

No. 11960

Supreme Court of Illinois

Woodbury.

vs.

Frink, Impleaded.

71641  7

Be it remembered that heretofore, to wit, on the twenty fourth day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty, there was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Peoria County in the State of Illinois a declaration in the words and figures following, to wit:

State of Illinois, }
County of Peoria, set }
Declaration

In the Circuit Court
August Term A.D. 1850.

Charlotte A. Woodbury complains of John Trunk,
Martin C. Walker, Benjamin H. Addcox, & Aaron P.
Burnell and Lorenzo P. Sanger of a plea of trespass on
the case on promises, for that whereas the said defendants
before and at the time of the making of his said promises
and undertakings hereinafter mentioned were common
carriers of goods and chattels for hire in and by a certain
Stage Coach from a certain place, to wit: from the City of
Peoria in the county aforesaid to a certain other place, to wit:
to the City of Springfield in the State aforesaid, to wit: at
Peoria aforesaid and the said defendants being such
carriers as aforesaid, the said plaintiff heretofore to wit: on the
twentieth day of September A.D. one thousand eight hun-
dred and forty seven at Peoria aforesaid at the special
instanced and request of the said defendants caused to be
delivered to the said defendants so being such carriers
as aforesaid at Peoria aforesaid, certain goods and chattels
to wit: a traveling Trunk packed full of young ladies
clothes, to wit: dresses, aprons, chemises, caps, capes,
collars, handkerchiefs, bonnets, shoes, hosiery &c of the
said plaintiff of great value, to wit: of the value of one
hundred dollars to be taken care of and safely and
securely carried and conveyed by the said defendants,
as such carriers as aforesaid in and by the said Stage Coach

from Peoria City aforesaid to Springfield aforesaid and
there, to wit: at Springfield aforesaid to be safely and
securely delivered by the said defendants for the said plain-
tiff and in consideration thereof and of certain reward to the
said defendant in that behalf, they the said defendants,
being such carriers as aforesaid, then and there, to wit: on
the day and year aforesaid at Peoria aforesaid undertook
and faithfully promised the said Plaintiff to take care of the
said goods and chattels and safely and securely to carry
and convey the same in and by the said Stage Coach
from said City of Peoria to said City of Springfield and
there, to wit: at said Springfield safely and securely
to deliver the same for the said plaintiff and although
the said defendant as such carrier as aforesaid, then and
there had and received the said goods and chattels for
the purpose aforesaid, yet the said defendants notwithstanding
their duty as such carriers nor their said promise
and undertaking so made as aforesaid but continuing
and fraudulently intending craftily and subtly to deceive
and injure the said plaintiff in this behalf, hath not
taken care of the said goods and chattels or safely and se-
curely carried or conveyed the same from said Peoria to said
Springfield aforesaid nor have they to wit: at Springfield
aforesaid safely or securely delivered the same for the
said plaintiff but on the contrary thereof, they the said defen-
dants being such carriers as aforesaid so carelessly and
negligently behaved and conducted themselves with res-
pect to the said goods and chattels aforesaid, that by
~~respect~~ reason and through the mere carelessness, negli-
gence and improper conduct of the said defendants and
their servants in this behalf, the said goods and chattels
being of the value aforesaid, afterwards to wit the day
and year aforesaid at Peoria aforesaid, became and were

wholly lost to the said Plaintiff, to wit at Peoria aforesaid
to the damage of said Plaintiff one hundred dollars and
therefore she sees fit. Said plaintiff further avers that
she resides in said county of Peoria and that said cause
of action arose in said county. ~~b~~ Ballance for Plaintiff.

And afterwards at the March Term of said court A.D. 1851, the
following proceedings were had in said court, to wit,

Tuesday March 4th A.D. 1851

Rule for rule to plead. Charlotte of Woodbury,

vs

Assumpsit.

John Snink & Martin & Walker & others.

This day came the plaintiff
by Ballance her attorney and entered a motion for a rule on
the defendants to plead to this action by the opening of court
to-morrow morning.

Wednesday March 5th A.D. 1851

Rule to plead. Charlotte of Woodbury

vs

Assumpsit.

John Snink & others.

This day came on to be heard the motion
of the Plaintiff for a rule on the defendants to plead to this action,
whereupon it is ordered that the defendants plead to this
action by Saturday morning next.

And afterwards on the eighth day of March A.D. 1851 the defendant
Snink filed his plea in said cause in the words & figures following, to wit,

Plea - Charlotte of Woodbury

vs

Peoria Circuit Court.

