

No.

8669

Supreme Court of Illinois

Branson & Romelia J. York,
Admrs.

vs.

John Davis, Admr.

71641  7

At a Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, began
and held at Mount Vernon, within and for the first
Grand Division of said State, On Tuesday the twenty-
eighth day of November, in the year of Our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and Sixty five, to wit:
on Monday the thirteenth day of November in the
year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and Sixty-five:

Present the Hon T. R. Walker chief Justice
" Sidney Breese associate "
" C. B. Lawrence " "

" Branson York and Romelia }
" York. Admr. Adams of Ely }
" York. deceased. Appellants }
" vs } Appeal from Hamilton
" John Davis. Admr. of Basheba }
" York deceased. Appellee }
" On this day came again the said parties and the
Court having diligently examined and inspected, as
well the record and proceedings aforesaid as the
matters and things therein assigned for error, and being
now sufficiently advised of and concerning the pur-
pose, are of opinion, that in the record and proceed-
ings aforesaid and in the rendition of the judg-
ment aforesaid, there is manifest error; Therefore
it is considered by the Court, that for that error,
and others in the record and proceedings afore-

" Said, the judgment of the Circuit Court in this behalf
" rendered, be reversed, annulled, set aside, and wholly
" for nothing esteemed, and that this cause be remanded
" to the Circuit Court for such other and further pro-
" ceedings as to law and justice shall appertain. The
" whole with the costs against the said Appellee"

Opinion by

Bruce Jr.

" On the fifteenth of August 1804, the Appellee, John
" Davis, as Administrator of Baabuba York, de-
" ceased, filed in the County Court of Hamilton County,
" a claim against the estate of Eli York, on whose estate,
" Appellants are administrators, for the value of specific
" articles of property allowed by the ~~statute~~, to the widows
" of persons dying in this State intestate.

" The County Court disallowed the claim, and
" rendered a judgment against the appellee for the costs.
" An appeal to the Circuit Court of Hamilton County,
" the case was tried by the Court without a jury,
" and a verdict found for him, as such administrator,
" for two hundred and forty-six dollars, being the as-
" certained value of the specific articles of property thus
" allowed to widows of intestates, and for which, the
" Circuit Court entered judgment.

" From this judgment, the Appellants have taken
" this Appeal to this Court, assigning this finding
" of the Circuit Court as error.

" The facts appear to be, that Eli York died,

" in this State on the 23^d of June 1863 intestate, leaving
" Barakba his wife surviving who on the 3^d day of July
" 1863, ~~and~~^{and} before administration was granted on her hus-
" bands estate also died and in this State. There were no
" children between them, nor had Barakba any family
" living with his or children under the age of twenty-one.
" Letters of Administration on Eli R. Morris's estate, were
" granted to the appelleants on the 11th day of July 1863,
" by the County Court of Hamilton County, and on the
" estate of his widow Barakba, on the eleventh day of
" July 1864 to the appellee, John Davis, and by the same
" court.

" On these facts, the question arises, is the estate
" of Eli Morris liable for this claim?

" The provisions of the statute on which the claim is
" founded, are as follows: Widows living in this state,
" of persons whose estates are administered upon in this
" state, shall be allowed in all cases, in exclusion of cred-
" itors, as their sole and exclusive property forever; nec-
" essary beds, bedsteads and bedding for themselves and
" families, necessary household and kitchen furniture,
" one spinning wheel, one loom and its appendages, one
" pair of Cards, one stove and the necessary pipe therefor,
" the weaving apparel of themselves and families, one
" milch cow and calf for every four persons in the fam-
" ily, one house of the value of forty dollars, one woman's
" saddle and bridle of the value of fifteen dollars,
" provisions for themselves and families for one year,

" two sheep for each member of the family and the
" pieces taken from the same, food for the stock above
" described for six months, fuel for themselves and
" families for three months, and forty dollars worth
" of other property. Scotts Comp. 1203.

" By section three, the appraisers are required
" to make out and certify to the Court of Probate,
" an estimate of the value of each article of specific
" property, allowed to the widow. Ibid.

" By section 4. if the widow desires to take other prop-
erty in lieu of ~~this~~ ^{specified} she shall take it at the valuation
" fixed by the appraisers, and by section 2. of the act
" of 1845 Appr. R. S. 597. where the intestate leaves
" no property of the description mentioned, the widow
" is entitled to retain other property of equal value,
" or the value of the same in money, and it is made
" the duty of the administrator or judge of probate
" to allow the value of the articles specified ^{personal} with money
" or other property. Scotts Comp. 1202.

" The Appellants insist, that as the statute requires
" the appraisers to set apart these specific articles to the
" widow, and, as there was no widow at the time Letters of
" administration were granted on the estate of Eli York,
" and no appraisers, a compliance with the statute was
" impossible, and they deny, that the administrators or
" the appraisers of, ~~that estate~~, had any right to
" set apart the specified articles to the administrator
" of the widow.

" The Statute does not so require, it requires only, that
" the appraisers shall make out and certify to the Court of
" Probate an estimate of the value of each article of
" specific property, in order, as we understand, that the
" administrator may not include them as assets and may
" have credit for their value, on the Settlement of his
" administration, with the Court.

" Appellants insist if, the administrator of the widow
" had no right to appear and demand to have the spe-
" cific articles set apart to him, there is no foundation
" for this claim, they contending, that the widow, on the
" death of her husband, had a mere naked right to the
" specific articles, the legal title to which, rested in the
" personal representatives of the husband, her right not
" reverting into a title, until the articles are set apart to her.

