court found against the evidence, which motion the court overruled and rendered judgment in favor of the said plaintiff and against the said defendant,

Proceedings at a term of the Circuit Court
begun and held at the Court house in the City of
Peoria, in and for the County of Peoria in the State
of Illinois, on the second Monday of May in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and fifty six, it being the twelfth day of said
Month, Present the Honorable Jacob Gale,
Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in the State
of Illinois, David D. Irons, Sheriff and James S.
Bartman, Clerk, Court.

Wednesday June 4th A.D. 1856.
Alexander McBoy
vs
Eleanor Morrow.

This day came again the parties
to this cause by their respective attorneys and the court
having heard arguments of counsel and being fully
advised in the premises does find that the defendant
is guilty of unlawfully withholding from the possession
of the said Alexander McBoy the premises in the amended
declaration mentioned that the said Alexander McBoy
has a title thereto in fee simple and does assess his
damages by reason of the premises at one cent.

Whereupon the defendant entered a motion for a new
trial in this cause which motion was overruled by the
Court, Therefore it is considered by the court

that the said Alexander McCloy have and recover of the said Eleanor Morrow possession of the premises in the amended declaration mentioned, to wit: the undivided half of the South East quarter of section number Twenty (20) Township number Eleven (11) North of the base line of Range number Seven (7) East of the fourth principal Meridian in Peoria County and that a writ of possession issue therefor, that he have and recover of defendant one cent his damages aforesaid and also his costs and charges in this behalf expended and that execution issue therefor.

The defendant prayed an appeal from this judgment to the Supreme Court of the State which is allowed ^{her} without filing an appeal bond according to the agreement or stipulation of the parties on file.

To which opinion of the Court in overruling said motion for a new trial and rendering judgment for the plaintiff the said defendant then and there by her counsel excepted and prayed that this bill of exceptions might be allowed which is accordingly done,

Jacob Gale, Seal

State of Illinois,
County of Peoria, I, James S. Battman, Clerk of the circuit Court in and for the County of Peoria in the State of Illinois do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the records of the proceedings in a wherein judgment was rendered on behalf of Alexander McCloy, plaintiff and Eleanor Morrow was defendant as the same appears of record and on file in my office. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at my office at Peoria this 10th day of June A.D. 1856.

James S. Battman, Clerk

Eleanor Monroe, Supreme Court June Term 1856

by { And now comes the said
Alexander H. Day, appellant by & At P. W. Lee
attorney and says that in the record and
proceedings aforesaid and in the reading of
the judgment aforesaid there is manifest error
because said judgment was rendered in favor
of said appellant against said appellee
when by law it should have been.

Recd 5/1
Eleanor Monroe Appellee
Court of Appeals

Filed June 13 1856
A. Leland
Clerk

Alexander H. Cog & al. Arguers.
vs. Powell & Hopkins
Eleanor Morrow for Defendants.

This case shows that Ebenezer Warren
^{intestate} died, on the 10th day of August AD 1830 at
Adams County in the State of Illinois having an
interest in the South East quarter of Section Twenty
in Township Eleven North of the base line of Range
Seven East of the Fourth Principal Meridian, being in
the County of Peoria State of Illinois.

That on the 28th day of October AD 1830
administration upon the estate of said Warren
deceased was duly granted to, and entered upon
by Willard A. Keyes of said Adams County.

That said Administrator filed in said Adams
County Court an Inventory and Appraisement Bill
and also a Sale Bill, all according to law.

That said Administrator made a final
settlement of said estate with said Court on the
5th day of December AD 1837.

That said tract of land in controversy was
not mentioned or contained in said Inventory,
Appraisement Bill or Sale Bill.

That at the August Term of the Adams
County Court AD 1835, a claim not before pre-
sented or allowed, was presented to said Court against
said estate in favor of John Ware per use of Wm. Goudy.

for the sum of \$8838.00 and a claim against
said Estate in favor of the Kennebec Bank for the
use of W^m Goudy for the sum of \$10145.00
both of which claims were allowed by said Court
and that the said interest of the said Warren in
said tract of land was disallowed to said Adminis-
trator, and

That thereupon on the 29th day of August
AD 1853 said Administrator filed in the said
County Court of Adams County an Inventory of
said newly discovered effects of the said Warren,
to wit, said tract of land in controversy among
many others, which had not been previously
inventoried or administered upon.