John Snink & others

March Term A.D. 1851.

And said defendant John Snink by H. O. B.

A. S. Meeninan his attorney comes and defends the wrong
and injury when &c and says he is not guilty of the said
supposed grievances above laid to his charge and of this he
puts himself upon the county &c. H. C. & A. S. Meeninan

Atty's.

And Plaintiff doth the like — & Ballancee.

And afterwards at the August Term of said court A.D. 1851 the following
proceedings were had in said cause in said court, to wit,

Thursday August 28th A.D. 1851
Charlotte et Woodbury,
vs Assumpsit
John Knirk & others.

This day came the plaintiff and
withdrew his demurrer to the plea filed herein.

And on the same twenty eighth day of August A.D. 1851 the defendant
Knirk filed his plea in said cause in the words & figures following, to wit,

Plea — Charlotte et Woodbury,
vs Peoria Circuit Court
John Knirk & als. August Term A.D. 1851.

Held defendant Knirk comes and de-
fends the wrong & injury when &c & says that he did not
undertake or promise in manner and form as said
plaintiff hath above declared against & of this he puts
himself upon the county. H. C. & A. S. Meeninan

Defts Atty's

And Plaintiff doth the like — & Ballancee.

Proceedings at a Circuit Court begun and held at the Court House in the City of Peoria in and for the county of Peoria in the State of Illinois on the second Monday of November in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty one, it being the tenth day of the month, Present the Honorable William Kellogg Judge of the tenth Judicial Circuit in the State of Illinois, to wit:

Thursday November 13th A.D. 1851

trial. Charlotte v Woodbury

vs

John Irwin, impleaded with
Martin Walker, Benjamin Haddock,
Aaron Burnell & Lorenzo Fanger.

This day came the Plaintiff by Charles Ballance her attorney and the said John Irwin by Hollenman his attorney and issues being joined, it is ordered by the court that a Jury be empannelled to try said issue whereupon came a Jury of twelve good and lawful men to wit: Royce Allen, Matthew G. Wells, James Clark, Ivory Butler, William C. Stevens, Rufus H. Bishop, Amri Dunn, Mountain Watkins, William Robinson, Lewis Meear, Isaac Pratt and J Van Buskirk who being duly chosen tried and sworn, well and truly to try the issue joined and a true verdict give according to evidence upon their oaths do say, We of the Jury do find for the defendant John Irwin. Whereupon the Plaintiff entered a motion to set aside the verdict herein and grant a new trial because 1st the Court erred in instructing the Jury as moved by the defendant. 2nd The Court erred in refusing to instruct the Jury as moved by the Plaintiff. 3rd The verdict is contrary to the evidence in the case.

No: to set aside verdict,

Tuesday November 18th A.D. 1851

judgment:

Charlotte A Woodbury,

vs

Assumpsit.

John Snitt, Martin Walker,

Benjamin Haddock, Aaron Burnell,

Lorenzo Sanger.

This day came on to be heard the motion for a new trial in this cause and the court being fully advised in the premises overruled said motion.

Therefore it is considered that the said John Snitt go hence without day and have and recover of the said Charlotte A Woodbury his costs & charges by him about his defense in this behalf expended and that she have execution therefor: It is agreed between the parties by their respective attorneys that the Bill of Exceptions in this case may be settled and signed by the court in vacation.

And afterwards on the twenty first day of November in the year 1851, the following Bill of exceptions was filed in said cause, to wit:

Bill of exceptions:

Charlotte A Woodbury,

vs

Nov 21st A.D. 1851

John Snitt et al.

Be it Remembered that on the trial of this cause the Plaintiff to maintain issued on her part introduced without objection, except as to the fourth cross-interrogatory & answer thereto which was not read to the Jury by either party, the deposition of Greenleaf A. Woodbury, which is as follows:

Charlotte A Woodbury vs John Snitt & als. In Peoria Circuit Court — The deposition of Greenleaf A. Woodbury a witness produced and sworn on part of said plaintiff

Proceedings at a Circuit Court begun and held at the Court House in the City of Peoria in and for the county of Peoria in the State of Illinois on the second Monday of November in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty one, it being the tenth day of the month, Present the Honorable William Kellogg Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in the State of Illinois, to wit:

Thursday November 13th A.D. 1851

trial - Charlotte v Woodbury

vs

John Knobell, impleaded with
Martin Waller, Benjamin Haddock,
Aaron Burnell & Lorenzo Fanger.