" It is difficult to perceive, by what process of reason-
" ing, Appellants have reached this conclusion, with the
" Statute before them. The language of the act, is em-
" phatic, and declares in the most express terms, that
" the specific articles, in exclusion of creditors, shall
" be the sole and exclusive property of the widow forever.
" From this language, it seems very clear, that the
" widow has something more than a mere naked
" right, and that the legal title to the specific articles
" passed, not to the representatives of the husband, but
" immediately on his death, to her. Her title does not
" depend upon the actions of the appraisers, nor for a
" dereliction of duty on their part could she be made

" to suffice. Her title is absolute and being so, must,
" at her death vest in her legal representatives. They
" are not assets in the hands of the administrator
" of the husband, else, why should the appraisers be
" required to certify their value to the court? If they
" were assets, the court could have no concern with them,

" The only reason, we can imagine, for this certificate
" of the appraisers, is, to exclude them from the assets
" of the estate, so that the administrator may not
" be chargeable with them as assets.

" If then, they are not assets, and are the exclusive
" property of the widow forever, it is not difficult
" to determine, to whom they go, on the death of the
" widow. To no one else, but to her personal representa-
" tives, and on their demand, the administrator of the
" husband, is required to set them off to them. If he
" fails to do so, it would be evidence of a conversion,
" and the administrator would be responsible for their
" value, if such articles or their value, belonged to
" the estate of the husband.

" On these points we are not without the authority
" of adjudged cases. In Hastings vs Myers 21 Missouri
" 519, the Supreme Court of Missouri held, under a Gen-
" eral Statute of that State, that on the death of the
" widow the specific articles did not revert to the estate
" of the husband, but went to the personal repre-
" sentatives of the widow. And it was further held,
" in that case, if the administrator of the husband,

" failed to set apart, this Statutory allowance to the widow,
" the Court of probate had power to compel him to
" pay the value in money. To the same effect is the case
" of *Kellogg vs Graves* 5 Indiana 509, and *Sheldon vs*
" *Bliss* 4 Sheldon (N.Y.) 34. The fact that no admin-
" istration on the estate of Eli York had been granted,
" before the death of his widow is immaterial. In the
" case of *Gross vs Leary and wife* 25 Ill 562, this Court
" held, that a widow whose husband died intestate, lea-
" ving no child or descendants, might recover in assump-
" tion, for the property of her deceased husband, although
" letters of administration had not been issued on the
" estate. The law cast the property upon her and admin-
" istration was unnecessary. The law vested this property
" in the widow and on her death, like any other property
" to which she was entitled, passed to her legal representa-
" tive and they can sue for it, and recover its value.

" The Appellants liken this case to a claim of dower
" in a deceased husband's real estate. There is a great
" difference between them. The right of dower is inchoate
" and resting in action, whilst this right to the specific
" articles is absolute and exclusive, depending upon
" no contingency - it is hers in the emphatic language
" of the Statute "forever." We think then, that immediately
" on the death of the husband, the right of the widow
" accrues and she having died before she received
" the specific articles and they not having been set
" apart to the administrator, their value must be

accounted for to him as assets of his estate.

The right of the widow being established, it is unfortunate for the representatives in this case, that the record does not show that the estate of Eli York was possessed of these specific articles at his death, or their value in other property or money. It is not shown that he died possessed of any property whatever. In the absence of this proof, the finding of the court be low was not justified. If there was evidence proving that fact, it is not to be found in this record and for that reason, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. On another trial, the proof can be made, if the absent fact exists!

State of Illinois, S.S.

Supreme Court of said State.

First Grand Division.

I, Noah Johnston, Clerk of said Supreme Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the final order and of the opinion of the said Supreme Court, in the above entitled cause, of record in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court, of Illinois, at Mount Vernon, this twenty seventh day of April - A.D. 1866.

Noah Johnston Cll

B & R York.

Adm - \$6 -

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John Davis.

adms \$6 -

1866

Cost bill for which
I am her receipt of 26-35

J. D. Davis

State of Illinois^D Hamilton Circuit Court
Hamilton County B October Term 1864

Please hold in the Circuit Court of Hamilton County Illinois at the October Term thereof A.D 1864 before the honorable Silas L Bryan at the time presiding in said court and holding said term by invitation of Hon S S Marshall judge of the 12th judicial circuit. Present Honorable Silas L Bryan judge.

John Davis admr' of
the estate of Basherba York Appeal p
vs probable
Branson York & Romelia^{admitting} County
York, of estate of Ely York deceased Court
from County Court

Appeal Bond filed in Circuit Court on the
20th day of Sept 1864 which is in the words
and figures following to wit

Pg 2

lawful money of the United States the payment of which well and truly to be made we bind ourselves our heirs and administrators jointly severally and firmly by these presents. Witness our hands and seals this 20th day of September 1864

The condition of the above obligation is such, that whereas, the said Brauron & Bonelia J York, did on the 20th day of September AD 1864 before the County Court for the County of Hamilton recover a judgment against the above bounden John Davis alias of Bushboro York for the sum of Five Dollars and ten Cents from which said judgment the said John Davis has taken an appeal to the Circuit Court of the County of Hamilton aforesaid, and State of Illinois. Now if the said John Davis shall prosecute his appeal with effect, and shall pay whatever judgment may be rendered by the court upon dismissal or trial of said appeal, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.