That at a term of the said Adams County
Court held on the 7th day of January AD
1856 the said Administrator presented a petition to
said Court, against John Warner, Ann Maughn
and William Vaughn only heirs of said E Warner
deceased, to sell said newly discovered interest of said
Warren in said real estate for the purpose of paying
the claims of & against said estate aforesaid.

That notice of the presentation of said petition
was published according to law in the Sunbury
Herald requiring all persons interested in said
estate to appear and show cause why said pe-
tition should not be granted.

That on said 7th day of January AD 1856

said County Court of Adams County ordered and
decreed that said Administrator sell said real estate
mentioned in said petition or so much thereof as
was necessary to pay said claims against
said estate.

That said Administrator gave notice of
said sale as required by law and pursuant
to said order of said Adams County Court and
did on the 16th day of April A.D. 1856 at the
door of the Court House in the County of Peoria
between the hours of 10 o'clock AM and 3 o'clock
PM sell the said tract of land to the Defendants
the being the highest & best bidder therefor.

That on the 16th day of April A.D. 1856
said Willard A. Keys Administrator as aforesaid
executed & delivered to Defendant a deed in due form
of law conveying to her the interest of said intestate
in said property tract of land.

But that in the
mean time, to wit, on the 1st day of May A.D.
1849 Ann W Vaughn and Mr Vaughn, heirs of
the said Warner deceased conveyed one undivided
half of said tract of land to Henry Warren, and
that said Henry Warren conveyed the same
to the Plaintiff on the 10th day of June A.D. 1854.

We maintain that the land in question was charged
able with the debts of the deceased and that the

~~title thereto passed to the defereants by the Administrators deed, and that the heirs could carry no title except such as might remain after the debts against the deceased were paid~~

1 The case shows that there were debts against the estate remaining unpaid after the personal estate had been exhausted. In such case the 103rd section of the Statute of Wills provides that the administrator shall proceed in manner therein directed out to have the lands of the intestate sold to pay such debts. And the case of

Gore vs Brazier 3rd May 523. Brewster vs Brewster 4th May 354. Vansycle vs Richardson 13 Ills. 17th decide that lands are still liable to be sold to pay debts of intestate although they may have been aliened by the heir.

And the case of Vansycle vs Richardson and cases there cited decide that under our Statute a lien in favor of the creditors is reserved upon all lands of the intestate for payment of debts, and that the heir cannot alienate or encumber the lands to the prejudice of creditors.

2 Has lapse of time operated to render ineffective the conveyance of the administrator to the defereants? We contend not.

Claims may be allowed after the expiration of 2 years, ~~limited by Statute~~ for presentation, to be paid pro rata out of effects not before in-

vented or accounted for

Thorn vs Norton 3 Gil. 26. People vs White
11 Ills. 341. Judd vs Kelly Id 211. Rowen
vs Kirkpatrick 14 Ills.

2 No limitation was pleaded to
bar the claim allowed against the estate
An Administrator is not bound to take
advantage of Statutory limitation in favor of estate.
Williams on Executors page 1535

Although he might take advantage of Special
limitation of 4 years in Massachusetts yet he
is not bound to do so of the general Statute limitation
Brown vs Grinderson 13 Mass 201

Thompson vs Brown 16 Do 172

Emerson vs Thompson 16 D 429

Keene vs Wells 5 Pick 140

For ought that appears in the case a new
promise on the part of the Administrator
may have existed which would have defeated
the Statutory bar of pleading

Williams on Executors page 1658

Head vs Manning 5 J.J. Marshall 255

Chapman vs Dixon 4 Star & J.

But we claim that the correctness
of the allowance of these claims cannot in this
suit be inquired into. It must have been
done ^{ess} at all before the County Court allowing the
claims or on an appeal taken from that court

3 There is no limitation of twenty years barring the intestate interest in the premises prior to the sale by the Administrator or the creditors claim thereon, because, although twenty years had elapsed since administration was taken out, yet there had been no adverse possession in any other person.

In order to constitute a bar by lapse of twenty years there must ~~have~~ been some one in adverse possession in whom favor the limitation runs. The case shows no such fact.

4 But although there is no actual bar by limitation, yet a material consideration in this case is whether the creditors were guilty of any catches by which they lost their claim upon the real estate of Warren upon deficit of personal estate sufficient to pay their claims.

We think it very clear that they were not.