This day came the Plaintiff by Charles Tallance her attorney and the said John Knobell by Hollenmann his attorney and issues being joined, it is ordered by the court that a Jury be empannelled to try said issues whereupon came a Jury of twelve good and lawfule men, to wit: Royce Allen, Matthew G. Wells, James Clark, Ivory Butler, William C. Stevens, Rufus H. Bishop, Amri Dunn, Mountain Watkins, William Robinson, Lewis Meear, Isaac Pratt and J Van Buskirk who being duly chosen tried and sworn, well and truly to try the issues joined and a true verdict give according to evidence upon their oaths do say, We of the Jury do find for the defendant John Knobell. Whereupon the Plaintiff entered a motion to set aside the verdict herein and grant a new trial because 1st the Court erred in instructing the Jury as moved by the defendant. 2nd The Court erred in refusing to instruct the Jury as moved by the Plaintiff. 3rd The verdict is contrary to the evidence in the case.

No: to set aside verdict.

Proceedings at a Circuit Court begun and held at the Court House in the City of Peoria in and for the county of Peoria in the State of Illinois on the second Monday of November in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty one, it being the tenth day of the month, Present the Honorable William Kellogg Judge of the tenth Judicial Circuit in the State of Illinois, to wit:

Thursday November 13th A.D. 1851

trial. Charlotte v Woodbury

vs

John Irvin R, impleaded with
Martin Walker, Benjamin Haddock,
Aaron Burnell & Lorenzo Fanger.

This day came the Plaintiff by Charles Ballance her attorney and the said John Irvin R by Hollenman his attorney and issues being joined, it is ordered by the court that a Jury be empannelled to try said issue whereupon came a Jury of twelve good and lawfule men to wit: Royce Allen, Matthew G. Wells, James Clark, Ivory Butler, William C. Stevens, Rufus H. Bishop, Amri Dunn, Mountain Watkins, William Robinson, Lewis Meear, Isaac Pratt and S Van Buskirk who being duly chosen tried and sworn, well and truly to try the issue joined and a true verdict give according to evidence upon their oaths do say, We of the Jury do find for the defendant John Irvin R. Whereupon the Plaintiff entered a motion to set aside the verdict herein and grant a new trial because 1st the Court erred in instructing the Jury as moved by the defendant. 2nd The Court erred in refusing to instruct the Jury as moved by the Plaintiff. 3rd The verdict is contrary to the evidence in the case.

No: to set aside verdict.

taken by agreement of parties, notice of taking the same
being waived by defendants counsel, Said Woodbury being
sworn deposes and says that he is the Brother of Plaintiff
that the Pet went to Springfield to accompany her Sister home
in the fall of the year 1827 who was at that time living in
Springfield after her arrival there she concluded to spend the
Winter there and wrote this deponent requesting him to
send her her trunk and clothes to be sent to her directed to
her to the care of Isaac L. Britton and to be left at the
American House, Springfield agreeable to her request this depo-
nent with his wife packed her clothes into her trunk and
took the same with Ira A Barnes to Peoria where there saw
Mr R. D. Earl the defendants agent at Peoria and made
an agreement with him to carry the said trunk to Spring-
field for the sum of one dollar he requested this deponent
to leave the said trunk at the Clinton House and before
leaving it this deponent went and got either one or two
labels and which this deponent cannot now remember
which and marked said label or labels with Pen & Ink
in large plain letters as follows as near as he can remember
Miss C. A. Woodbury care of Isaac L. Britton Springfield Ill.
to be left at the American House, the said label or labels
were by this deponent securely nailed upon the end or
ends of said trunk he then took said trunk to the said
Clinton House and left the same with the person that had
charge of the house or barr and requested him to put the same
with the Springfield Baggage which was done, the contents
of said trunk and the value of the same this deponent
cannot give the a list of the same but that the contents
consisted of wearing apparel and other articles such as a
young woman would generally have the wearing apparel
composed the main body of the articles in the trunk said
trunk was a New Leather traveling trunk some 26 or 28

inches in length, the said Trunk was filled to its utmost capacity, so much so that some few articles that Plaintiff wanted could not be put into said Trunk, the deponent would say that as regards the value of said Trunk and contents it is hard to arrive at but having had some nearly twenty years experience in the purchase and selling of Dry Goods he would say that in his belief said Trunk and contents were ~~as~~ worth at least Seventy five dollars.