Approved by me at my office John Davis Seal
in McLeanboro this 20 day of Wilson Rankin Seal
of September 1864 signed H M Sneed Seal
James Lane of W [L S]

which said bond is endorsed as follows:

Filed 29th Sept 1864

J W Marshall Clerk

Filed September 20th A.D. 1864

G. W. Burton - C.M.

Transcript of proceedings in county court
filed in circuit court on the 10th day
of October 1864, which transcript is in
the words and figures following to wit:

Hamilton County County (Probate) Court
July Term 1864

John Davis Administrator of
the estate of Barbara York deceased
vs. Demand \$1000

Branson York & Rowley of York
Administrator of the estate of Sir York see }
Continued by consent until next term

August Term 1864
parties appeared & cause continued until
next term

September term 1864 July 20th
again this day come the parties & Township
for Plaintiff & Carpenter & Goodridge for
Defendants & joined issue - after hearing

the evidence & argument it is considered by the court, that Plaintiff has no cause of action. It is therefore ordered that the Defendants recover of the plaintiff their costs in this behalf expended &

State of Illinois
Hamilton County

J. W. Marshall clerk
of the County Court in & for said County
Certify the foregoing to a correct transcript
of the judgment & proceedings had before the
County court of said county in the above in-
titled cause

Summons stamp
to the amount
of 5 cents
on this cert

In Testimony whereof I have here-
unto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court at Moline
This 20th day of Sept 1864

J. W. Marshall Clerk

Filed October 10th 1864

G. W. Burton Clerk

Summons Issued out of the circuit court
on appeal on the 20th day of September 1864
which summons is in the following words
and figures to wit

The State of Illinois³³
 Hamilton County

The People of the State
 of Illinois to the Sheriff of Hamilton
 County Greeting: We command you to
 summon Brauson York and Romely -
 J York Administrator of Eli York deceased if they may
 be found in your county personally to be
 and appear before the Circuit Court of
 Hamilton County on the second day of the
 Term (the day on which the suit is set
 tried) to be helden at McLeansboro on the
 3^d Monday of October 1864 next there and
 there to prosecute a certain suit brought
 into our said court by appeal from the judgment
 of the County Court of said County where
 John Davis Administrator of Bashaba York
 Deed is Plaintiff and Brauson York & Romely
 J York Administrators of Eli York deceased
 are defendants; in which suit judgment was rendered
 in favor of the Defendants for five dollars and ten
 cents cost of suit and have you there this
 writ with an endorsement in what manner
 you shall have executed the same.

Witness G W Burton Clerk of said
 Court and the seal thereof at McLeansboro
 in said County this 20th day of Sept
 AD 1864. G W Burton

on which said summons is the following
endorsement of file marks " filed 2.
and count this 10th day of October A D 1864

G W Burton Clerk

which summons was returned with the
following endorsement to wit

State of Illinois
Hamilton County

I have duly served this writ
by reading the same to Branson York &
Romelia J York Adm & re

This 24th day of September A D 1864

P M Bowers Sheriff

Copy of ac filed in the cause
The Estate of Eli York Decedent

To

John Davis administrator of the estate of
1864 Bashela York Dr

" necessary bed bedstead & bedding for self and family	\$100.00
" necessary household and kitchen furniture	200.00
" one Spinning wheel	5.00
" one Loom and its appendages	25.00
" " one pair of cards	3.00
" " stove and the necessary pipe therefor	40.00
" the weaving apparel for self and family	
" one milk cow and calf	30.00
" one hors	40.00
" woman's saddle & Bridle	15.00
Provision for self and family for one year	300.00

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" to 8 sheep	25.00
" 8 fleeces of wool	16.00
" Food for stock six month	70.00
" fuel for self and family for 3 months	20.00
" other property	<u>6.00</u>
	843.00

filed 15th augt 1864

J W Marshall Clerk

whereupon proceedings were had in said circuit court as follows to wit:

United States of America
State of Illinois
Hamilton County

at a regular term of
the Circuit Court of said county of
Hamilton begun and holden at the
Court house in M Graysboro in said
county of Hamilton on Monday the 17th
day of October AD 1864 it being
the third Monday in said Month

Present the Hon Silas L Bryan Judge

Attest G W Burton

B M Bowers - Sheriff

G W Burton - Clerk

Hamilton Circuit Court Record fourth day
October 20th Term 1864

John Davis Administrator of the
estate of Barbara York Deceased
vs

Braunton York & Bowely of York
Administrator of the estate of Eli York deceased

And now comes
the plaintiff and defendants with their attorney
and join issue and the cause submitted to
the court on the evidence and court being
fully advised order and decrees that the plaintiff
have and recover a judgment against the
defendants for the sum of two hundred and
fifty six Dollars and all the costs in and
about this suit by them expended to be
paid by said Administrators in the due course
of Administration. Then comes the defendant
and prays an Appeal which is granted by
said defendants filing an appeal Bond
within 30 days from this date in the Penalty
of five hundred Dollars, to be approved by
the Clerk of this Court and further that the
Bill of exceptions at Supreme Court in
November may then be signed at Mt Vernon and
the defendants also prays a new trial which
was overruled &c

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois
on appeal Bond was filed in the said Circuit
Court on the 19th day of November 1864 which
appeal Bond is in the words and figures to wit