Section 81 of the Statute of Wills requires Administrators, within three months from the date of letters of administration, to file with the court an inventory of all real and personal estate coming to their possession or knowledge.

This inventory was duly filed by said Willard A. Keyes but did not contain said tract of land in controversy. Consequently said Warren deceased was not then known to have had any interest in said tract of land.

The 115th section of the Statute of Wills requires claims to be presented within 2 years of the granting of letters of administration. These claims were not presented within that time & consequently not to participate in the assets of property previously inventoried.

But the same section provides that claims not presented within that time limited may be paid out of assets or property not previously inventoried or accounted for.

How long thereafter administration granted may newly discovered effects be inventoried and used to discharge debts against the estate.

We say very clearly at ^{it may be done} any time so long as there are outstanding claims against the estate and whenever new undiscovered effects come to the knowledge of the Administrator.

The Courts in the case of *Thorn against Hutton* 5th of Gil 29 in giving construction to this section use this language "It does not prevent the bringing an action at any distance of time provided the creditor can find property not previously inventoried or accounted for by the Administrator." and again in the same case that upon a claim allowed after the expiration of two years the creditor may have further proceedings "in case he should ever afterwards be able to find other estate not inventoried or accounted for".

In the case of *Stevens v Pool* 15 Ills 47 it is decided that where an administrator does not inventory ^{real estate} till after the expiration of the two years limited by Statute that it is liable for debts not presented within the two years. It is intimated that in *Verry v. Rich-ardson* # 13 Ill 171 that the creditor may lose his lien upon the real estate of the in-estate by profligacy or unreasonable delay. But in this case the creditors are guilty of no laches or delay in enforcing their lien against the land but did so at the earliest possible mo-ment to be sure the claims might have been presented and allowed sooner, and the cred-itors took the risk that the administrator might plead Statute limitation against them in not doing so, but they pursued the lien against the land uninterrupted with the least laches or delay.

Section 89 of the Statute of Wills requires adminis-trators to file additional Inventories of effects, title to personal and real property of all kinds as the same shall come to their knowledge. In pursuance of this section said Administrator Keyes filed in said Adams county court and In-ventory certifying the tract of land in question, ~~on the 29th day of August 1853~~ which was not before scheduled or inventoried consequently up to this time no knowledge ex-

isted on the part of the Administrator that his ~~estate~~ had any interest in the land in dispute.

On the seventh day of the following January the application was made for an order of Court to sell this land to pay the said debts. Could they have well pursued their claim sooner? What would have constituted laches on the part of the creditors in this matter? Why very clearly we think they must have been guilty of unreasonable delay after they had found all other estate of the ~~instate~~ univer-
tored and unaccounted for. The case fails to show any such fact, but on the contrary it appears that they pursued the land as soon as it was discovered and inventoried. The statute requires the same lien, for the payment of debts not presented within the two years, upon the property not previously inventoried or accounted for, that it does, ~~in fact~~ for the payment of claims presented within that time upon property inventoried ~~after~~ within that time. And the time which expires between the expiration of the two years and the discovery, by the creditor where claim has not been previously allowed, of estate not previously inventoried or accounted for is just as much within the period limited by statute for enforcing that class of claims as the period of two years is for enforcing the claims allowed within that time. And it would be singular indeed if the cred-
itor acting within the time prescribed by Statute should be guilty of ~~a~~ ^{any} "gross laches" and unreasonable delay!"

In fact he must be guilty of unreasonable delay after discovering the facts mentioned in the Statute before he can be chargeable with laches at all.

The case of Vernayle vs Richardson 13 Mass., was an action brought ten years after the death of the intestate and the land had been aliened by the heir. That was a proceeding in chancery to enforce the creditor's claim and of course process upon the fact that the applicant had knowledge of the intestate's interest in the land from the first, yet that case enforces a claim after ^{ten years} the creditor ~~had~~ knew it or ought.

But in this case the claim is enforced immediately upon its discovery.

We insist that there is no laches, and that it is the obvious intent of the Statute that the creditor should have his remedy against estate not previously inventoried or accounted for provided he should enforce it within a reasonable time after discovering the estate.

We apprehend that the case of Thompson vs Brown 16 Mass 172. Scott vs Hancock 13 Mass 162. Brown vs Anderson 13 Mass. 201 & Allen Petitioner 15 Mass 58 are relied upon to show the defendant's title affected with laches.