Cross Interrogatories

- 1 Please name the articles in said Trunk & the value of the same specifically.
The contents principally consisted of Dresses made of Silk, Cotton & Linen and under clothes with a shawl or Shawls & handkerchiefs &c &c as to the value of each article I am unable to give specifically.
- 2 Please give a full and particular description of said Trunk.
The Trunk I should judge was either 26 or 28 inches long covered with BLK leather and nailed with Brass Stails & I believe the corners were covered with plated brass, the top of said Trunk was a regular Bellows top.
- 3 State the time said Trunk was left at the Clinton House in Peoria as aforesaid.
I think it was during the Term of Circuit Court of Peoria County for the fall of 1847 this deponent cannot give the date but think it was in the month of October.
- 4 Was the freight on said Trunk to Springfield paid by you or plaintiff.
I think it was to be paid at Springfield on the delivery of the same.

taken by agreement of parties, notice of taking the same
being waived by defendants counsel, Said Woodbury being
sworn deposes and says that he is the Brother of Plaintiff
that the Pet went to Springfield to accompany her Sister home
in the fall of the year 1827 who was at that time living in
Springfield after her arrival there she concluded to spend the
Winter there and wrote this deponent requesting him to
send her her trunk and clothes to be sent to her directed to
her to the care of Isaac L. Britton and to be left at the
American House, Springfield agreeable to her request this depo-
nent with his wife packed her clothes into her Trunk and
took the same with Ira A Barnes to Peoria where there saw
W^m R D. Earl the defendants agent at Peoria and made
an agreement with him to carry the said Trunk to Spring-
field for the sum of one dollar he requested this deponent
to leave the said Trunk at the Clinton House and before
leaving it this deponent went and got either one or two
labels and which this deponent cannot now remember
which and marked said label or labels with Pen & Ink
in large plain letters as near as he can remember
Miss C. A. Woodbury care of Isaac L. Britton Springfield Ill.
to be left at the American House, the said label or labels
were by this deponent securely nailed upon the end or
ends of said Trunk he then took said Trunk to the said
Clinton House and left the same with the person that had
charge of the house or barr and requested him to put the same
with the Springfield Baggage which was done, the contents
of said Trunk and the value of the same this deponent
cannot give the a list of the same but that the contents
consisted of wearing apparel and other articles such as a
young woman would generally have the wearing apparel
composed the main body of the articles in the trunk said
Trunk was a black leather traveling trunk some 26 or 28

6 Did the plaintiff at the time said Trunk was left at Peoria aforesaid or during the winter or spring following own or possess a trunk similar to the one above mentioned? I am unable to say from the fact she lived at Springfield and this deponent in the west part of this county.

7 What was the value of the Trunk above mentioned and did you have in your family either at the time above mentioned or since a Trunk like the one in dispute? I should say the value of said Trunk was from \$5 to 7 dollars and have had no Trunk in my family of that description since. G W M. Woodbury

[Subscribed & sworn to before]

me this 17th 1851.

Jacob Hale, clerk.

He then proved that the defendants were partners in the business of carrying persons and parcels of goods between Peoria and Springfield as stated in said deposition and said Carl was their agent at the time of his receiving said Trunk of goods and this was all the evidence in the cause. Plaintiff then moved the court to instruct the jury as follows; that if they believe from the evidence that the Trunk and Goods in the declaration mentioned were delivered to the agent of the defendants to be delivered in Springfield to said Plaintiff the burden of proof is on the defendants to prove that said goods were delivered and failing to do so the plaintiff is entitled to recover. C T Ballance.

which motion the court overruled and said instruction was not given to said Jury.

Defendant Trunk then moved the court to instruct the Jury as follows: That the burden of proof of the non-delivery of the Trunk at the place of delivery is on the plain-

tiff and until the plaintiff has shown some evidence that said Trunk was not delivered the defendant is not required to produce any evidence that it was so delivered, in order to sustain his defense.

Which motion the court sustained and gave said instruction to the jury, to which decisions of said court plaintiff then and then excepted and prayed that this his exception be sealed and made of record which which is done.

W^m Kellogg [Seal]

State of Illinois

Pekin county I Jacob Gale clerk of the circuit court in and for the county of Pekin in the State of Illinois do hereby certify that that the foregoing is correctly copied from the record of proceedings in said court in a certain cause therein at common law wherein Charlotte A. Woodbury is plaintiff and John Grink impleaded with Martin Walker, Benjamin Haddock, Aaron Burnett and Lorenzo P. Sanger is defendant as the same remains of record and on file in my office.

In testimony whereof I hereby set my hand and the seal of said court at Pekin this eleventh day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty two -

Jacob Gale, clerk.

Transcript fees for copy of do. \$2.75-}

certificate to do 25- } \$3.00

Received payment of plaintiff
by Charles Battani -

Jacob Gale, clerk.