Know all men by these presents that we the
undersigned Brauron York, Romeoey J York
Administrators of the estate of Eli York
Deed and Draw B York of the County of
Hamilton in the State of Illinois, are held
and firmly bound unto John Davis
Administrator of the estate of Bashabs York
Deed, in the penal sum of five hundred
Dollars lawful money of the United States
for the payment of which well and truly
to be made we bind our selves our
executors and administrators jointly severally
and firmly by these presents. Witness our
hands and Seals this 19th day of November 1864

The condition of the above obligation
are such that whereas the said John Davis
Plaintiff, on the 24th Day of October 1864 in
the Circuit Court of the County of Hamilton
in said State of Illinois, at the October Term
thereof recover judgment against the above
bounden Brauron York and Romeoey J York
Administrators of Eli York Deed Defendants
in an action at law for the sum of

hundred and forty six Dollars and costs
of suit, from which judgment the said
Branson and Romley of York have taken
Appeal to the Supreme Court, of the State
of Illinois. Now if the above bondmen —
Branson York and Romley of York, shall
duly prosecute their Appeal and shall pay
said Judgment, costs interest and dam-
ages in case the said Judgment shall be
affirmed, the above obligation to be void —
Otherwise to remain in full force and effect

Branson York Seal
Romley of York Seal
Iram B York Seal

Approved 19th day of November AD 1864
J.W. Burton Clerk

Approved also by me

Silas L. Bryan Proctor J.P.

Filed in my office November 19th AD 1864

J.W. Burton - Clerk

Bill of exceptions filed in said circuit court on
the 24th day of December 1864 which bill of
exceptions is in the following words & figures to wit

John Davis Administrator of the estate

of Barbara York Deceased, vs, Brauson
York and Remely J York administrators
of Eli York Deceased.

In the circuit court of
Hamilton County State of Illinois

Appeal from the Probate Court of the County
of Hamilton in the said State

~~This was a claim presented in the Probate court by the Plaintiff against the Defendants for the recovery of the value of the specific articles of property allowed by the statute to the widow of persons dying intestate.~~

The cause came on for hearing at the October Term of the said Circuit Court AD 1864, and was by agreement of parties tried by the Honorable Silas Bryan presiding judge Pro Temp, without the intervention of a jury.

Jesse Malone was produced and sworn on the part of the Plaintiff by whom he proposed to prove the value of the specific articles allowed by the laws of Illinois to widows of persons dying intestate and Defendant objected to all evidence proving or tending to prove the value of said articles, the court overruled the objection.

admitted the testimony and the defendant then and there excepted to the said ruling of the Court, and the admission of said testimony.

The said witness being examined stated that a bed and bedding to which the widow was entitled under the statute in cases where it was allowed would be worth forty dollars. Household furniture twenty five to thirty dollars. Spinning wheel four dollars Loom eight dollars, and pair of card two dollars. Stove & Pipe twenty to twenty five dollars. Milk Cow and Calf twenty to twenty five dollars Saddle and Bridle twenty to twenty five dollars Provisions for herself forty dollars Two Sheep four dollars. Feed for said stock eighteen to twenty dollars and fuel three dollars He further stated that the said Baskaba York was the Widow of Eli York deceased, and that she died on the third day of July A.D. eighteen hundred and Sixty three and that she had no family living with her at the date of her death and also that Eli York died on the twenty third day of June A.D. eighteen hundred and Sixty three Lewis L. Moore a witness for the Plaintiff was produced and sworn by whom it was proposed to prove the same facts as by the former witness and the Defendants objected to the introduction of all testimony.

for that purpose,

The Court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony whereupon the defendant then and there excepted to the said ruling.

The said witness being examined testified as follows - that a bed and bedding would be worth forty Dollars Household and Kitchen furniture twenty five to thirty dollars Spinning wheel four to six dollars. a Loom eight to ten dollars, one pair of card two to three dollars, Stove and pipe twenty to twenty five dollars, Pitch Cow and calf twenty five dollars, Sall and Bridle fifteen to twenty dollars provisions forty dollars, two sheep four dollars, feed for stock eighteen to twenty dollars and guel three to five dollars which was all the testimony offered on the part of the Plaintiff and to all of which the Defendants then and there excepted. It was admitted on the trial by the parties Plaintiff and defendant as a matter of evidence in the cause, that the said widow had no children by the said Eli York deceased and that she had no family living with her at the date of her death any children under twenty one years of age.

The Defendants then offered in evidence

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the records of the Probate Court of the said
County which were admitted and which
shows that Eli York died intestate on the
twenty third day of June in the year A.D.
eighteen hundred and sixty three and that
letters of administration were granted by
the said Court on his estate on the eleventh
day of July A.D. eighteen hundred and sixty
three to the Defendants which facts were on
trial admitted by the Plaintiff to be correct,
see copy of record attached, the same record
also shows that Barbara York widow of
the said Eli York died intestate on the third
day of July A.D. eighteen hundred and sixty three
before her husband's estate was administered upon
and that letters of administration were by
the said Court granted to the Plaintiff on
her estate on the eleventh day of July A.D.
eighteen hundred and sixty four which fact
were also admitted by the Plff to be true —
see copy of the record hereto attached —
and that no other letters of administra-
tion were ever granted upon the estate
of either of said decedents, and this was
all the evidence offered or given in the cause

the court entered a judgment for the Plaintiff
and against the defendants for the sum of

two hundred and forty six dollars with costs
to which judgment the Deft by his counsel then and
there excepted, whereupon the Defendants moved
the Court for a new trial and also in arrest
of judgment, which motions the court overruled
and the defendant then and there excepted
to said ruling of the court and prayed that
this their Bill of exceptions might be signed
by the said judge, and made a part of the
record in the said cause, which is according
by done, at the same time, at the said place
of the said Court