But these will be found to be all cases giving construction to the peculiar Statute of Mass. Chancery making no provision for the payment of claims not presented within the time limited by Statute out of estate not inventoried.

also

and containing a limitation of four years
forever barring all claims not presented
within that time, unless suit is previously
brought or disabilities exist on the part of
the creditor, and which limitation the
administrator is obliged to take advantage
of (though not of the general statute of limitation.)
And it will be seen that the law in controversy
in all the cases referred to had, unlike that in
the present case, been previously invented
by the administrator.

In addition, there are cases where either the
administrator had been guilty of great
delay in not executing the license to sell
for many years after it had been granted,
or where the administrator had sold land
without the authority of a license, it
having been previously acted upon and
exhausted or having been granted con-
trary to the said statute after the lapse of
four years. But those cases, as we under-
stand them, form no authority, or analogy,
to the present, the court not acting reg-
ularly within its jurisdiction, or the ad-
ministrator not acting regularly under
the authority of the court.

41 But we maintain, in ad-
dition to the above, that the question of
batches in the ~~of~~ creditors as well as all
~~proceedings~~ ^{of} the County Court of Adams County
and those acting under its authority
is not open to investigation in this pro-
ceeding.

The 103 section of the Statute of Wills requires

that administrators before presenting a petition for license to sell real estate shall publish notice &c six weeks successively in the nearest newspaper of their intention to do so requesting all persons interested to show cause why the land should not be sold. The case shows that this publication was made as the Statute requires. In some instances, as under some of the Massachusetts acts, actual notice by the administrator must be given to all persons interested. But such is not the case in this state. The case of *Bolles vs Roche* 3rd Gilman 409 decides that notice advertised according to the Statute is notice to every one interested, and any one having an interest may appear & defend the application.

The Plaintiff might & ought to have resisted the application for license to sell before the Adams County Court, and if dissatisfied with the order of said court, taken an appeal therefrom but those proceedings cannot be inquired into or revised collaterally in this court. If the County Court of Adams County had jurisdiction of the matter in which it acted, and the defendant's title is a question clearly under its authority, whether that court exercised its powers prudently or imprudently, whether it erred or otherwise in granting said license, will not be collaterally examined in this proceeding.

Buckmaster vs Berlin 3rd Gil 104 and such is the doctrine of Kinningshuer 13 Ills 432.

In a proceeding between the claimants under the Administrator and a claimant under the heir of one intestate, the Court cannot go back and examine into the correctness of granting the license to sell the land in controversy.

Purvis vs Fairfield 11 Mass 227

Bearwell vs Harris 7 Mass 292

The only questions which the Court can inquire into in this case, are whether the Adams County Courts had jurisdiction of the subject matter in which they acted; whether the Plaintiff had actual or constructive notice of the pending of said petition, and whether the Defendant's title is regularly derived under the license. All of which the case shows affirmatively.

Powell & Hopkins

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Alexander McCoy
vs.
Eleanor Morrow

McCoy & Eleanor Morrow
Argument
Argument

Filed May 4, 1857
S. Leland
Clerk

515

H. B. Hopkins.

ALEXANDER McCOY,

vs.

ELANOR MORROW.

} In the Supreme Court: ~~Ejectment~~.

The Record in the case shows that both parties claim title to S. E. ^uqr. 20, 11 N, 7 E. from Ebenezer T. Warren. That they admit the title to be in said Warren at the time of his death.

That said Warren died 10th of August, A. D., 1830: and letters of administration were granted to Willard Keyes on the 28th day of August, 1830, by the county court of Adams county, in this state.

That the Plaintiff below bought his title from Henry Warren, the grantee of Anne W. Vaughn and William M. Vaughn, one of the heirs of said Warren, on the 10th day of June, A. D., 1854. Twenty-three years and ten months after the decease of said Warren, and more than twenty-three years after letters of Administration were granted on his estate, and without any notice whatever of any outstanding indebtedness against said estate.

The Record also shows that the claim, under which defendant below derives her title, was not filed against said estate until the August term of the Adams County Court, A. D., 1855, more than one year after plaintiff had purchased from Henry Warren, the grantee of one of the heirs, and more than six years after said heir had sold to Henry Warren, and after the deed from said heir had been recorded.