I do hereby certify that the fourth cross-interrogatory and the answer thereto omitted above to be inserted in the deposition of Greenleaf M. Woodbury copied into the Bill of exceptions in said cause is in the words and figures following. to wit

"Q. When did you first learn that said trunk was not received by said plaintiff and if by letter from her please attach such letter to your deposition? This defendant cannot give the exact time, but thinks that in a few weeks after he left the trunk he rec'd a letter from either the plaintiff or Isaac L. Britton of Springfield informing him that said trunk had not arrived, but cannot attach said letter to this deposition from the fact that the letter is now at this defendant's residence in Kane county Ill. if said letter has not been lost or mislaid."

And I further certify that the said interrogatory is in the handwriting of H. O. Morrison Esq and the answer in the handwriting of Greenleaf M. Woodbury as I believe.

I also certify that the Bill of Exceptions is in the handwriting of Charles Ballance Esq except the following "Except as to the fourth cross-interrogatory and answer thereto which was not read to the Jury by either party." which is in the handwriting of H. O. Morrison Esq as I believe and is attached to the Bill of Exceptions on a slip of paper by a wafer.

In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said court at Peoria this seventh day of June AD 1852.

Jacob Gale, Clerk.

Plaintiff by Ballance her attorney says that in the record and proceedings of record is manifest error in this to wit 1st Said court erred in withholding from said jury the instructions asked for by said plaintiff

2nd Said court erred in giving said instructions asked for by said defendant

3^d Said court erred in refusing to set aside said verdict and give said plaintiff a new trial

4th Said judgement ought to have been for said plaintiff and not for said defendant

C. Wallace

And the said defendant in error comes
and says that there are no such errors in
the record & proceeding of said cause as
are alleged nor any nor either of them -

Manning for defendant

People

Charlotte H. Moultrie
Laws.
John Finch simple

57

Defence

Filed June 10th 1852.
J. Island Clerk
N.Y.C. Island Reg.

1852

11960

Pekin June 8 1852

Lorenzo Leclerc Esq

Please receive inclosed the record in the
case of C. A. Woodbury et al. vs. John Frink et al. and send on
prompt to Pekin and for fear Mr. Frink shall have left here
for Chicago send one also to Cook county. You will also find
inclosed a five dollar bill to be credited on account of your fees.

211960-3

Yours in haste
C. Bellcorner

C. A. Woodbury
vs.
John Frink in the
Principle

Filed June 10th 1852
Delaware Ct
by F. K. Deland & Son,

Charlotte A Woodbury

vs 3rd Error to Perma

John Frink

This was a trespass brought by the appellant, against the appellee and others, as common carriers, for the value of a trunk of goods, delivered to them to be carried from Perma to Springfield. None of the defendants were served with process but Frink, and he alone pleaded. The value of the goods and their delivery to defendants under a promise to take them to Springfield, for a dollar, were proved, but what became of them did not appear. The court instructed the jury that the burden of showing what became of them, or that they were not delivered, was on plaintiff, and upon this instruction the jury found for the defendant, and the court gave judgment accordingly.

To reverse this judgment appellant relies on the following points, and authorities.

1st Plaintiff had her option to bring her action in tort for the negligence, or in trespass on the promise. Orange Bank vs Brown 3 Wend. 368; McColl vs. Forsyth 4 Watts & Sargent 180.

2nd If a promise is relied on, it is trespass although negligence may be charged, and this even if a plea of not guilty be filed. Orange Bank vs Brown above referred to, and Corlett vs Parkington 6 Barn. & Cresp 268.

3rd This being trespass, one of the incidents of that form of action was to throw the burden of proof on the defendant. 1 Phil. Ev. 198; McColl vs Stroth. 119; 5 U.S. Ann. 117 Dig 60; Buckner & Johnson vs. Shause et al. 5 Petole¹⁸³⁹; Platt vs. Hibbard, 7 Cowan 501.

1st There was however some proof of the non-delivery - enough to require from defendants to account for the goods. The 4th interrogatory, ^{asked by defendant} and answer thereto, proves the non-delivery. It is true an effort has been made to keep this out of the record, which effort is so effectually exposed by the certificate of the clerk, at the foot of the record, that plaintiff's counsel confidently hopes it will not succeed. It will be seen that ^{as is} usual the bill of exceptions is in the hand writing of the unsuccessful party's attorney, but there is a rider

found stuck on it, with a paper, in the hand writing of
the defendant's attorney, saying that it was not read to the
jury, and it is left out of the record; but the clerk having
his attention called to it inserted it in the latter part of
the record; and that this question and answer ought to
be in the record is manifest from the fact that the record
has been here for more than a year, subject to the
inspection of the attorneys of the defendant, with the cer-
tificate aforesaid, stating them in the fact; yet they
have not only taken no steps to have it stricken
out of the record, but have by their entire silence on the
subject acquiesced in it.