Silas L. Brown ^{Att.}
Judge 2^d judicial Circuit 3^d pr.
Sitting with 12th circuit L

Filed in Hamilton Circuit Court
December 24th A.D. 1864

R. W. Townshend
Clerk

State of Illinois ³³
Hamilton County

The People of the State of Illinois
To all to whom these presents shall come:
Greeting; — Know ye that whereas John
abu York of the aforesaid County aforesaid
State died intestate on or about

day of July A.D 1863, being the time
 of her decease Personal Property in the same
 which may be lost, destroyed or diminished
 in value, if speedy care be not taken of
 the same. To the end thereof that, said
 property and debt may be collected and
 preserved for those who shall appear to have
 a legal right or interest therein, we do
 hereby appoint John Davis - of the aforesaid
 County and State. Administrator of all
 and Singular the goods chattels, rights credit
 and effects which were of the said Barbara
 York at the time of her decease, with full
 power and authority to secure and collect
 the said property and debts wheresoever the
 same may be found in this state and in
 general to do and perform all other acts,
 which now are or hereafter may be required
 of him by law -

Done by order of the County Court
 of Hamilton County, Illinois at
 the - Term A.D 18

In witness whereof I have here
 unto set my hand and affixed
 the seal of said court at McLe-
 anboro the 1st day of June
 A.D 1864.


 J. W. Marshall - Clerk

Hamilton County Court June Term 1864
 Monday June 20th 1864

Court in session, present Hon J. L. Law
 presiding judge - J. W. Marshall clerk & Co
M. Bowers Sheriff

The Clerk of this Court report that he
 issued Letters to John Davis as Administrator
 of the estate of Bashaba York dec'd (on the
 1st day of June 1864) ordered that the
 Bond of said Administrator be approved, &
 the acts of the Clerk.

State of Illinois }
 Hamilton County }
 { Act now stamp }

J. G. Marshall

J. G. Marshall Clerk of
 the County Court in & for said county
 certify that the foregoing is a true copy
 of the letters issued of Bashaba York
 dec'd also of the order of court subsequently
 made in relation thereto



In testimony whereof I have
 hereunto set my hand and
 affixed my official seal
 being the seal of said court
 this 23rd day of June 1864

J. G. Marshall

Filed in Hamilton Circuit
Decr 24th 1864
R.W. Townshend

State of Illinois^{ss}
Hamilton County

The People of the State of Illinois
To all to whom these presents shall come
- Greeting - Know ye that whereas Eli York
of the aforesaid County and State died inten-
tate on or about the 23rd day of June A.D.
1863 having at the time of his decease -
Personal Property in this State, which may be
lost, destroyed or diminished in value, if
speedy care be not taken of the same -

To the end therefore that said property and
debts may be collected and preserved for
those who shall appear to have a legal
right or interest therein, we do hereby
appoint Brauson York & Romel's
of York of the aforesaid County and State
Administrator of all and singular the Goods
Chattos, Rights & Credits and effect which
were of the Said Eli York -- at the time
of his decease, with full power and authority
to secure and collect the said property and
debts whereverover the same may be found

in this state, and in general to do and perform all other acts which now are or may hereafter be required of them by law done by order of the County Court of Hamilton County Illinois at the town AD 18--

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at M. Franklin the 11th day of July A.D 1863

[Stamp]

J. H. Marshall - Clerk

Hamilton County Court July 3 1863

Monday, July 20th 1863

Court in Session, Present Hon - James Tauer - presiding judge - &c

Came J. H. Marshall Clerk of this Court and reported the following estates Administered upon since last Term - viz -

Estate of Eli York - Amelie J York & Brouson York appointed Administrators, the Bond dated 10th July 1863, (\$6000) Letters prob. the 11th July 1863 - ordered paid

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approved - & the acts of the court never
be confirmed.

State of Illinois
Hamilton County

{ & c. Rec'd stamp }

J. J. Marshall Clerk of the
County Court in & for said County certify that
foregoing is a true copy of the Letters issued to B &
R York as Administrators of the estate of Eli York
deed also of the order of court - subsequently made
in relation thereto

In Testimony whereof I have hereunto
set my hand & affixed the seal of said court at
Wauwatoa this 23rd day of July 1864

J. J. Marshall - Clerk

Filed in Hamilton Circuit Court Dec 24th 1864

R. W. Townshend Clerk

State of Illinois

Hamilton County } Richard W. Townshend Clerk of
of the Circuit Court in and for said County do her-
by certify that the foregoing Transcript of the records,
proceedings & papers had in above cause are truly copied
from the books & files of my office & that the same is a
full & complete copy of the records of the proceedings had
in the said cause,

Given under my hand & seal of said court at my office
in Wauwatoa this 28th Day of October A.D. 1865.