1. The plaintiff below claims that whatever lien the statute may reserve on the lands of an intestate, to secure payment of debts against his estate, in this case is lost, by the unreasonable delay of the creditors in filing their claims. See Vansyckle et al., vs. Richardson et al., 13th Ill.; page 173. Ricard vs. Williams, 5th volume condensed reports, S. Court U. S., page 246. Sumner vs. Childs, 2 Conn. Rep. 607.

2. If the lien is not perpetual on the land it ought certainly, at least, be barred after the same lapse of time that real estate actions are barred, and that in this case 25 years having elapsed after the letters of Administration were taken out, before the creditors presented their claims, they were certainly barred, and had lost whatever lien they might have had upon the land.

3. Although the claim was allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction, and decree obtained under said allowance to sell the land from same court, yet the lien being lost by the laches and delay of the creditors, any power to sell thus derived under the law, and not from the act of the party, is void, and would not revive the lien, and therefore cannot take any title whatever. See Ricard vs. Williams, vol. 5 condensed reports, U. S. 246.

GROVE & McCOY.

3 ✓

McCoy vs. Morrison

MAXWELL, L. C. — *The Great Comets*, 1887.

Y 7/11/02 exp. # 8 et altri molti valori di ed es. di lucchetto
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e l'individuo lo avete ben : 0381-01-A-
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tutto il possibile per loro e io ho fatto

^uHeld Apr 29, 1857

S. Seland

Ober S.

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about Ed. and not to give him 1000 and college ab-
out 1000 or 1000.7 or 2. and the 1000
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and will be engaged in it for some time
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you and yourself and your wife
and others have established themselves
and added acid with some money and
and out there living and have done some
and I am not sure if I can do more but
I am not sure if I can do more but

Eleanor Monroe appellant
vs
Alexander McCay appellant

Suspence Court

Abstract of the case

This was an action of Ejectment brought by Alexander McCay vs Eleanor Monroe to recover the possession of the undivided half of the S.E. 2d T 11 R 7 E of the 11th principal meridian.

The case was submitted to the court without a jury upon an agreed State of facts.

It was agreed that the plaintiff before deduced a regular chain of title to the undivided half of said tract of land through three conveyances from the Rev. Ebenezer Warren. That said Warren died in August 1830 leaving as his only heirs John Warren & Ann W Vaughn. That Ann W Vaughn and William Vaughn her husband by deed bearing date May 1st 1849 conveys her interest in said land to Henry Warren and the said Henry Warren by deed bearing date June 10th 1851 conveys the undivided half of said tract to said McCay.

It was agreed on the trial that the appellant claimed title as follows viz

Ebenezer Warren died seized of said tract of land in August

5 Ad 1830 That letters of administration was granted on his estate to Welland Shegs by the Probate Court of Adams County Illinois in October 1830. That an inventory and appraisement bill of the personal estate of said deceased was duly made and filed in the Probate Court of said County by the said Administrator in due time and according to law. That a Sale Bill was also duly filed as required by law.

6 That a final settlement of said estate was made by the administrator on the 5th of December 1837 so far as the effects had been inventoried and claims had been filed and allowed against said estate.

6 That no inventory of any real estate of which said Warren died seized had been filed in the Probate Court prior to the final settlement as aforesaid.

7 That on the 29th day of August 1855 the said Administrator filed in the County Court of Adams County an inventory of real estate of which said Warren died seized amongst which is the aforesaid land

7 That at the August term of said County Court 1855 claims against said estate were duly presented filed and allowed amounting to over \$18000

8 That at the January term

of the County Court of Adams County 1856
The said administrator presented a petition
for an order to sell said land amongst
other lands. Due notice of the application
for such order was given by publication
as required by law. That the order for sale
was made at said term

9

That the administrator by
virtue of said order off sale on the 16th
day of April 1856 in due form of law
sold said land to Eleanor Monroe the
appellant and duly deedrd the whole of
said tract to her.

The court below on the facts
contained in the agreement which facts
are fully set out in the bill of exceptions
found the issue for the plaintiff to which
finding of the court the appellant excepted
and moved the court for a new trial
for the following reasons viz

- 1st The court found against law
- 2 The court found against evidence
which motion was overruled and judgment
reversed in favor of the plaintiff
below to which opinion of the court re-
garding said motion and reversing
the judgment aforesaid the appellant excepted
and now appears for error
- 1 General error
- 2 In overruling motion for new trial

E A Powell
att^r for appellant

Eleanor Monroe
by
Alex McCoy

Abstract

Filed June 18, 1856
L. Leland
Clerk