C. P. Ballance

C. A. Woodbury

no.

John Thimk

Bright

The doctrine as laid down by Greenleaf
on Evidence, 2 vol. sec. 213, and in some other books,
is stated more strongly against the plaintiff as to
the onus probandi, than the cases relied on will
justify, and the error comes by not paying due
regard to the kind of action. In all or nearly all
the cases where the onus is put on the plaintiff,
the action was trespass on the case, and not assump-
sit. I contend that where the promise to carry
and safely deliver, are the cause of action; and
that he did not safely ^{as charged} deliver, the onus is on the
plaintiff to prove that he ^[dost] did receive the article,
and promise, and the onus is on the defendant
to show that he did deliver, or show a good ex-
use for not having done ^{as} like any other suit
on a promise: For instruments to pay money. We
simply show the promise and leave it to the
defendant to prove that he did pay.

It is never, or seldom ever, in the power of the
plaintiff to prove negatively, that defendant
did not deliver the article, but it is always
in the power of the defendant to prove
that he did deliver it, (if it be true,) by his
clerk or servant who did it, or by the
receipt.

In an action for criminal negligence
however, whether ^{the} action be civil or criminal,
some negative proof is required, because
the law will not presume a person guilty of
criminal negligence.

The case of Tucker vs. ~~the~~ Cracker Cracklin, 2 Stark.
Rep. 385, referred to by Greenleaf is not ^{at} all in point.
It went off on a point of variance between the

declaration and proof, as to the place to which the goods were to be carried.

Now does ^{is} the case of Griffith vs. Lee st C. & P. 110.

The point relied on was the notice that the carrier would not be liable for any thing over five pounds. There was however some proof of non delivery which the court say was sufficient, but what have been the consequences had no proof been given, is not stated.

The other authority which he relies on, to next, Doy vs. Ridley 1 Washl. 48 so far from sustaining him, is really against his position. In that case the court say "Had this been an action of assumpsit against the defendants on their contract to deliver the meal at Troy, it might have been sufficient to prove the delivery to the defendants, not call on them to account for it." and the court refer for this doctrine to the same case of Tucker vs. Crooklin.

The case of Fleming vs. Sloane 18 John. 403, is in nowise in point. It was case for fraud in the sale of a negro.

See that is said on the subject in 2 Phillips Eq. 75, is that "Slight evidence of loss of goods will be sufficient on the part of the plaintiff, as by calling the shop keeper who can state that he did not know of the arrival of the parcel, and that he would have known it, if it had arrived, and the same cases of Tucker vs. Crooklin and Griffith vs. Lee, and none others are referred to.

The case of Williams vs. The East India Co. 3 East 142, was simply a suit for putting on board a ship combustible matters without giving notice, and the whole question was as to the notice, and the court

decide that the plaintiffs who aver that it was done without notice, should prove the allegation. But action was for a tort, and not guilty the plea.

The case of *Hannane vs. Small*, 1 Esp. 315, was goods stolen from a trunk.

In the case of *The Orange Bank vs. Brown* 3 Wm. 368, it is said that "The plaintiff has his choice of remedies either to bring a ~~summons~~ or case, and that when one or the other action is adopted it must be governed by its own rules;" but if the party relies on a promise, although he may also state the custom, it shall be treated as a ~~promise~~ *assumpsit*. See beginning of next page.

The case of *McCull vs. Forsyth*, 1, Watts & Layt. 180, is direct on the question as to the option of the plaintiff to sue in case or *assumpsit*, and to be governed accordingly.

In the case of *Corbitt vs. Parkington*, 6 Barn. & Cuff 268 = 13 Com. Law Rep. 170. The action was declared to be *assumpsit* and not case, although there was a plea of not guilty, simply because there was utilized a consideration and promise, as in the present case.

In 1 Phillips 198, the doctrine is laid down which in fact is found in all the books, that the fact must be proved by the party within whose possession the proof is. Here plaintiff cannot know what became of the goods, but defendant can only avoid that knowledge by the commission of "gross negligence" in that event it is his business to find them, or pay for them.