Richard W. Townshend Clerk
for J. J. Marshall - Deputy

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The State of Illinois^D, Hamilton Circuit Court
Hamilton County^M October Term A.D. 1864

John Davis Adm &c

D^r W^m Cork Adm^r

Docketing suit 10, entering appearance of party 10, entering appearance of Atty 20, entering satisfaction of judgment 15, entering final judgment or decree 25, filing papers on appeal 50.	10 30 15 75
Issuing original writ and serving same 10.	40
Filing bill & bill set fee 100, serving bill of cost & copy of same 30, after laying costs 20.	100 30
order for execution 20, Sheriff fees, 210.	230
Swearing to 2 affidavits for Piff 10.	10
County Clerks fees 740, Sheriff fee in Co Court 265, Townshead's clerks fees for making record to Supreme Court 6,80 & certificate & seal 50, copy of per bill & mailing 50.	740 265 680 50 50

Name of Witnesses

L^o Moore

100

1824.15

State of Illinois
Hamilton County

J A W Townshend
of Circuit Court in aid for

22
do hereby certify that the above is a true
and correct copy of the fees in said cause
as appears of the record in my office

In witness whereof I have here-
unto set my hand & the seal
of my office this 28th day of
October AD 1865

J. W. Townshend - Clerk
Randolph Co - W. Va

State of Illinois }
 First Grand Division } In the Supreme Court
 November Term 1865

Branson York and Romelia J.
 York admr of the estate of
 Ely York, decd. appellants } assignment of
 vs. } Errors.
 John Davis, admr of the estate }
 of Basheba York, appellee }

And now the said
 Branson York, and Romelia J. York, appelleants, come and say, that in the record
 and proceedings aforesaid, there is mani-
 fest error in this, to wit,

1st The circuit court erred in giving judgment for appellees, and against appellants.

2nd The circuit court erred in overru-
 ling the motion of appellants for a
 new trial.

Pollock & Marshall
 for appellants.

State of Illinois.
First Grand Division

No 58

Sapraue Court
November Term 1865

John Davis Adm of the
Estate of Basherba York
deed

Atts
Bjanson York & Romely
of York Admrs of
Ely York deed

And the said John Davis
Admr & C ~~Defendant~~ Appellee
& now comes ad says that in
the record a proceeding affixed
there is no error, or ^{of their judgment}
opposed in the manner and form
as above designated.

And therefore beseeches
that the said Judgment may be
affirmed. And that he may
have Judgment for his Costs
and

By R. H. Townshend &
J. A. Tanner & ~~Cass~~
Atts - for Appellee

make
index

Branson York, and
Romecia J. York, administrat⁴⁴ors of the estate of
Ely York. Deed. appelleants.

vs.

John Davis, administrator
of the estate of Bash
aba York, -appellee.

appeal from Hamilton

Filed Nov. 8. 1865.

A. Johnston C.M.

Paid by Judge M. \$500

IN THE SUPREME COURT,

First Grand Division,---State of Illinois.

NOVEMBER TERM, A. D., 1865.

BRANSON YORK and ROMELIA J.
YORK, Administrators of the Estate
of Eli York, Dec'd, Appellants,
vs.
JOHN DAVIS, Administrator of the
Estate of Basheba York, Deceased,
Appellee.

Appeal from Hamilton.

BRIEF.

This is a suit commenced in the Probate Court by the adm'r of the widow to recover of the estate of her husband the value of the specific articles allowed by statute to the widows of persons dying intestate.

The provisions of the statute on which the claim is founded are: "That widows shall be allowed in all cases, in exclusion of creditors, as their sole and exclusive property forever" certain enumerated articles.—Scates' Statutes, p. 1203.

Sec. 5. "The appraisers shall make out and certify to the Court of Probate an estimate of the value of each article of specific property herein allowed to the widow id.

"The widow may elect whether she will take that part of the personal estate to which she may be entitled by right of *dower* or otherwise, out of the articles mentioned in such bill of appraisement, according to the appraised value thereof, or the amount thereof in money. * * * And in all such cases it shall be the duty of the executor or administrator to notify the widow as soon as such appraisement is made, and to set apart to her such article or articles of property as she may prefer or select. * * * Within 30 days after written application shall be made for that purpose by such widow; and if any executor or administrator shall neglect or refuse to comply with the foregoing requisition, when application shall be made for that purpose, he shall forfeit and pay for the use of such widow the sum of twenty dollars per month for each months delay to set apart said property so selected, after the said term of thirty days shall have elapsed, to be recovered in the name of the People of the State of Illinois for the use of such widow. Scates' Statutes, p 1201, sec 88.

The requirement of the statute is that the appraisers shall set apart the property to the widow. But in the case at bar, at the time of the administration there was no widow, and hence a literal compliance with the provisions of the statute by the administrator was impossible.

The appraisers and administrators are not required, and we submit, would have no right to set apart the specific articles of property to the administrator of the widow.

If the administrator of the widow had no right to appear and demand to have the specific articles set apart to him, there is no foundation for the claim here set up.

The widow, by the death of her husband, has a mere naked right to the exempt articles. The *legal title* vests in the personal representative of the husband, and this right does not ripen into a title until the articles are set apart to her.

Willard on executors, p 253-254. Voeckner vs. Hudson, 1 Sandford Sup. C. R., p 215.

"It is clear that the widow could have no right or title to any specific chattel until it had been inventoried and set apart by the appraisers for her use."—Voeckner vs. Hudson, 1 Sandford's Sup. Court R., p 219.

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Bouvier Law Dict., title Legacy, sec. 11. Bacon Abr., Legacy E. Com. Dig. Chan., 3 Y., 13. Willard on Executors, 253-255. Lownd on Leg., chap 12, p 408 to 419. 1 Rap. on Leg., chap 8, p 319 to 341.

The estate granted by the Statute is analogous to the right of the widow to dower in the real estate of her husband, and like it is simply a provision for the personal support of the widow and her infant children. In deed it is called her dower in the Statutes. Seates Statutes, p 1201, sec 88, and page 1203 sec 6.

It is settled that until assignment the right of dower is clearly *inchoate* and the dowress does not even have a right of entry. Hoots vs Graham 23d Ills p 81; and if she dies while she has a suit for dower pending, her representatives cannot have damages assessed. Turney vs Smith 84 Ills 243.

And if this is so in regard to her interest in lands which could be identified immediately on the death of the husband by the widow as easily as by the heir, for a stronger reason shoull it be so in regard to the property in dispute here, for though called specific articles they are not and cannot be identified, and in no sense can the title thereto vest in the widow, until they are appraised and set apart and selected or received by such widow. 1st Sandford Sup C R, p 219.

There are many cases in which an interest similar to the one in controversy is lost by death, as in the case of a husband who had a right to all the personal property of his wife, yet if he fails to reduce the property to possession during lifetime his right is lapsed, and his representatives have no right thereto.

The reason and object of the law fails by the death of the widow immediately after the death of the husband, and before administration on his estate. The provision is for the personal support of the widow and her infant children. But there being no such persons in existence at the time of administration there should be no good reason why the law should stand. The maxim: "*Cessante Ratione legis cessat ipsa lex*," is peculiarly applicable.

But if the widow were still living, we insist that on the case presented there would be no right to recover against the appellants. There is no proof that Ely York, the husband, left one particle of property of any kind, or that there has been any appraisement, or any appraisers appointed. If there was property it was the duty of the Probate Court to appoint appraisers. If this duty is neglected, application should be made to the court to have them appointed. If the appraisers fail to act, proceedings should be instituted to compel them to act, or for the appointment of others. And after the appraisement she must make a selection, and the administrators are not in default until the expiration of thirty days after written application to them by her for such articles. Scates Statutes, p 1201, sec 88.

The burthen of proof was upon the appellee to show facts authorizing a recovery. There must be property—an appraisement—a selection by the widow—a demand in writing by her—and a failure by the administrators for thirty days after such written demand before they are in default. And there is no proof of any of these facts in this case. Scates Stat. p 1201, sec 88.

And even in case of such default the remedy would not be by filing a claim against the estate. See same statute.

Doubtless if there was proof of property, and that the property to which the widow was entitled had been converted into money by the administrators, the Court of Probate might order that the money should be paid to her—even though there had been no appraisement. But this is as far as the courts have gone. Bliss vs Sheldon, 4 Seld. 31.

MARSHALL & POLLOCK, *For Appellants.*

Branson York et al
admr. v.

John Davis, admr.

Brief of appellants

8669

Filed Nov 10/65
W. Johnston
Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS;
First Grand Division November Term A. D. 1865.

ABSTRACT.

Branson York and Romelia J. York
Administrators of the Estate of Ely York. }
Deceased. Appellants } VS.
John Davis Administrator of the estate of
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PAGE 11. Cause tried in Circuit Court of Hamilton County, on appeal from the county court on a claim filed by appellee, as administrator of the estate of Basheba York, against the estate of Eli York, deceased, for the value of the specific articles of property allowed by statute to the widows of persons dying intestate.

PAGE 11. Cause tried by the Court without the intervention of a jury.

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PAGE 13. Said widow (Basheba York) had no children by said Eli, and no family living with her and no children under 21 years of age.

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1st. The Circuit Court erred in giving Judgment for appellee, and against appellants.

2nd. The Circuit Court erred in overruling the motion of appellants for a new trial.

POLLOCK & MARSHALL. for Appellants

Braunson York &
Romelia J. York
vs.

John Davis admr

abstract

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1865

Julie Ann 8.1865
A. Johnston CM
" "

IN THE SUPREME COURT.

First Grand Division,---State of Illinois.

NOVEMBER TERM, A. D., 1865.

BRANSON YORK and ROMELIA J.
YORK, Administrators of the Estate
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vs.
JOHN DAVIS, Administrator of the
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APPELLEE'S BRIEF

The provision of the statute relied upon by the appellee reads as follows: "That widows, living in this State, of persons whose estates are administered upon in this States, shall be allowed in all cases in exclusion of creditors as their sole and exclusive property forever, necessary beds," &c. *Seates' Statute*, page 1203, sec 1. *Lesher vs. Worth*, XIV Ill., 39.

The widow's right to the property vests in her absolutely, the moment the intestate dies. Her title is absolute and is in exclusion of her husband's debts or the claims of any other person whatever. This right at her death vests in her heirs and legal representatives. These specific articles are not regarded as assets in the hands of the administrator of her dece'd husband. On the death of the widow the exempt articles do not fall back into the estate of her deceased husband, but go to her personal representatives. Hastings vs. Myers, 21 Miss (6 Bennett) 519. Willard on Executors, page 257. Kellogg vs. Graves, 5 Indiana (Porter) 509. Sheldon vs. Bliss, 1 V. Seldon 35. Bliss vs. Sheldon, VII Barbour 152. Cross vs. Carey, XXV Ill., 564. Riley vs. Loughrey, XXII Ill., 97. Note D, III P. Williams, 50. Reeve on Descent, 57.