In the case of *McCull vs. Brock*, 5 Stobh. 119 = 5 N.S. Annual Dig. 69, it is said that "In an action against a common carrier it is sufficient for plaintiff to prove that the goods were received by the carrier, and that he has failed to deliver them according to his undertaking. If the carrier cannot show that the loss of the goods has occurred, by one of the excepted perils, he must pay the loss." Proof of negligence is unnecessary.

to charge him and proof of diligence will not excuse him."

In Backman & Johnson vs. Shouse et al. 5 Rawle 187, it is said that "All a plaintiff has to do, in the first instance is to prove the contract and the delivery of the goods, and this throws the burden of proof that the goods were lost on the carrier.

As to this question of the onus probandi the court will please read the instruction of Judge Walworth to the jury, in the case of Platt vs. Hilliard, 7 Cowen 500.

The case of Clark & Co. vs. Spence, sometimes referred to, is badly written, but if it means any thing, it is in my favor rather than against me.

I have examined all the authorities usually referred to by the elementary writers on this subject, but think it unnecessary to take further notice of them except to say that although some remarks in the elementary works (at first blush) may seem to militate against my position, that yet when the cases referred to are read with the distinction between actions ex contractu and in tort kept in the mind, I think my position will be found impregnable.

But one side of the authorities, it seems to me by analogy and reason, I am sustained, beyond a doubt. If I sue a man, and charge that in consideration of \$100 he undertook and faithfully promised to deliver me a certain horse, and that disregarding his promise &c. he did not deliver the horse, does any one doubt that I have made out my case, when I have proved that I paid him the \$100, and in consideration thereof, he promised to deliver the horse? Does any one suppose I have to prove he did not deliver the horse, or what became of him? But should I not rely on the promise of delivery, and sue him in tort for the conversion, injury, abuse or destruction of the horse, so that he was not delivered, the case is equally clear, that I would have to prove

The tort.

A man frequently has his choice of actions, and his reasons for his choice. If in these cases a man brings a sum perit, he has less proof to make, but he must at his peril sue all who are equally liable; whereas if he sue in tort, he will recover although it may turn out that others were equally liable; and inasmuch as it generally difficult, and often impossible to know ^{all} who are liable, it is usual in these cases to sue in tort; and hence doctrines are laid down generally, that only apply to actions in tort.

C. Ballance.

Woolbury
M

Fink

Ballance's
Point & authorities

Print July 12th 1853.
A. Ballance Ch.
By P.H. Allard Esq.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, }
Supreme Court. }

The People of the State of Illinois,

To the Sheriff of the County of Pekin — Greeting:

BECAUSE in the record and proceedings, and also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which was in the circuit court of Pekin — county, before the Judge thereof, between Charlotte A. Woodbury Plaintiff and John Grinnick impleaded with Martin Walker, Benjamin Haddock, Aaron Burnell, & George Danner.

defendant, it is said that manifest error hath intervened, to the injury of the said

Charlotte A. Woodbury —

as we are informed by her complaint, the record and proceedings of which said judgment we have caused to be brought into our Supreme Court of the state of Illinois, at Ottawa, before the justices thereof, to correct the errors in the same, in due form and manner, according to law; therefore we command you, that by good and lawful men of your county, you give notice to the said John Grinnick —

that he be and appear before the justices of our said supreme court, at the ~~next~~ term of said court, to be holden at Ottawa, in said state, on the second Monday in June A.D. 1853, ~~next~~, to hear the records and proceedings aforesaid, and the errors assigned, if he shall see fit; and further to do and receive what said court shall order in this behalf; and have you then there the names of those by whom you shall give the said John Grinnick — notice, together with this writ.

Witness, the Hon. SAMUEL H. TREAT, Chief Justice of our said Court, and the seal thereof, at Ottawa, this 10th day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty two.

G. Leland Clerk of the Supreme Court.

By P. W. Leland Depy. Clk.

Charlotte H. Woodbury
Mrs.
John Trainimphoe
Sci. Fa-

Edward June 29th 1852
A.M.

July 24th 1852.
S. Island Ch.
By P. Island Ch.

Ms. A. 2. 2
15
25

Mr. L. C. Young
of Allentown, Pa.
desires to have some
specimens of the following
which he has been unable
to get from any other source.
He would be very grateful
if you would furnish him
with some specimens of the
following:—
1. A small species of
the genus *Leucostoma*,
with a large central cavity
and a thin skin, which
is easily torn, so that
it can be dried without
losing its form. This
is to be used for
making a small
specimen of the plant
for his collection.

State of Illinois, sc*t*.

WRIT OF ERROR—FREE TRADER PRINT.