The administrator in this case is the representative of the widow, and it is his duty to collect all claims due the estate of his intestate. Willard on Executors, 267. Bouvier's Institutes, vol. 2, 143.

It is the duty of the adm'r of the deceased husband to set apart to the widow her allowance under the statute. Scates' Statute 1202, sec 5. Sheldon vs. Bliss, IV Seldon 35.

If the adm'r fails to set apart the statutory allowance to the widow, the Probate Court has power to compel the adm'r to pay out of the assets of the estate the value thereof in money. Sheldon vs Bliss, 4th Seldon, 34; Hastings vs Myers, 21 Miss. (6 Bennett) 519.

In this case, the widow having died a few days after her husband, and before the specific property was set apart to her by the adm'r of her deceased husband, the right thereto vested in the adm'r of her estate; and the adm'r of the husband's estate having failed to set apart the specific property to the appellee, but having converted the same he is liable as adm'r for the value thereof. Hastings vs Myers, 21 Miss. (6 Bennett) 519; Kellogg vs Graves, 5 Ind. (Porter) 509; Willard Executors, 257; Sheldon vs Bliss, 4 Sel. 35.

The authorities referred to in appellant's brief are solely applicable to the dower interest of a widow in real estate.

This right of the widow to specific property is not in the nature of real estate dower, but is a right, absolute and definite; whilst a dower is an *inchoate* right, resting in action, ~~and~~ only at the death of the husband, and measured by the duration of the life of widow, even when assigned.

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R. W. TOWNSHEND, TANNER & CASEY,
Attys for Appellees.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
ILLINOIS.

Plaintiff in error vs. Illinois.

Filed, A.D. X. AND REMANDED.

No 40

Braeson York and
Cornelia J York
Adams & Ely York
and

vs

John Davis Adams
re

Appellee's Brief

Filed A.D. 10th 1865
A. Johnson Clerk

1865

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS;
First Grand Division November Term A. D. 1865.

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Administrators of the Estate of Ely York.
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THE GREAT GENEALOGICAL COLLECTION
MERRILLER TURNER A. H. 1865

A. E. LEAVES.

Filed Nov. 8. 1865—

Mr. Johnston Ch.

Branson York and
Romelia J. York adms

vs

John Davis, admr.

abstract

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IN THE SUPREME COURT,

First Grand Division,---State of Illinois.

NOVEMBER TERM, A. D., 1865.

BRANSON YORK and ROMELIA J.
YORK, Administrators of the Estate
of Eli York, Dec'd, Appellants,
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R. W. TOWNSHEND, TANNER & CASEY,
Att'y's for Appellees.

The bill of exceptions to judgments, in not containing a copy of the records of the Probate Court, the existence of assets was shown by the intoduction of the instrument, hence should the record in this Court take the place of the record below, the cause should be remanded -

IN THE ESTATE COURT.

IN CHARGE DIVISION--Estate of Eliot.

RECEIVED IN THE ESTATE COURT

No 40

Branston York and
Romelia J York
Admrs of the Estate
& Eli York decd

vs

John Davis Am
of the Estate of
Pashoba York decd
Bulb & Appellee

Sixth Novr 10' 1865-

N. Johnston Clark

IN THE SUPREME COURT,

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NOVEMBER TERM, A. D., 1865.

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And if this is so in regard to her interest in lands which could be identified immediately on the death of the husband by the widow as easily as by the heir, for a stronger reason should it be so in regard to the property in dispute here, for though called specific articles they are not and cannot be identified, and in no sense can the title thereto vest in the widow, until they are appraised and set apart and selected or received by such widow. 1st Sandford Sup C R, p 219.

There are many cases in which an interest similar to the one in controversy is lost by death, as in the case of a husband who had a right to all the personal property of his wife, yet if he fails to reduce the property to possession during lifetime his right is lapsed, and his representatives have no right thereto.

The reason and object of the law fails by the death of the widow immediately after the death of the husband, and before administration on his estate. The provision is for the personal support of the widow and her infant children. But there being no such persons in existence at the time of administration there should be no good reason why the law should stand. The maxim: "*Cessante Ratione legis cessat ipsa lex*," is peculiarly applicable.

But if the widow were still living, we insist that on the case presented there would be no right to recover against the appellants. There is no proof that Ely York, the husband, left one particle of property of any kind, or that there has been any appraisement, or any appraisers appointed. If there was property it was the duty of the Probate Court to appoint appraisers. If this duty is neglected, application should be made to the court to have them appointed. If the appraisers fail to act, proceedings should be instituted to compel them to act, or for the appointment of others. And after the appraisement she must make a selection, and the administrators are not in default until the expiration of thirty days after written application to them by her for such articles. Scates Statutes, p 1201, sec 88.

The burthen of proof was upon the appellee to show facts authorizing a recovery. There must be property—an appraisement—a selection by the widow—a demand in writing by her—and a failure by the administrators for thirty days after such written demand before they are in default. And there is no proof of any of these facts in this case. Scates Stat. p 1201, sec 88.

And even in case of such default the remedy would not be by filing a claim against the estate. See same statute.

Doubtless if there was proof of property, and that the property to which the widow was entitled had been converted into money by the administrators, the Court of Probate might order that the money should be paid to her—even though there had been no appraisement. But this is as far as the courts have gone. Bliss vs Sheldon, 4 Seld. 31.

MARSHALL & POLLOCK, *For Appellants.*

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~~Branson York et al~~
admits.

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John Davis admr

appellants' Brief

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