The People of the State of Illinois,
To the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the County of Peoria — GREETING :

BECAUSE in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which was in the Circuit Court of Peoria county, before the Judge thereof, between

Charlotte A. Woodbury plaintiff and John Grinnell impleader
with Martin Walker, Benjamin Haddock, Aaron Burnell
& Sonrige Dangar —————

defendant, it is said manifest error hath intervened, to the injury of the aforesaid

Charlotte A. Woodbury —————
as we are informed by her complaint, and we being willing that error, if any there be, should be corrected in due form and manner, and that justice be done to the parties aforesaid, command you that if judgment thereof be given, you distinctly and openly, without delay, send to our Justices of the Supreme Court the record and proceedings of the plaintiff aforesaid, with all things touching the same, under your seal, so that we may have the same before our justices aforesaid at Ottawa, in the county of La Salle, on the 2^d Monday in June A.D. 1853 —————, that the record and proceedings, being inspected, we may cause to be done therein, to correct the error, what of right ought to be done according to law.

WITNESS, the Hon. SAMUEL H. TREAT, Chief Justice of our said Court, and the seal thereof, at Ottawa, this *Truth*
day of *June* in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty two.

S. Leland, Clerk of the Supreme Court.
By P. H. Leland, Depy. Clerk.

211960-12

Charlotte A. Woolbury
vs.
John Trink ^{imple} &c.

Writ of Error.

Filed June 60th 1852.
L. Leland Clk.
By P.W. Leland Dpy.

State of Illinois
Supreme Court
2d Term October
add
Charlotte A. Woodbury

Sept. Brief Point

Action of Assumpsit. for trunk & contents

The proof in this case shows simply an agreement
of Dft's agent to carry Plff's trunk from Peoria to
Springfield, & that the trunk by mutual arrange-
ment was left by Plff's brother at Clinton house
in Peoria with the baggage for Springfield, that
the trunk & contents was worth \$75⁰⁰

Upon this proof the verdict was for the defendant.

The Plaintiff brings the cause to the court, and
applies as error, the instruction given by the court below
that the plaintiff could not recover without proving
the nondelivery of the trunk at Springfield. And a refusal
to instruct the jury that ~~for~~^{on} if they believed from the
evidence that the trunk was delivered to the ^{agent of the} defendant
to be delivered to the plaintiff, in Springfield, that the
burden of proof was on defendants.^{to}

1. The Court properly refused the instruction asked by
the plaintiff below

1st because it is not sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff to recover, that the jury should believe
the trunk was delivered to the agent of defendants to
be carried to Springfield. But the jury should also
have believed from the evidence that the defendants
were carriers. The instruction was therefore erroneous
as it did not embrace all the conditions upon which
the defendants liability depended.

3^o The instruction given by the Court below to the Jury
at the request of the defendants Counsel is not
erroneous.

1. It is alleged that the transit was not delivered
See declaration

2^o Greenleaf Evidence Section 213 If the loss or non-delivery of the goods is alleged the plaintiff must give some evidence in support of the allegation, notwithstanding its negative character

It makes no difference whether the action is in form Angel on law of Assumpsit or case. Some evidence tending to show a Carriers Section 1704. nondelivery must be given by the plaintiff in order to recover & before the defendant can be put upon proof of fulfilment of the contract
Sec 47!

Angels law of carriers Sec 38. In trover a demand and refusal is sufficient on the part of the plaintiff to put the defendant on his defence. But in case of assumpsit the plaintiff must prove his case *prima facie* as charged

Day et al vs Ridg et al 16 Vermont 57
"It is undoubtedly true that he who affirms a fact is usually bound to prove it. And when a culpable neglect or omission or breach of duty is charged, the plaintiff is bound to prove it though he may have to prove a negative."

3^o It is a general principle that a fact not necessary to be proved, need not be alleged. And that which is necessary to be proved must be alleged in pleading.

The plaintiffs declaration in this case would fail to make a cause of action without an allegation of non-delivery

The allegation in the declaration being necessary
to make a cause of action, it is necessary that the
plaintiff should have some evidence to show a
failure to deliver

No proof was given tending to show a
non-delivery. On the contrary the plaintiff relied
upon mere proof of delivery to the deft's agent and
asked the court to declare such evidence sufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to recover.

The judgment should therefore be
affirmed

Manning & H. Smith

For Dft in Error

Salt Spring 14 Court
John Friend at
ad

Charlotte A. Woodbury
Depts Brief & Bonds

7th July 1853.
L. Delancey
By M. Ward Sept.